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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A risk assessment approach was used to: a) define the risk of acquisition of meticillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in pet dogs over a defined time period, b) attempt 
to identify important priority data gaps for future research efforts in this area and c) 
comment on the usefulness of risk assessment in this regard, in a data sparse area and in a 
field in which it has not previously been used.   
 
A conceptual model was defined that identified the potential pathways for acquisition of 
MRSA in a pet dog over any given 24 hours.  A qualitative risk assessment, using 
categorical qualitative estimators and combining estimates using a matrix approach was 
undertaken.  It was found that this approach was unsatisfactory for the specification of this 
biological model that encompassed a non-modular, non-sequential form, characterised by 
non-mutually exclusive pathways of acquisition.  Modification of the categorical 
descriptors enabled a relative, rather than absolute assessment of risk and resulted in the 
conclusion that both veterinary and non-veterinary routes were potentially important for 
the acquisition of MRSA in pet dogs and that family members and staff were likely to be 
the most important sources of the organism in the community and veterinary clinic 
environments respectively.  Given the limitations encountered, a quantitative risk 
assessment was pursued. 
 
Data gaps that were defined within the qualitative risk assessment were addressed through 
dedicated data-collection studies and an expert opinion elicitation exercise.  The studies 
found a lower veterinary environmental and staff prevalence than had previously been 
reported, corroborated prior estimates of dog-dog and dog-human interactions and justified 
the inclusion of dog foods as environmental sources of MRSA rather than independent and 
important sources in their own right.  The expert opinion elicitation exercise used a 
modified technique to obtain numerous estimates relating to prevalence and transmission 
of MRSA.  However, it was found that experts lacked confidence in estimation of 
transmission variables in particular, and the resulting distributions for these variables 
demonstrated divergence between experts and resulted in wide and poorly-informative 
combined distributions. 
 
These results were utilised, along with published and unpublished data, to parameterise a 
second order stochastic simulation-based quantitative risk assessment model.  The model 
produced a biologically plausible outcome and allowed the application of sensitivity 
analyses with the intention of identifying areas of putative importance for future research 
efforts.  The implementation of logistic regression analyses directly to the input/output 
relationship within the simulation model represented a novel application of a variance-
based sensitivity analysis technique in the area of veterinary medicine, and was 
implemented with and without the consideration of interaction terms.  In addition, one-at-a-
time (OAT) and Plackett-Burman (P-B) analyses were also completed.  The results of the 
sensitivity analyses were complicated and ambiguous.  While family members and the 
environment were identified as potentially important independent and non-independent 
sources of MRSA, respectively, it was not possible to discount, or defensibly rank the 
importance of other sources.   
 
In conclusion, it was found that, despite the application of well researched and previously 
utilised methods, marked limitations were encountered in the use of risk assessment to 
address a biologically complex phenomenon that is characterised by sparse data such as 
this.     4
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1.1  Introduction 
 
The review of the literature presented below may be conceptually divided in two sections.  
The first section relates to the methods that are drawn upon within these studies and the 
second presents the literature surrounding the area of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA). 
 
 
1.2  Risk analysis 
 
Risk analysis can be defined as: ‘the quantifying, either qualitatively or quantitatively, of 
the probability and the potential impact of some risk’ (Vose, 2000).   
 
It has been asserted that the origins of risk analysis lie with a group called the Asipu, who 
served as consultants for risky decision-making in 3200BC (Covello and Mumpower, 
1985).  While this group almost certainly represent the first risk consultants, it is reported 
that their data were predominantly of divine origin and as such, the foundation of modern 
data-driven risk analysis is more recent and likely to have been borne out of environmental 
health concerns in the 1960s (Covello and Mumpower, 1985; Thompson et al., 2005).  The 
intended outcome of a modern risk analysis is to provide a repeatable and objective 
assessment of risks that may arise from a particular course of action (MacDiarmid and 
Pharo, 2003).  Risk analysis is common in a number of disciplines, including engineering, 
toxicology, economics and animal health.   
 
The use of risk analysis as a tool in the animal health field is relatively recent and its 
genesis may be directly associated with the implementation of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement) by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in the 1990s (MacDiarmid and Pharo, 2003; OIE, 2006).  The SPS 
agreement requires the removal of trade barriers unless a risk exists to human, animal or 
plant health, along with the demonstration of this risk through a dedicated risk analysis 
(MacDiarmid, 2000).  Thus, this trade agreement advocated the use of risk analysis 
simultaneously to stimulate international trade and protect human and animal health in the 
importing country (MacDiarmid, 2000).  Subsequently, risk analysis techniques have been 
utilised with two main objectives in the field of animal health (MacDiarmid and Pharo, 
2003).  Import risk analysis (IRA) is used to assess the disease or pathogen risk associated   23
with importation of animals, animal products or food (Murray, 2002; OIE, 2003; Peeler 
and Thrush, 2004; Jones et al., 2005) while microbial risk analysis (MRA) is used to 
quantify microbial risk relating to food consumption from an animal source (Alimentarius, 
1999; Hope et al., 2002; Clough et al., 2006).   
 
 
1.2.1 Frameworks for risk analysis 
 
Guidelines for undertaking risk analysis in the area of IRA along with other areas of animal 
health, are published by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) in the form of 
Terrestrial and Aquatic Animal Health Codes (OIE, 2008b; OIE, 2008a), and MRA 
guidelines are published by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), a World Health 
Organisation/Food and Agriculture Organisation (WHO/FAO) body, as a principles and 
guidelines document (CAC, 1999).  The latter of these frameworks is currently under 
revision and extension to include Risk Assessment Guidance regarding foodborne 
antimicrobial resistant microorganisms (FAO/WHO) (CAC, 2009).  
 
While the framework that is used to guide a risk analysis may vary (sections 1.2.1.1 and 
1.2.1.2), the holistic process of risk analysis has a common structure, which has been 
summarised by Vose (2000) to consist of a five step process of; 
a)  Identifying the risk  
b)  Undertaking a qualitative description of the risk 
c)  Quantitative or semi-quantitative analysis of the risk and associated 
management options 
d)  Implementation of an approved risk management strategy  
e)  Communicating the decision and its basis to stakeholders  
 
 
1.2.1.1  OIE framework for risk analysis 
 
The OIE framework is based on a model developed by Covello and Merkhover (Covello 
and Merkhofer, 1993).  Using this model, the process of risk analysis can be subdivided 
into the areas of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication (OIE, 2007).  Within this framework, the area of risk assessment (less 
formally defined as the determination of how likely it is for a hazard to occur), is further   24
separated into the areas of release assessment, exposure assessment, consequence 
assessment and risk estimation.  The interaction between the four main areas of risk 
analysis as put forward by OIE is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The four components of risk analysis as defined by OIE (OIE, 2006). 
 
 
More specifically, within the OIE framework, the step of hazard identification refers to the 
identification of one or many hazards (pathogenic agents that could produce adverse 
consequences) associated with the ‘risky’ behaviour that is modelled (e.g. importation of a 
commodity) (OIE, 2006).  The most important, and intellectually intensive, component of 
the risk analysis process presented here is risk assessment, which consists of four inter-
related steps that may be assessed either qualitatively or quantitatively.  An initial release 
assessment is undertaken to determine the likelihood of an imported commodity being 
infected or contaminated with a hazard, along with a description of the potential routes of 
release.  The exposure assessment describes the pathways necessary for exposure of 
animals or humans to the hazard(s) identified and estimation of the likelihood of the 
exposure(s).  The consequence assessment addresses the consequence of the exposure(s) 
to the hazard(s) and risk estimation refers to the integration of the results from the 
previous three steps to result in summary measures of the risks associated with the 
identified hazard(s) (OIE, 2006). 
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The areas of risk management and risk communication are separate to the risk assessment 
process.  Risk management is ideally undertaken by a dedicated risk manager (who has not 
been involved with the risk assessment) and involves identification, selection and 
implementation of measures for risk reduction (National Research Council, 1983; OIE, 
2008b), while risk communication refers to the interactive exchange of information on the 
specified risk among risk assessors, risk managers and other interested parties such as 
stakeholders (OIE, 2008b). 
 
The OIE framework offers a flexible approach to risk assessment that may be applied to a 
range of risk questions, not simply restricted to IRA (OIE, 2006). 
  
 
1.2.1.2  CAC framework for risk analysis 
 
The CAC guidelines for risk analysis follow a related, yet distinct framework to those 
published by OIE (Figure 1.2) and uses terminology defined by the National Academy of 
Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) (National Research Council, 1983).   
 
While the areas of risk management and risk communication can be defined as for the OIE 
framework (section 1.4.1), the risk assessment component in the CAC framework consists 
of different steps and definitions.  Within the risk assessment area of this framework, the 
step of hazard identification refers to the identification of (known or potential) health 
effects associated with a particular agent or pathogen.  Hazard characterisation is the 
qualitative or quantitative evaluation of the nature of the adverse effects associated with the 
agents that may be present in food and the exposure assessment refers to the qualitative or 
quantitative evaluation of the degree of intake likely to occur.  Risk characterisation 
refers to the integration of the previous three steps to obtain an estimation of the adverse 
effects that are likely to occur in a given population, including attendant uncertainties 
(WHO, 2008). 
 
The CAC framework is used extensively in microbial risk assessment to define the 
maximum amount of hazard advisable for human exposure in food and, while this system 
is important for use in toxicology and food safety scenarios, it is somewhat less flexible 
that the OIE approach (OIE, 2006).   
   26
 
Figure1.2. Relationship between the three components of risk analysis specified by WHO  
(WHO, 2008). 
 
 
1.2.2  Risk assessment 
 
The frameworks presented in sections 1.2.1 describe the conceptual nature of the risk 
assessment process, but the mechanistic process of a risk assessment requires further 
description.  Risk assessments may be undertaken using qualitative, semi-quantitative or 
quantitative estimates of risk.  All techniques are based on an initial conceptual model, 
whereby the potential pathways that are required for the risk to occur are described, 
although the process of risk estimation at each step varies with the type of assessment used. 
 
 
1.2.2.1    Qualitative risk assessment 
 
A qualitative risk assessment is defined as “A risk assessment based on data which, while 
forming an inadequate basis for numerical risk estimations, nonetheless, when conditioned 
by prior expert knowledge and identification of attendant uncertainties permits risk ranking 
or separation into descriptive categories of risk.” (CAC, 1999).  A qualitative risk 
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assessment is commonly used as the first step of an overall risk assessment process and has 
been described as a building block for quantitative assessment (Clough et al., 2006).  This 
technique may also stand alone and is used as the basis of many stakeholder decisions in 
emerging or data sparse areas and where a rapid analysis or decision-making is required.  
Although few qualitative risk assessments have been published in the veterinary literature 
(Moutou et al., 2001; Peeler et al., 2004; Coburn et al., 2005; Clough et al., 2006; Hauser 
et al., 2007), they are widely utilised by policy makers and examples of those used may be 
accessed readily on government biosecurity and other websites:  
http://www.daff.gov.au/ba/ira/final-animal,  http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Agriculture/ 
animal-welfare/Diseases/SpecificDisease/bluetongue/bluetonguevetriskassess, 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_home.htm. 
 
Estimates generated by qualitative assessments are in the form of pre-specified user-
defined categories, usually described by terms such as ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ (OIE, 
2006).  The qualitative risk assessments that have been published in the veterinary 
literature are divided into the areas of food safety (Coburn et al., 2005; Clough et al., 2006; 
Hauser et al., 2007) and import risk assessment (Moutou et al., 2001; Peeler et al., 2004).  
The more defensible of these assessments specify conceptual pathways, and follow a 
matrix approach for the combination of categorical estimates resulting pre-defined 
outcomes, based on a qualitative interpretation of probabilistic combinations (Moutou et 
al., 2001; Clough et al., 2006).  Combination of risk estimates may also be undertaken 
using broad subjective conceptual considerations (Bernard and Anderson, 2006; Peeler et 
al., 2006).  Recently, criticism of the use of risk matrices has surfaced, which expounds the 
possibility of misleading overall risk estimates, lack of fine resolution of input variables 
and ambiguous input and output measures (Cox et al., 2005; Cox, 2008).   
 
 
1.2.2.2  Quantitative risk assessment 
 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) provides “numerical expressions of risk and indication 
of the attendant uncertainties” (Codex Alimentarius Commission, 1999).  In its most 
simple form, QRA may be deterministic, consisting of mathematical combinations of 
point-estimates to result in a single number output (OIE, 2006).  However, the probabilistic 
form of QRA is preferred, in which inputs are in the form of probability distributions and 
the output represents a distribution of random combinations of samples from each of the   28
attendant inputs (Vose, 2000; OIE, 2006).  Thus, while the use of qualitative risk 
assessment is often described as the precursor to a quantitative analysis, the benefit of a 
quantitative assessment is not only to re-define qualitative measures with numerical 
estimates, but also, in its probabilistic form, to enable consideration of attendant input 
variability and uncertainties and to quantify overall output uncertainty (OIE, 2006).   
 
The overall quantitative estimation of the probability and magnitude of risk is usually 
undertaken with the use of mathematical probability theory, and a robust QRA effectively 
represents a network of inter-related probability distributions (Vose, 2000).  Each 
probability distribution represents the variability and/or uncertainty of the modelled 
variable, both of which refer to the unpredictability of a system but represent separate and 
distinct entities, the understanding and modelling of which are central to the accurate 
implementation of QRA methods.  Variability is specific to the system that is modelled and 
refers to the effect of chance (Vose, 2000).  This measure represents the true heterogeneity 
of the population that is a consequence of the physical system and is not reducible through 
further study or measurement (Murphy, 1998; Andserson and Hattis, 1999; Vose, 2000; 
Colyvan, 2008).  Conversely, uncertainty refers to the lack of knowledge about a parameter 
value that can be reduced by further study or measurement (Murphy, 1998; Anderson and 
Hattis, 1999; Vose, 2000).  Furthermore, uncertainty may be categorised as either 
‘epistemic’, which refers to uncertainty about a determinate fact, or ‘linguistic’ which 
arises out of language-based vagueness or ambiguity (Colyvan, 2008).   
 
The combination of variability and uncertainty is often referred to as ‘overall’ or ‘total’ 
uncertainty (Vose, 2000), and care must be taken to differentiate this from the previously 
defined measure of uncertainty.  A QRA model may be classified as either first- or second-
order, which refers to the inclusion of total uncertainty as a composite measure, or the 
separation and independent modelling of uncertainty and variability within the risk model 
(Vose, 2000; Cummins et al., 2008).  The distributional output of a quantitative risk 
assessment can be termed an ‘uncertainty analysis’ and this refers to the quantification of 
the overall uncertainty associated with the output of a model as a result of uncertainties 
(and variability) in the model input (Saltelli, 2000).   
 
Parameterisation of QRA models refers to the population of each step of the model with 
representative estimates that are to be combined probabilistically.  These estimates may be 
made using previously published data, unpublished data, or expert opinion.  In probabilistic 
QRA modelling, parameter estimates are distributional in nature, and the data obtained,   29
through any of the aforementioned means, may be used to construct one of numerous 
discrete or continuous probability distributions.  The combination of these distributions to 
obtain an output risk estimate is undertaken using iterative sampling and combination from 
each input distribution until output convergence is reached and is referred to as Monte 
Carlo simulation or analysis (Campolongo et al., 2000b; Vose, 2000)   
 
Sampling from each input distribution may follow Monte Carlo or Latin Hypercube 
sampling methods (Vose, 2000).  Monte Carlo sampling refers to random, or pseudo-
random, sampling, whereby a random sample, x, is selected from the input distributions by 
the substitution of a computer-generated random number, r, from a Uniform(0,1) 
distribution into the inverse function G(F(x)) of the cumulative distribution function F(x), 
such that G(r) = x (Vose, 2000).  While Monte Carlo sampling represents a truly random 
technique, this method requires a large number of iterations to ensure that the model will 
reproduce the desired distribution and may under- or over-sample components of the 
distribution (Vose, 2000).  In contrast, Latin Hypercube sampling provides a stratified 
sampling technique (without replacement) that requires fewer iterations to enable 
reproduction of the desired distribution.  The method of Latin hypercube sampling involves 
dividing the range of each input factor into N intervals of equal marginal probability (1/N).  
Random selection of i) interval and ii) observation within that interval, F(x), is then 
undertaken and the random sample, x, is computed by x = G(F(x)), for each of N iterations 
(Campolongo et al., 2000b; Vose, 2000).  Both sampling methods are adequate, although 
the use of Latin hypercube sampling results in greater reliability of sampling of the entire 
parameter space using fewer iterations (Meinrath et al., 2000; Vose, 2000). 
 
Quantitative risk assessment methods have been used extensively in the fields of import 
risk assessment (de Vos et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2005; Peeler et al., 2006; Martinez-Lopez 
et al., 2008) and food safety in the form of microbial risk assessment models (Snary et al., 
2004; Bartholomew et al., 2005; Parsons et al., 2005; Vosough Ahmadi et al., 2006; 
Stacey et al., 2007; Cummins et al., 2008).  The methods of QRA are not prescriptive and 
the mathematical relationships between input variables will vary depending on the system 
studied.  Historically these mathematical relationships have been deterministic, although 
modern risk assessments rely to a greater degree on simulation modelling, allowing 
consideration of uncertainty and variability as described above (Cassin et al., 1998).   
Within the stochastic probabilistic risk assessment process, uncertainty modelling relies on 
the specification of uncertain input distributions through consideration of the probability 
distribution most accurately able to represent the uncertainty and variability that requires   30
modelling (Vose, 2000) and combination of these specified distributions is based on the 
laws of probability theory, as derived by Cox (Cox, 1946a; Cox, 1946b; Jaynes, 2003).  
Scenario tree modelling is often utilised in import risk assessment (Nauta, 2002; 
MacDiarmid and Pharo, 2003; Jones et al., 2005; Peeler et al., 2006; Cummins et al., 
2008), whereas modular process modelling with multiplicative combinations or more 
complex mathematical relationships are more likely to be utilised in microbial risk 
assessment models (Cassin et al., 1998; Stacey et al., 2007).   
 
 
1.2.2.3  Sensitivity analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis may be defined as the evaluation of a model’s response to change in 
inputs (Law and Kelton, 2000; Saltelli, 2000; Ascough et al., 2005).  The process of 
sensitivity analysis is referred to as one of the key steps in construction and utilisation of 
risk analysis models (Borgonovo, 2006) and is considered imperative to the overall process 
of risk assessment (Saltelli, 2002).  The rationale for undertaking a sensitivity analysis will 
vary depending on the model to which it is applied, but includes: verification, validation 
and refinement of the model as it is constructed, evaluation of the robustness of model 
results for decision-makers, and identification of important uncertainties within model 
inputs for prioritisation of future data collection and research (Ascough et al., 2005). 
 
One of the classifications of sensitivity analyses defines the methods as either ‘screening’, 
‘local’ or ‘global’ (Saltelli, 2000) and allows a structured description of the nature of the 
analysis that is undertaken and the extent of the inference that may be made from the 
results obtained.  Screening analyses are generally undertaken as an initial step to identify 
those variables that control most of the output variability in models with large numbers of 
input parameters (Saltelli, 2000).  Local, or nominal range, analyses refer to methods that 
take into account relatively small perturbations to input variables, are predominantly used 
for deterministic models and assess the effect of variation of a single model input whilst all 
other inputs are held constant at their central (nominal) value (Frey and Patil, 2002).  In 
contrast, global sensitivity analyses explore input factors over their full range and shape 
and also take into account the effects of all other input parameters on the factor being 
assessed (termed multidimensional averaging) (Saltelli et al., 1999; Saltelli, 2000).  Global 
analyses allow the assessment of interactions and may be extended to include primary and   31
secondary interaction terms. Furthermore, many global analysis techniques do not require 
models to satisfy assumptions of linearity or monotonicity (Ascough et al., 2005).   
 
The use of one-at-a-time (OAT) sensitivity analysis refers to the variation of only one input 
variable at a time, to an upper and lower value in turn, whilst all others are set to a nominal 
value.  While this local method is easily applicable, it requires that the input/output (I/O) 
function of the model is monotonic, that factors act additively over the range of interest and 
importantly, does not account for any interaction between inputs, which may not accurately 
reflect the underlying model (Campolongo et al., 2000a; Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2003).  
In order to represent all of the interactions that may be present between input variables 
(factors) and provide a global analysis, extension of the OAT design to a design whereby 
each factor is varied with respect to the other is required.  However, the number of 
scenarios required to compute this ‘complete factorial’ design is n
k, where k represents the 
number of factors assessed and n represents the number of levels each factor is assessed at 
(usually set at 2 for upper and lower values).  The consideration of this number of 
scenarios rapidly leads to excessive, and often impossible, requirement of computing time 
as the number of included factors increases (Campolongo and Saltelli, 2000; Beres and 
Hawkins, 2001).  Implementation of ‘fractional factorial’ designs are based on the concept 
that full factorial designs specify numerous ‘unimportant’ higher order interaction terms 
that are not detectably different to noise (Campolongo and Saltelli, 2000).  The assumption 
that some of the higher order terms are unimportant allows specification of 2
k-p fractional 
factorial designs, whereby a fraction (1/2
p) of the possible 2
k combinations are actually run 
to result in estimates of main effects and specified interactions (Henderson-Sellers and 
Henderson-Sellers, 1996; Law and Kelton, 2000).  In the specification of fractional 
factorial designs, confounding occurs between main effects and interaction terms and thus, 
it is important that the design is specified to avoid confounding between two potentially 
important factors (Law and Kelton, 2000; Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2003).  The application 
of a ‘foldover’, whereby the design matrix is reflected upon itself increases the resolution 
of the design, resulting in reduced confounding between effects and the addition of 
orthogonality also increases the accuracy of the estimators (Kleijnen, 1987; Law and 
Kelton, 2000; Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2003).  
 
The Plackett-Burman (P-B) approach represents a fractional factorial design with further 
reduced computational requirement, using only k+1 runs to investigate the effects of k 
factors, providing k+1 is divisible by 4 (Plackett and Burman, 1946; Law and Kelton, 
2000).  This design is defined as ‘context-free’ and the type or nature of model that it is   32
applied to is not prescribed (Plackett and Burman, 1946; Beres and Hawkins, 2001).  The 
addition of a foldover to the P-B design increases the ‘resolution’ of the design and thus 
yields main effect estimators not biased by two-factor interactions, although these 
interactions are confounded with each other (Kleijnen, 1987).  The output of factorial 
designs may be analysed by consideration of main effects and interactions through 
specified algorithms that estimate the average change in response due to a change in the 
specified factor, or interaction between factors (Law and Kelton, 2000).  Another, more 
sophisticated option is to fit a metamodel to the I/O relationships defined by the factorial 
design to enable an overall approximation of the I/O behaviour of the model (Kleijnen and 
Sargent, 2000; Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2003; de Vos et al., 2006).  Metamodels are often 
in the form of regression models and linear, tobit and logistic regression (LR) models have 
been fitted for this purpose within the veterinary literature (Kleijnen and Sargent, 2000; 
Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2003; de Vos et al., 2006).  While regression analysis has been 
described as a primary probabilistic technique for sensitivity analysis, its application in this 
form is sparse (McCarthy et al., 1995). 
 
Numerous alternative techniques are also described for sensitivity analysis, all utilised to 
enable the estimation of the effect of variation of input variables on the output of the 
model.  These methods include, but are not exclusive to, response surface methods, Fourier 
Amplitude Sensitivity Test (FAST), extended FAST and the technique of Sobol’ (Chan et 
al., 2000; Frey and Patil, 2002).  To the author’s knowledge these techniques are yet to be 
applied to veterinary-based studies. 
 
 
1.3  Zoonoses and zoonotic disease  
 
Zoonoses can be defined as ‘diseases and infections which are naturally transmitted 
between vertebrate animals and man’ (WHO, 1959).  Diseases that may be classified as 
zoonoses are wide-ranging, include those caused by bacterial, viral and protozoal 
pathogens and may be transmitted by direct contact (including wounds, inhalation and 
iatrogenic transmission), indirect contact (food, waterborne and environmental), or by 
vectors such as arthropods (Woolhouse, 2002; Hubalek, 2003).  Emerging and re-emerging 
zoonoses refer to a subset of zoonotic diseases that have an increasing incidence following 
introduction to a new population, or within an existing population as a result of long-term 
change in the underlying epidemiology (Woolhouse, 2002).     33
 
Zoonotic disease was first described in the 19
th Century by Virchow, a physician who also 
promoted the idea of ‘one medicine’, referring to the linkage of human and veterinary 
medicine as a comparative discipline (Brown, 2004; Stewart et al., 2005).  While the last 
century witnessed a dissolution of close interaction between medics and veterinarians 
(Stewart et al., 2005), recently and subsequent to several instances of high-profile 
emerging and re-emerging zoonotic diseases, calls have been made to reestablish closer 
linkage between disciplines, with the aims of enhancing the understanding of zoonotic 
disease and improvement of prevention and control strategies (Schelling et al., 2005; 
Stewart et al., 2005; Zinsstag et al., 2005; Kahn, 2006; Hueston et al., 2007).  
 
Global infectious disease emergence is dominated by zoonoses, which account for 60.3% 
of emerging infectious disease (Jones et al., 2008) and 58% of human infectious pathogens 
(Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria, 2005).  The ability of a pathogen to infect multiple 
hosts has also been identified as a risk factor for emergence in human and livestock 
pathogens (Cleaveland et al., 2001).  As such, zoonoses are considered a priority area for 
research and veterinary public health. 
 
  
1.3.1 Zoonoses in companion animals (in particular pet dogs) 
 
Zoonotic disease is commonly associated with farm animal species and developing 
countries, and the contribution of companion species to the disease burden in humans is 
often overlooked or downplayed.  This is particularly noted in the developed world, where 
a combination of factors including increased pet ownership, close living contact between 
pets and owners and an increasing prevalence of immunocompromised individuals 
combine to result in a valid threat of companion animal zoonotic disease (Robinson and 
Pugh, 2002; Poglayen, 2006). 
 
Much has been documented about the potential effects of pet ownership on human health 
(McNicholas et al., 2005; Knight and Edwards, 2008).  Positive effects of pet ownership 
were first noted by Friedmann and colleagues (Friedmann et al., 1978; Friedmann et al., 
1980), who reported increased one-year survival after myocardial infarction in pet owners.  
These findings were replicated by the same group some 15 years later (Friedmann and 
Thomas, 1995) and many other benefits of human-companion animal interactions have also   34
been reported, including blood pressure moderation (Allen, 2003; Virues-Ortega and 
Buela-Casal, 2006), protection against allergy (Chen et al., 2008) and enhanced physical 
and psychological health in the elderly (Knight and Edwards, 2008).  However, studies 
undertaken in Australia have disputed the beneficial effect of pet ownership in terms of 
cardiac, psychological and physical health (Parslow and Jorm, 2003; Parslow et al., 2005).  
While it is possible that these contradictions reflect a geographical and cultural difference 
in the role of companion animals between countries, other negative implications of pet 
ownership have also been reported to include dog or cat bites and their associated infection 
(Morgan and Palmer, 2007), exposure to allergens and the potential transmission of viral, 
parasitic, fungal or bacterial zoonotic diseases (Robinson and Pugh, 2002).   
 
Many different zoonotic pathogens have been isolated from dogs and are known to transfer 
directly between dogs and humans.  The most prevalent viral zoonosis that may be 
transmitted between dogs and humans is rabies, a Lyssavirus that, while exotic to the UK, 
is endemic in other areas of Europe, the Middle East and Africa (Wandeler and Bingham, 
2000).  Parasitic zoonoses of importance include nematodes such as Toxocara 
(roundworms), Ancylostoma (hookworms) and cestodes (tapeworms) such as Dipylidium 
and Echinococcus, while important fungal pathogens include dermatophytes, malassezia 
and aspergillosis (Beran and Steele, 1994; Morris et al., 2005).  Bacterial zoonoses number 
many and are covered in the next section.  A non-comprehensive list of the most 
commonly considered zoonoses that are potentially transmitted by dogs is presented in 
Table1.2. 
 
 
1.3.2   Bacterial zoonoses in companion animals (in particular 
pet dogs) 
 
Many different bacteria may be carried by companion animals, either as commensals or 
disease-causing organisms, including Bartonella,  Pasteurella,  Campylobacter, 
Staphylococcus,  Streptococcus and Salmonella species (Chomel and Arzt, 2000).  The 
likelihood of zoonotic transmission of bacterial organisms from animals to humans 
depends on numerous factors including the number of infected animals, mode of 
transmission of the agent, behavioral characteristics of the human and existing measures of 
prevention (Chomel and Arzt, 2000; Robinson and Pugh, 2002; Murphy, 2008).  Literature 
that documents the transfer of bacterial pathogens between companion animals and humans   35
(excluding dog and cat bite pathogens) is sparse.  It has been shown that ownership of 
puppies and contact with diahorreic animals are risk factors for Campylobacter spp. 
enteritis in children and adults respectively (Saeed et al., 1993; Tenkate and Stafford, 
2001), that Staphylococcus intermedius may transfer directly to humans from dogs and that 
human infection with meticillin-resistant MRSA may be obtained from horses 
(Guardabassi et al., 2004; Weese et al., 2006a).  Additionally, while cause and effect 
cannot be directly established, indistinguishable isolates of MRSA have also been 
identified in humans and domestic pets (Cefai et al., 1994; Manian, 2003; van Duijkeren et 
al., 2005; Weese et al., 2006b) and in some cases, infection or colonisation of owners has 
been unable to be cleared until the pet has also been decontaminated (Cefai et al., 1994; 
Manian, 2003). 
 
Although transmission of bacterial zoonotic disease from companion animals to humans is 
known to occur and is cited as a potential negative effect of animal ownership, no 
randomised controlled trials exist in this area (Hemsworth and Pizer, 2006). 
 
 
1.4  Staphylococcus aureus and MRSA 
 
Staphylococcus describes a genus of bacteria that are identifiable as facultatively 
anaerobic, catalase positive Gram positive cocci, measure around 1μm in diameter and 
divide in more than one plane to form grape-like clusters (Wilkinson, 1997; Humphreys, 
2002).  Staphylococci grow readily on blood agar, nutrient soy agar and brain heart 
infusion agar as white colonies that are 1-3mm in diameter (Kloos and Lambe, 1991; 
McCandlish and Taylor, 1998).  More than 30 species of staphylococci have been 
described, of which S. aureus represents the most common pathogen (Lindsay, 2008a).  
Staphylococcus aureus exhibits diagnostically distinctive features of the production of an 
extracellular enzyme, coagulase, thermostable nucleases and the surface-associated protein 
known as clumping factor (Humphreys, 2002).  Although S. aureus are found as 
commensal organisms in approximately 30-50% of healthy humans (Lowy, 1998), 
infection with these organisms may result in a number of diseases such as pneumonia, skin 
and soft-tissue infections, bacteraemia, sepsis and toxin-medicated disease such as toxic-
shock syndrome (Humphreys, 2002; Lim and Webb, 2005).  Staphylococcus aureus are the 
leading cause of nosocomial human infections, and bacteraemia resulting from infection 
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Table 1.1 Zoonoses potentially transmitted by dogs (adapted from Hemsworth and Pizer (2006)). 
 
Disease Organism  Category  Transmission  Signs  and  Symptoms 
Ascaridiasis 
(Roundworm infection) 
Toxocara canis 
Toxascaris leonina 
Parasite  Ingestion of infective eggs in the environment  Dependent on organ damaged during larval 
migration – visual, neurological or tissue damage. 
Campylobacteriosis  Campylobacter spp.  Bacteria  Eating or drinking contaminated food or 
water, unpasteurised milk and direct or 
indirect contact with faecal material from an 
infected person or animal 
Mild to sever infection of the gastrointestinal. 
system, watery or bloody diarrhoea, fever, 
abdominal cramps, nausea and vomiting.  A rare 
complication is Guillain-Barre syndrome. 
Cryptosporidiosis  Cryptosporidium parvum  Parasite  Faecal-oral route, water  Watery diarrhoea, accompanied by abdominal 
cramps.  Nausea, vomiting, fever, headache and 
loss of appetite may occur.  Rarely, gall bladder 
inflammation or pneumonia may occur. 
Dermatophytosis  Microsporum canis 
Trichophyton 
mentagrophytes 
Mycotic Direct  or  indirect  contact with asymptomatic 
animals or with skin lesions of infected 
animals, contaminated bedding 
Often mild, self limiting; scaling, redness and 
occasionally vesicles or fissures. 
Giardiasis  Giardia intestinalis 
(Giardia lamblia) 
Parasite  Ingestion of contaminated water or food, 
faecal-oral route  
Diarrhoea, fever, severe abdominal cramps. 
Hookworm  Ancylostoma caninum 
Ancylostoma braziliense 
Ancylostoma tubaeform 
Uncinaria stenocephala 
Parasite  Ingestion of infective eggs or contact with 
contaminated soil 
Pruritic skin lesions.  Intestinal bleeding and pain. 
Rabies  Lyssavirus  Virus  Bite wound  Acute encephalitis and death. 
Salmonellosis  Salmonella spp.  Bacteria Ingesion  of  foods  contaminated with animal 
faeces, faecal-oral route 
Acute gastroenteritis with sudden onset of 
abdominal pain, diarrhoea, nausea and fever. May 
lead to scepticaemia. 
Tapeworm  Dipylidium caninum 
 
Echinococcus granulosus 
Parasite 
 
Parasite 
Ingestion of infected flea 
 
Faecal-oral route 
Proglottids are passed in faeces or are found 
around anus causing itching. 
Hydatid cysts on viscera.  
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with fully susceptible strains of S. aureus is associated with a 20-40% mortality rate 
(Mylotte et al., 1987).  
 
Meticillin-resistant  S. aureus refers to strains of S. aureus that exhibit resistance to 
penicillins and other β-lactam antibiotics, with or without resistance to other antibiotic 
classes (Enright, 2008).  While S. aureus originally exhibited susceptibility to penicillin, 
resistance rapidly developed through the acquisition and spread of β-lactamase-producing 
plasmids (Shopsin and Kreiswirth, 2001).  Meticillin (originally given the trade name of 
celbenin), is a synthetic penicillin introduced to overcome this resistance through an ability 
to be only slowly hydrolysed by staphylococcal β-lactamase (Dyke and Gregory, 1997).  
However, meticillin-resistant strains of S. aureus (through mechanisms discussed below) 
were isolated within a year of its production (Barber, 1961) and have been globally 
widespread in human hospitals since the 1980s (Walsh, 2003).  Although meticillin has 
long since been superseded by alternative agents (in particular flucloxacillin in the UK), 
the acronym MRSA continues to be used (Johnson et al., 2005).  Meticillin-resistant S. 
aureus are  increasingly recognised as an emerging zoonotic pathogen of considerable 
importance to public health. 
 
 
1.4.1  Antimicrobial resistance specific to MRSA 
 
The first antibiotic, penicillin, was discovered as a ‘chance observation’ (Fleming, 1945) 
by Scottish physician and bacteriologist Sir Alexander Fleming in 1928.  Concentration of 
this antibiotic into an active form by Sir Howard Florey and Dr Ernst Chain in 1940, and 
subsequent mass-production of penicillin and other antibiotics for use during the Second 
World War, heralded the onset of what was thought to be the golden age of treatment of 
bacterial infectious disease (Cohen, 2000).  However, the potential for development of 
resistance to antimicrobial agents was recognised shortly after the discovery of penicillin 
(Cohen, 2000).  Indeed, the possibility for negligent use of penicillin to result in 
development of microbial resistance was highlighted by Fleming himself in his Nobel 
Prize acceptance speech (Fleming, 1945). 
 
Since these early days of antimicrobial development, the number of available antibiotics 
has increased dramatically, as has the acquisition of resistance to antibiotics in previously 
susceptible organisms (Neu, 1992).  The introduction of these newer drugs constitutes part  
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of a vicious cycle whereby the continued development of resistance to new antimicrobials 
requires the continued development of more efficacious antibiotic agents (Cohen, 1992).  
The inevitable slowing of this cycle, with development of multi-resistant strains of bacteria 
and reduction of pharmaceutical company interest in antibiotic development, has been 
acknowledged as an impending crisis since the early 1990s (Soulsby, 2005).  Substantial 
public health implications arise from the possibility of a ‘postantimicrobial era’ (Cohen, 
1992) and calls for the development of alternatives to antimicrobials (Soulsby, 2005), the 
use of stringent infection control within healthcare settings and stricter regulation of the 
use of antibiotics in both humans and animals are now widespread (Weber and Courvalin, 
2005).   
    
 
1.4.1.1  Mechanisms of antimicrobial resistance 
 
Antimicrobial resistance may either be intrinsic (occurring without genetic alteration) or 
acquired (Normark and Normark, 2002; Walsh, 2003).  Acquired resistance occurs when 
susceptible bacteria gain resistance genes either through mutations within the bacterial 
genome and subsequent vertical transfer or, more commonly, through horizontal transfer, 
involving the transport of new genetic material into the cell through transformation (uptake 
of naked DNA), transduction (viral transfer of DNA) or conjugation (plasmid mediated and 
requiring cell-to-cell contact) (Neu, 1992; Normark and Normark, 2002).  The main 
mechanism of acquisition of antimicrobial resistance appears to be through conjugation, 
whereby mobile genetic elements such as plasmids and transposons act to transfer 
resistance between bacteria that are not necessarily of the same species (Walsh, 2003; Lim 
and Webb, 2005).   
 
The presence of resistance genes within bacteria confers a selective survival advantage 
over sensitive organisms in the face of antimicrobial therapy, and the use of antibiotics in a 
mixed bacterial population will provide increased selection pressure for resistance (Walsh, 
2003).  The four mechanisms of resistance identified so far are drug inactivation, target 
modification, reduced permeability and drug efflux pumps (Lim and Webb, 2005).   
Selection for resistance may occur slowly, through the continued environmental presence 
of an antibiotic, or more quickly, through direct antimicrobial prescribing (Walsh, 2003).  
Although not the only determinant, the development and spread of resistance has been 
shown to be driven primarily by antimicrobial prescribing (Livermore, 2005).   
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1.4.1.2  Beta-lactam drugs and resistance 
 
Beta-lactam antimicrobials include penicillins, cephalosporins, carbapenems and 
monobactams and are defined by the presence of a structural β-lactam ring.  These 
antibiotics function by binding to the bacterial cell wall through native penicillin-binding 
proteins (PBPs), causing disruption to the peptidoglycan layer of the cell wall and resulting 
in bacterial lysis (Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008).   β-lactamase, an enzyme that may 
be produced by certain bacteria, functions to hydrolyse the β-lactam ring (Figure 1.3), 
converting the antimicrobial containing this ring into an innocuous form (Dyke and 
Gregory, 1997).   
 
Figure1.3. Penicillin nucleus – circle demarcates β-lactam ring. 
 
 
1.4.1.3  Molecular resistance mechanisms for MRSA 
 
Meticillin resistance occurs due to the presence of an altered penicillin-binding protein 2a 
(also denoted as PBP2α and PBP2’) which renders the cell wall insensitive to β-lactam 
antibiotics (Wilke et al., 2005).  This PBP is encoded for by the mecA gene, which resides 
on a large mobile genetic element called the staphylococcal chromosomal cassette mec 
(SCCmec).   At the time of writing, seven different types of SCCmec had been defined, 
with this number rapidly increasing in recent years (SCCmec I-VII) (Ito et al., 2001; Ma et 
al., 2002; Ito et al., 2004; Oliveira et al., 2006; Takano et al., 2008).  These genetic 
elements differ in size and genetic composition, with SCCmec types II and III able to 
confer resistance to multiple classes of antibiotics in addition to β-lactams due to the 
presence of integrated plasmids and transposons (Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008).   
Additional (non SCC) mobile genetic elements that encode virulence genes and resistance 
to other antibiotics may also be found within the MRSA genome (Lindsay, 2008b). 
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1.4.1.4  Evolutionary considerations for MRSA 
 
“Evolution requires genetic change and then selection of the fittest” (Lindsay, 2008b).  
Genetic change in S. aureus may occur by mutation or acquisition of mobile elements.   
 
Two evolutionary theories have been presented for MRSA (Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 
2008) and, while it has been postulated that all MRSA clones evolved from a common 
meticillin-sensitive S. aureus (MSSA) ancestor that acquired SCCmec on one occasion 
(Kreiswirth et al., 1993), it is now commonly acknowledged that SCCmec was introduced 
on a number of occasions into different S. aureus lineages (Musser and Kapur, 1992).  The 
latter, more common, theory is supported by evolutionary studies using multilocus 
sequence typing (MLST) combined with SCCmec typing and based upon repeat sequence 
types (BURST) analysis (Enright et al., 2002; Feil et al., 2004).  These studies conclude 
that MRSA has evolved in relatively few independently stable lineages, otherwise known 
as clonal complexes (CCs), that individual MRSA clones have arisen on multiple occasions 
from the introduction of SCCmec elements into successful MSSA clones and that 
horizontal transfer of mec genes is relatively frequent within S. aureus (Enright et al., 
2002; Lindsay, 2008b).  The implications from these findings are that the mec genes are 
likely to have been introduced into already successful S. aureus clones within hospitals that 
were already well adapted to transmission, resulting a marked potential for adaptability in 
the face of new antimicrobial treatments (Enright et al., 2002).  It is also known that the 
rate of horizontal transfer of SCC elements between staphylococcal strains is low, although 
the mechanism of this transfer is yet to be identified (Lindsay, 2008b). 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
1.4.2 MRSA in humans 
 
Staphylococcus aureus is found as a commensal organism that primarily resides and 
multiplies in the anterior nares (Williams, 1963) but may also be isolated from areas 
including the throat, axillae, perineum (Ridley, 1959) and groin and is often shed onto 
healthy skin (Williams, 1963; Wertheim et al., 2005) (Figure 1.4).  Carriage of S. aureus is 
known to occur in 30-50% of healthy humans (Lowy, 1998) and carrier status is associated 
with a three-fold increase in the risk of clinical infection (Wertheim et al., 2004).  A 
proportion of these S. aureus strains are meticillin resistant, resulting in estimates of <1-
3% of healthy humans being colonised with MRSA at any given time (Abudu et al., 2001;  
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Jernigan et al., 2003a; Jernigan et al., 2003b; Kuehnert et al., 2006).  Benchmark studies 
have identified human carriage of any strain of S. aureus as either persistent (referring to 
10-35% of individuals who predominantly harbour one strain of S. aureus), or intermittent 
(referring to 20-75% of individuals who intermittently carry any strain of S. aureus) and 
between 5 and 50% of the population are referred to as noncarriers as they almost never 
carry S. aureus (Williams, 1963).  Persistent carriers are associated with a higher bacterial 
load of S. aureus, resulting in increased dispersal of the organism (Figure 1.4) and 
association with a higher risk of acquiring bacterial infection (Wertheim et al., 2005).   
 
The clinical importance of MRSA is well established in human medicine.  As a hospital 
acquired pathogen, MRSA may be responsible for outbreaks of infection in health-care 
settings, but may also be endemic in these institutions.  Although the spectrum of disease 
resulting from MRSA is similar to MSSA, ranging from soft tissue infections to fulminant 
pneumonia, infection with the resistant organism is associated with a poorer outcome and 
increased mortality in hospital settings, along with increased consumption of healthcare 
resources (Whitby et al., 2001; Cosgrove et al., 2003; Kollef and Micek, 2006).  
 
Figure 1.4. Staphylococcus aureus carriage rates per body site for the general population 
and those with persistent nasal carriage of S. aureus (after Wertheim et al., 2005).  
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The prevalence of MRSA within human hospitals is officially assessed by the percentage 
of blood culture isolates of S. aureus that are resistant to meticillin (Johnson et al., 2005).  
Within the UK, a combination of voluntary reporting dating since 1989, mandatory 
reporting since 2001, data collection from sentinel laboratories and other surveillance 
studies, has provided robust information regarding the prevalence of MRSA bacteraemia 
(Johnson et al., 2005).  These data show that an increase in prevalence of MRSA 
bacteraemia (as a proportion of S. aureus bacteraemia) has occurred over recent years, with 
yearly rates increasing from 2% in 1990/91 to around 40% since 2000 (Johnson et al., 
2005; Enright, 2006) (Figure 1.5, 1.6).  More recently, the prevalence of MRSA in the UK 
has been observed to taper (EARSS, 2007; HPS, 2008b).  Although these data serve as a 
guide only (not all cases of MRSA are bacteraemic (Adedeji and Gray, 2005)) and inherent 
biases in data collection must also be considered, the figures give an insight into recent 
trends.   
 
 
Figure 1.5. Numbers of MRSA and MSSA bacteraemia reports per year in the UK (from 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1196942169446). 
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Figure 1.6. Percentage of Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemias attributable to MRSA in the 
UK (after Johnson et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
1.4.3 Geographical considerations for MRSA 
 
The prevalence of MRSA varies geographically, and epidemiological characteristics 
including prevalence, distribution and genotypic variation may alter at a resolution at the 
level of country, town, institution or ward (Livermore and Pearson, 2007).  On a global 
scale, the distribution of prevalence of MRSA in 2005 has been collated by Grundmann 
and colleagues (2006) and is presented in Figure 1.7.  Similarly, European data have been 
collated by the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (EARSS) (2007) 
and are presented in Figure 1.8.  Brief visualisation of these maps reveals the variation of 
estimates, both within and between continents.  While it is certain that the colour-scheme 
does not accurately reflect prevalence of MRSA at national borders, the variation in 
prevalence between countries undoubtedly depends not only on physical geographical 
boundaries, but other factors such as prevention and control strategies, population densities 
and is also likely to reflect variation in laboratory methods and reporting (Grundmann et 
al., 2006; Gould, 2007).    
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Figure 1.7. Worldwide prevalence of MRSA displayed by country (after Grundmann et al., 
2006). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.8. Proportion of invasive isolates resistant to MRSA in 2006 (after EARSS, 2007) 
(* these countries did not report any data, or less than 10 isolates). 
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1.4.4 Classification of MRSA 
 
Accurate characterisation and classification of MRSA isolates facilitates exchange of 
information and subsequent monitoring of the spread of disease and antimicrobial 
resistance (Enright, 2008).  This characterisation may be undertaken using epidemiological 
and/or molecular descriptors.  
 
 
1.4.4.1  Community-associated and Hospital-associated MRSA 
 
In addition to the organism’s prevalence and biological importance within hospital settings, 
MRSA is also recognised as an emerging pathogen within the community.  Since the initial 
identification of a novel MRSA strain in populations with no prior health-care exposure or 
other typical risk factors in 1993 (Udo et al., 1993), MRSA has been broadly classified as 
either hospital or community acquired/associated.  Controversy exists over the 
differentiation between these two categories, and definitions may centre around presence 
or absence of hospital-associated (HA-) risk factors, appropriate genetic markers and 
phenotypic profiles (Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008).   
 
An epidemiological definition of community associated (CA-) MRSA strains, used by the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), refers to those isolated in an outpatient setting or 
within 48 hours of hospital admission, in people without: i) a previous history of MRSA 
infection or colonisation, ii) hospitalisation, admission to a nursing home or dialysis in the 
last year, or iii) the presence of permanent indwelling devices (Deurenberg and 
Stobberingh, 2008).  However, temporal associations may be misleading due to putative 
scenarios such as prior carriage of a CA- organism only causing infection after an invasive 
procedure, or previous exposure to hospitalised individuals within the community and it 
has recently been shown that defining CA-MRSA by absence of risk factors for healthcare 
exposure greatly underestimates the burden of CA-MRSA disease (David et al., 2008).  
Phenotypically, CA-MRSA are more likely to be sensitive to non-β-lactam antibiotics than 
HA- strains and genotypically are more likely to harbour SCCmec type IV, V or VII and 
the Panton-Valentine Leukocidin (PVL) virulence factor (Grundmann et al., 2006; 
Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008).  It is known that the presence of the PVL toxin is 
associated with the propensity for CA- strains to cause skin and soft tissue infection, along 
with the more concerning necrotising fasciitis and necrotising pneumonia (Morgan, 2005;  
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Boyce, 2008).  It is also likely that more complicated interactions between multiple genetic 
factors, including the presence of α-haemolysin, the arginine catabolic mobile element 
(ACME) and phenol-soluble modulins (PSMs) along with specific variants of PVL are 
responsible for the heightened virulence of CA- strains, although research continues in this 
area (Lowy, 2007; Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008; Ellington et al., 2008).  Clinically, 
although CA-MRSA strains are often associated with greater antimicrobial susceptibility, 
the presence of additional virulence factors means that they are more likely to result in, 
possibly severe, disease in non-compromised individuals (Elston, 2007).   
 
While CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA are often thought of as distinct epidemiological entities, 
one must consider that there is directional movement of MRSA from hospitals to the 
community, from the community to hospitals and that there are also independent reservoirs 
of MRSA within both settings (Kluytmans-Vandenbergh and Kluytmans, 2006).  A recent 
study undertaken in a single hospital in the USA has shown that, while overall prevalence 
of MRSA blood stream infections did not change over a two year period, community 
associated genotypes, inferred by phenotypic rules based on an established algorithm using 
PFGE results and antimicrobial susceptibilities, were twice as prevalent (49% of MRSA 
infections) in the second year of the study than the first (Popovich et al., 2008).  The 
implications associated with the putative generalisability of the findings from this study are 
far-reaching, including potentially necessary reassessment of treatment and prevention 
strategies for endemic hospital strains that display enhanced virulence, along with those 
with marked resistance (Popovich et al., 2008).  
   
In addition to the classification of MRSA as HA- or CA- is the recent identification of a 
distinct MRSA clone, typed as ST-398, amongst pigs, pig farmers and veterinarians in The 
Netherlands (Voss et al., 2005).  While this clone does not fit the typical definition of CA- 
or HA-MRSA, it appears to have originated de novo from pigs or cattle and, since its initial 
identification in 2003, has infiltrated communities and hospital settings in The Netherlands, 
where currently over 20% of MRSA isolated from humans are attributable to this clone 
(van Loo et al., 2007b).  This strain (ST-398) has also been isolated from pigs in other 
countries, including Singapore, Canada, Germany, Austria and Denmark (Guardabassi et 
al., 2007; Sergio et al., 2007; Witte et al., 2007; Khanna et al., 2008; Meemken et al., 
2008) and, while ST-398 is not thought to be primarily a human pathogen, it is 
nevertheless capable of causing infection in humans (Lewis et al., 2008; van Belkum et al., 
2008).    Furthermore, ST-398 has been shown to transfer readily from animals to humans.  
Over 12% of delegates at an international pig-health meeting in Denmark were found to  
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carry ST-398 and over 20% of pig farmers in the Netherlands have been identified as 
carriers, representing a risk of carriage that is 12 times greater than the general population 
(Voss et al., 2005; van Loo et al., 2007b; Wulf et al., 2008).  Although ST-398 has not yet 
been isolated from livestock in the UK, the clone has been isolated from three hospitalised  
humans with no known contact with pigs, farmers or history of travel to The Netherlands 
or other countries where this strain is present (HPS, 2008a).  Recent identification of the 
PVL toxin within ST-398 in two countries demonstrates the potential for enhanced 
virulence associated with this infiltrative organism (van Belkum et al., 2008; Yu et al., 
2008).  The presence of enhanced virulence in such a readily transferable zoonotic 
organism could result in a marked increase in the prevalence of disease in non-
compromised individuals.     
 
 
1.4.4.2  Molecular Typing of MRSA 
 
A number of different molecular typing methods are available for MRSA.  The most 
important of these are pulse field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), MLST, S. aureus protein A 
(spa) typing and SCCmec typing (Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008).  Each of these 
methods allows assessment and comparison of isolates at varying resolutions, differing in 
accuracy, discriminatory power and reproducibility (Melles et al., 2007).   
 
The use of the highly discriminatory PFGE, which involves the use of a switching electric 
field to facilitate separation of large restriction fragments of chromosomal DNA, created 
by enzymatic cleavage using the enzyme SmaI, to produce a restriction pattern or 
fingerprint on agarose gel (Enright, 2008) (Figure 1.9), is described as the gold standard for 
investigating outbreaks of S. aureus (Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008).  However, this 
technique does not allow international comparison of strains and is limited in its 
reproducibility due to lack of standardised methods between laboratories and sensitivity of 
the technique to small amounts of genetic change (Enright et al., 2002; Deurenberg and 
Stobberingh, 2008).  MLST examines allelic diversity at seven housekeeping (highly 
conserved) gene loci by DNA sequencing of 500bp internal fragments and subsequent 
comparison of sequences with known alleles at each locus to enable generation of an allelic 
profile (Enright, 2008).  In contrast to PFGE, MLST  allows robust repeatability that 
facilitates international strain comparison through the identification of allelic profile 
designated sequence types (STs) (Enright et al., 2002; Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008).   
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Furthemore, these strain types may be combined in clusters of closely related genotypes, 
referred to as CCs using BURST algorithms (currently implemented as eBURST), to 
provide putative evolutionary inference (Figure 1.10) (Enright et al., 2002; Feil et al., 
2004; Lindsay and Holden, 2006).  While MLST is robust and applicable for the 
investigation and comparison of long-term global studies and evolutionary relationships, 
slow accumulation of genetic variation in the housekeeping loci results in a lack of 
discrimination between epidemiologically unrelated strains (Melles et al., 2007).  In 
contrast, spa typing, a single locus sequence typing method based on the determination of 
the sequence variation of the polymorphic region X (consisting of a variable number of 
highly diverse 24 nucleotide repeats) of a hyper-variable single (spa) locus (Koreen et al., 
2004; Deurenberg and Stobberingh, 2008; Enright, 2008) provides intermediate 
discriminative power and is cheaper and less laborious than MLST (Deurenberg and 
Stobberingh, 2008).  Cluster analysis of spa types as spa-clonal complexes (spa-CC) is 
also possible using the based upon repeat pattern (BURP) algorithm, although this 
grouping method may lack accuracy and discriminatory power in some scenarios 
(Strommenger et al., 2008). Combination of BURP analysis with additional markers such 
as SCCmec typing has recently been advised to increase the discriminatory power of spa 
typing and BURP analysis (Strommenger et al., 2008).  SCCmec types (described in 
1.4.1.3) may be identified using PCR-based techniques and a combination of SCCmec 
types and MLST designation results in a robust categorisation that may be compared to 
PFGE types (Ito et al., 2001; Oliveira and de Lencastre, 2002; Enright, 2008).            
 
 
 
Figure 1.9. Schematic diagram of PFGE process – obtained from 
http://www.biochem.arizona.edu/classes/bioc471/pages/Lecture8/AMG4.10b.gif. 
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Figure 1.10. Example of eBURST output for Staphylococcus aureus.  Clusters of linked 
isolates correspond to clonal complexes (Feil et al., 2004).  Each circle represents a 
genotype (MLST sequence type (ST)) whose prevalence is proportional to its area 
(Enright, 2008).  Primary founders are positioned centrally in the cluster.  ST labels 
removed for clarity – obtained from http://eburst.mlst.net/. 
 
 
1.4.5 MRSA in animals 
 
Meticillin-resistant  S. aureus colonisation and infection is a more recently defined 
phenomenon in the area of veterinary medicine. Reports of MRSA in non-human species 
have increased in number considerably in the last decade and contamination and infection 
with MRSA has been documented in wildlife, farm and companion animal species (Lee, 
2003; O'Mahony et al., 2005; Rich and Roberts, 2006).  The range of clinical signs 
resulting from MRSA infection in companion animals is similar to those observed in 
human disease: skin and soft tissue infections predominate and these infections anecdotally 
appear to be most commonly associated with post-operative wounds, prolonged 
hospitalisation and/or immunosuppressive therapy (Duquette and Nuttall, 2004; Rich et al., 
2005; Leonard et al., 2006; Morris et al., 2006; Griffeth et al., 2008).   
 
The published data that stem from companion animal populations, and with respect to 
canine species in particular, are largely based on isolation from clinical cases (Tomlin et 
al., 1999; Morris et al., 2006; Rich and Roberts, 2006) or cross-sectional estimates of 
prevalence of MRSA colonisation (Baptiste et al., 2005; Loeffler et al., 2005; Rich, 2005;  
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Abbott et al., 2006; Murphy et al., 2006; Vengust et al., 2006; Bagcigil et al., 2007; 
Griffeth et al., 2008; Hanselman et al., 2008; Moodley et al., 2008).  These data are 
predominantly obtained from clinical specimens in the first instance, and nasal swabs taken 
from hospitalised and non-hospitalised dogs and veterinary staff in the latter.  Longitudinal 
information on duration of carriage or likelihood of infection in colonised animals is not 
available.  However, the data that have been presented thus far from small animal 
veterinary settings do appear to mirror the situation in human populations over the past 
decades: prevalence appears to be increasing in animal populations and an increased 
prevalence of MRSA colonisation has also been found in veterinary staff compared to the 
general population (paralleling a greater prevalence noted in human health care workers) 
(Cesur and Cokca, 2004; Loeffler et al., 2005; Hanselman et al., 2006a; Moodley et al., 
2008).    
  
  
1.4.6 MRSA as a canine zoonosis 
 
The relationship between MRSA in humans and companion animals is poorly understood.  
It is known that dogs may act as reservoirs of MRSA for humans, where the term reservoir 
refers to the potential for direct or indirect transmission, and that the same strain may be 
found in dogs and humans inhabiting the same household, or veterinary workers in contact 
with infected dogs (Cefai et al., 1994; Manian, 2003; Leonard et al., 2006). However, in 
contrast to the stains most commonly recovered in horses (Weese et al., 2005) and pigs 
(Voss et al., 2005), MRSA found in dogs are indistinguishable from the most common 
hospital acquired strains found in humans (predominantly EMRSA-15, but also EMRSA-
16 in the UK) and as such, it has not been possible to describe the direction of transfer 
between humans and dogs thus far (Baptiste et al., 2005; Leonard and Markey, 2008).  
Consequently, while the implication, based on typing data, is that MRSA has emerged in 
dogs as a result of MRSA in humans (Baptiste et al., 2005; Moodley et al., 2006; Leonard 
and Markey, 2008), the potential contribution of dogs that are colonised or infected with 
MRSA to the burden of disease in humans and conversely, the potential contribution of 
colonised and infected humans to canine disease, has not been directly quantifiable.   
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1.5  Assessing the risk associated with MRSA in dogs 
 
A number of studies have been published in the human literature that describe transmission 
models utilised for the assessment of potential outbreak scenarios associated with MRSA 
in hospitals, the community and other institutions such as gaols (Cooper and Lipsitch, 
2004; Cooper et al., 2004; Kajita et al., 2007; McBryde et al., 2007).  The mathematical 
models that have been described are predominantly undertaken to model the transfer of 
MRSA within contained environments, where information on population admissions, 
discharges, contact, colonisation and infection rates are generally known.  Even in models 
where the population is relatively large (>8,000 reported cases were modelled in an 
outbreak of CA-MRSA in a county gaol (Kajita et al., 2007)) these models are able to be 
populated with known, or well estimated parameters.  Most of these models work with the 
assumption that pathogenic transfer within the community (that is, outside a hospital or 
other institutional setting) is negligible.  Contradicting this assumption are the accounts of 
transmission of MRSA between family members and persistent re-infection or colonisation 
with MRSA within the community setting (Kniehl et al., 2005; Huijsdens et al., 2006; 
Johansson et al., 2007).  However, to date, no models have been published that describe or 
explore the risk of exposure to or transmission of MRSA outwith a contained environment. 
 
 
1.6  Aims and objectives of the current study 
 
The objective of the current study was to explore the relationship between MRSA in dogs 
and humans.  The aims were to undertake an assessment of the risk of MRSA acquisition 
in pet dogs in order to a) assess the risk of acquisition of MRSA in dogs over a defined 
time period; b) identify important priority data gaps for future research efforts in this data-
sparse area; c) comment on the usefulness of risk assessment, in a data sparse area and 
within a field in which it has not previously been used, for the above aims and objectives. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
GENERAL MATERIALS AND METHODS 
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2.1  Introduction 
 
The methods adopted throughout these studies centre around the application of a risk 
assessment to the area of MRSA in pet dogs.  This thesis presents a qualitative risk 
assessment (Chapter 3) and a quantitative risk assessment with attendant uncertainty and 
sensitivity analyses (Chapters 6 and 7), along with three data collection studies (Chapter 4) 
and an expert opinion elicitation procedure (Chapter 5) that were required to enhance 
parameterisation of the quantitative model.  The methods used for each of these areas of 
study are presented below. 
 
 
2.2  Risk analysis 
 
The risk analysis structure that is followed represents a hybrid of previously described OIE 
and CAC techniques (Section 1.2.1), designed for use in import and food safety risk 
analyses respectively (Codex Alimentarius Commission, 1999; OIE, 2006).  The structure 
utilised is discussed fully within Chapter 3, but briefly is composed of two steps: (1) 
hazard identification and characterisation and (2) risk estimation.  Exposure and 
consequence assessments were undertaken within the step of risk estimation.  This 
structure was adhered to for the purpose of conducting an initial qualitative risk assessment 
and construction of a conceptual model (Chapter 3).  The conceptual model was specified 
based on the results of hazard identification and characterisation and allowed a structured 
approach to risk estimation, both for the qualitative (Chapter 3) and quantitative (Chapter 6 
and 7) models.  Within the qualitative assessment, categorical estimators (negligible, low, 
moderate and high) were used to define the risk at each point of the conceptual model and 
a published, repeatable and reproducible matrix was used to combine these categorical 
estimates (EFSA, 2007).  The quantitative risk assessment was specified as a stochastic 
simulation model that loosely followed the steps set out for a simulation study by Law and 
Kelton (2000) as displayed in Figure 2.1.  The overall estimate of risk obtained from the 
specified models refers to the risk of acquisition of MRSA in pet dogs in a given 24 hour 
period.  There was no measure of the consequence of acquisition of the organism and as 
such the outcomes of the qualitative and quantitative models are strictly termed ‘exposure 
assessments’.    
  54
 
 
Figure 2.1. Steps in a simulation study, outlined by Law and Kelton (2000). 
 
 
 
Yes
Yes
No 
No
Formulate problem 
and plan the study 
Collect data and 
define a model 
Conceptual 
model valid? 
Construct a computer 
program and verify 
Make pilot runs 
Programmed 
model valid? 
Design experiments 
Make production runs 
Analyse output data 
Document, present 
and use results  
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2.2.1 Simulation modelling 
 
Simulation refers to the imitation of a real-world system through the adherence to a set of 
assumptions that take the form of mathematical or logical relationships (Law and Kelton, 
2000).  The simulation model that was specified in this thesis was a stochastic model, 
incorporating random or probabilistic components and resulting in a random or 
distributional output.  Each of the inputs to the quantitative model was specified as a 
distribution based on available data and random selection was made from each of these 
distributions on each model run using Monte Carlo and Latin Hypercube sampling 
techniques (Vose, 2000) as described in Chapter 1.  The model was run for a discrete time 
period (24 hours) and is described in detail in Chapter 6.  
 
 
2.2.2 Software 
 
The software predominantly used in these studies was R (R Development Core Team, 
2008).  R represents a “language and environment for statistical computing” (http://www.r-
project.org/) which supports a wide variety of statistical and graphical techniques and 
consists of a dedicated language and run-time environment (Hornik, 2009).  It is an open-
source implementation of the S programming language and is supplemented by a large 
number of ‘packages’ to undertake complex analyses (Fox and Andersen, 2005).  All code 
was written and edited in the text interface WinEdt® (version 5.5, 
http://www.winedt.com/) which was incorporated as an R plugin using the RWinEdt 
package (http://www.r-project.org/).  Other R packages that were utilised included epicalc, 
stats and lhs (http://www.r-project.org/).   
 
The project-specific code that was used to run each of the models and analyses represented 
in this thesis is discussed in the relevant sections and model-specific programming code is 
included as appendices where appropriate.  All code was written by the author except 
where specified.  Model checking was undertaken for the quantitative risk assessment 
model (Chapter 6) by running the loops within the model independently and separately 
assessing the outcome for each step.  The model was also checked by two experienced 
users of R who were familiar with simulation modelling procedures. 
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A sample of the code used in this thesis is presented as Figure 2.2 as an example of the 
programming language used.  This small portion of code was written to obtain combination 
expert opinion distributions, the full discussion of which is presented in Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Example of R code used within this thesis. 
 
 
Prior to using R, the quantitative risk assessment model was implemented in @RISK 
(version 4.5.7, Pallisade Corporation).  However, the model was too complex and required 
too many iterations to be fully implemented in this programme.   
 
In addition, Microsoft Excel 2003 (Microsoft Corporation) and Microsoft Access 2003 
(Microsoft Corporation) database programmes were used for data storage and 
manipualation.  All data for input into and output from R were stored within Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet format as .csv files.   
 
Minitab (Minitab release 14.1, Minitab Inc. 2003) and StatsDirect (StatsDirect Ltd, 2008) 
programmes were also used for statistical analyses within the thesis (Chapter 4). 
 
qnum <‐ read.csv("/question.numbers.csv")
qnum <‐ qnum[,1] 
 
n.experts <‐ 15 
n.sample <‐ expert.iterations  
 
combination.data <‐ matrix(nrow=n.sample, ncol=length(qnum)) 
 
for(i in 1:length(qnum)){ 
 
filename <‐ paste("/question",qnum[i],".csv",sep="") 
 
data <‐ read.csv(filename) 
 
opinion <‐ numeric(n.experts*n.sample) 
dim(opinion) <‐ c(n.experts,n.sample) 
 
 
for(expert in (1:n.experts)){ 
 
if(i>37){ 
opinion[expert,] <‐ 
rmodbetapert(n.sample,data[expert,2]/100,data[expert,3]/100,data[expert,4]/100,data[expert,5])}   
else{ 
opinion[expert,] <‐ 
rmodbetapert(n.sample,data[expert,2]/1000,data[expert,3]/1000,data[expert,4]/1000,data[expert,5])} 
} 
 
combination.data[,i] <‐ sample(opinion,n.sample,replace=TRUE, 
prob=rep(c(0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1),n.sample))   
} 
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2.2.3 Statistical methods 
 
Sample size calculations that were undertaken in Chapter 4 for the estimation of 
proportions used the following formula: 
2
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Where 
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Z is the standard normal distribution corresponding to a two-sided confidence 
level of 
2
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α
− , L is the desired precision of the estimate and p is the expected prevalence 
of interest in the population (Houe et al., 2004).  
 
Chi-square (χ
2) and McNemar’s statistics were calculated for the comparison of 
proportions for un-paired and paired data respectively (Chapter 4) and LR models were 
specified as part of the sensitivity analyses for the simulation model (Chapter 6 and 7).  As 
discussed in Dohoo et al. (2003), using the logistic model and a logit transformation, the 
relationship between the probability of the outcome (p) and predictor variables (X = Xj) can 
be modelled as follows: 
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The probability of the outcome of the logistic model is expressed as: 
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  and the odds ratio (OR) for the outcome associated with factor Xk can be expressed 
as 
k e
β . 
 
The basic assumptions that are required to be met for logistic (or linear) regression are: i) 
independence of observations and ii) linearity of continuous explanatory variables with the 
outcome (Dohoo et al., 2003).  Further discussion of LR modeling will appear in Chapters 
6 and 7 and this statistical technique is described in detail in a number of reference texts, 
examples of which include Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) and Dohoo et al. (2003).    
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2.2.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
In addition to the LR models described above, OAT and fractional factorial Plackett-
Burman (P-B) designs were used to implement sensitivity analyses in this thesis (Chapter 
7).  Literature describing these techniques has been outlined in Chapter 1 and the methods 
are discussed in full in Chapter 7.  Briefly, both of these techniques involve ascribing an 
upper and lower value to each input variable under consideration and then varying these 
values one at a time for the OAT analysis, or with respect to a defined pattern that allows 
consideration of the effect of other variables for the fractional factorial design 
(Campolongo and Saltelli, 2000).  
 
 
2.3  Questionnaire design 
 
Questionnaires were used on two occasions in the studies described in this thesis.  The first 
occasion was documented in Chapter 4B and was an orally administered questionnaire 
designed to assess dog-human and dog-dog interactions and the second, documented in 
Chapter 5, was an emailed questionnaire used to elicit expert opinion with respect to 
MRSA in pet dogs.  The specific methods of questionnaire construction are covered within 
the relevant chapters.  Briefly, the questionnaire structure, design and administration was 
based on the Total Design Method, described by Dillman (1991) and its subsequent 
modification (Yammarino et al., 1991; Eaker et al., 1998), aimed at maximising the 
response rate while concurrently reducing potential sources of error.  The modalities of 
survey application in these studies (oral and email administration) are less common than 
mailed (self-administered) although many of the same considerations are required for these 
modalities.  Previously identified techniques for increasing response rate, including 
repeated contacts (in the form of follow-ups), inclusion of appeals within cover letters, a 
high level of salience of the topic to the respondent and affiliation of the questionnaire with 
a University were used where possible (Fox et al., 1988; Yammarino et al., 1991). 
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2.4  Bacterial isolation and identification 
 
In order to enable parameterisation of the quantitative risk assessment model, two 
laboratory-based studies were undertaken and are presented in Chapter 4A and 4C.   
 
 
2.4.1 Environmental and veterinary staff prevalence  
 
Isolation and identification of MRSA from swabs taken of the external nares of veterinary 
staff members and the environment in the University of Glasgow Small Animal Hospital 
(Chapter 4A), was undertaken using the following methods. 
 
 
2.4.1.1  Isolation of MRSA 
 
All swabs were placed directly into Tryptone Soya Broth (TSB, Oxoid Ltd., UK) 
supplemented with 2.5% NaCl and incubated for 24 hours at 37ºC.  A 10μl aliquot of TSB 
was then streaked onto chromogenic agar (MRSA Select; BioRad, France) and incubated 
aerobically at 37ºC.  The plates were assessed for growth at 24 and 36 hours, in line with 
manufacturer recommendations.  Presumptive MRSA colonies were subcultured onto 5% 
sheep blood agar.  Representative samples from each of these plates were confirmed as S. 
aureus using API ID 32-STAPH (BioMérieux) and S. aureus specific latex agglutination 
kit (Oxoid Ltd, UK). 
 
 
2.4.1.2  Antimicrobial susceptibility testing 
 
The antimicrobial resistance profile for each MRSA isolate was determined by two 
methods: (i) the automated Vitek 1 system (BioMérieux, UK) as per manufacturer’s 
instructions to determine the minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) and (ii) disc 
diffusion, using diagnostic sensitivity test agar (DSTA, Oxoid Ltd, UK) in accordance with 
British Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy guidelines (Andrews, 2001).  The 
following discs were used; cefuroxime (30ug), chloramphenicol (10ug), ciprofloxacin 
(1ug), clindamycin (2ug), erythromycin (5ug), fusidic acid (10ug), gentamicin (10ug),  
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kanamycin (30ug), meticillin (5ug), mupirocin (5ug), neomycin (10ug), oxacillin (1ug), 
penicillin (1ug), rifampicin (2ug), sulphamethoxazole (25ug), streptomycin (10ug),   
tetracycline (10ug), tobramycin (10ug), trimethoprim (1.25ug). 
 
 
2.4.1.3  Genotypic characterisation of MRSA 
 
PCR was performed to identify mecA and PVL genes, and to identify SCCmec types of the 
MRSA isolates.  MecA and PVL detection were performed as described below (Bignardi et 
al., 1996; Lina et al., 1999) with an internal S. aureus specific  nuc control included 
(Brakstad et al., 1992).   
 
DNA extraction was carried out by the suspension of approximately 5 bacterial colonies in 
NET buffer (10mM NaCl, 1mM EDTA, 10mM Tris (Sigma, UK)) containing 100U 
achromopeptidase (Kobayashi et al., 1994; Leonard et al., 1995), and incubation of the 
suspension at 50ºC for 15 minutes.  Two microlitres of DNA template was then added to 
PCR Master Mix (12.5µl ReddyMix (0.625 units Thermoprime Plus DNA Polymerase, 
75mM Tris-HCl (pH 8.8 at room temperature), 20mM (NH4)2SO4, 1.5mM MgCl2, 200mM 
of each dNTP and 0.01% (v/v) Tween 20)) (Abgene,UK) containing 1µl of each of the 
appropriate primers (MWG Biotech, UK) at the correct concentration (Table 2.1).  Tissue 
culture grade water (Sigma, UK) was added to give a final reaction volume of 25µl.  PCR 
amplification was carried out with a mastercycler® ep thermal cycler (eppendorf, 
Hamburg, Germany) and using the following cycle: 95ºC for 5 minutes; 30 cycles of 95ºC 
for 30 seconds, 55ºC for 30 seconds, 72ºC for 1 minute; and a final extension at 72ºC for 5 
minutes.  Six µl of PCR product was loaded into 1.5% agarose (Mast, UK) gel and 
electrophoresis performed in 0.5 x TBE buffer at 180V for 90 min using a power-pac 300 
pwer pack (BioRad, France).  Gels were stained with 1µg/ml ethidium bromide (Sigma, 
UK) for 20 min, examined under UV light and photographed. 
 
SCCmec typing was performed according to the Oliveira method (Oliveira and de 
Lencastre, 2002).  Details of extraction, master mix preparation and electrophoresis are as 
described above.  The following cycle was used: 94ºC for 4 minutes; 30 cycles of 94ºC for 
30 seconds, 53ºC for 30 seconds, 72ºC for 1 minute; and a final extension at 72ºC for 4 
minutes.  Primers and product sizes are detailed in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Primers and product sizes used for PCR for nuc, mecA and PVL gene 
identification and SCCmec typing. 
 
Primer Sequence  (5’-3’)  Product 
size (kb) 
Concentration 
(µM) 
mecA-1 CTCAGGTACTGCTATCCACC  1 
mecA-2 CACTTGGTATATCTTCACC 
449bp 
1 
nuc-1 GCGATTGATGGTGATACGGTT  1 
nuc-2 AGCCAAGCCTTGACGAACTAAAGC  280bp  1 
pvl-1 ATCATTAGGTAAAATGTCTGGACATGATCCA  1 
pvl-2 GCATCAASTGTATTGGATAGCAAAAGC 
(S=G/C 1:1 ratio) 
433bp 1 
CIF2 F2  TTCGAGTTGCTGATGAAGAAAGG  0.4 
CIF2 R2  ATTTACCACAAGGACTACCAGC  495bp  0.4 
KDP F1  AATCATCTGCCATTGGTGATGC  0.2 
KDP R1  CGAATGAAGTGAAAGAAAGTGG  284bp  0.2 
MEC1 P2  ATCAAGACTTGCATTCAGGC  0.4 
MEC1 P3  GCGGTTTCAATTCACTTGTC  209bp  0.4 
DCS F2  CATCCTATGATAGCTTGGTC  0.8 
DCS R1  CTAAATCATAGCCATGACCG  342bp  0.8 
RIF4 F3  GTGATTGTTCGAGATATGTGG  0.2 
RIF4 R9  CGCTTTATCTGTATCTATCGC  243bp  0.2 
RIF5 F10  TTCTTAAGTACACGCTGAATCG  0.4 
RIF5 R13  GTCACAGTAATTCCATCAATGC  414bp  0.4 
IS431 P4  CAGGTCTCTTCAGATCTACG  0.8 
PUB110
R1 
GAGCCATAAACACCAATAGCC 381bp  0.4 
IS431 P4  CAGGTCTCTTCAGATCTACG  0.8 
PT181 
R1 
GAAGAATGGGGAAAGCTTCAC 303bp  0.4 
MECA 
P4 
TCCAGATTACAACTTCACCAGG 0.8 
MECA 
P7 
CCACTTCATATCTTGTAACG  162bp  0.8  
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2.4.1.4  Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) 
 
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis typing of SmaI (Invitrogen, UK) digested DNA was 
performed
 by a modification of a previously described method (Bannerman et al., 1995).  
Briefly, S. aureus colonies from overnight cultures were incorporated into agarose plugs. 
After bacterial lysis, genomic DNA was digested using SmaI (Invitrogen, UK).  PFGE was 
performed by clamped homogeneous electric field (CHEF) electrophoresis with a CHEF-
mapper system (Bio-Rad Laboratories, California, USA). The fragments were separated 
with a linear ramped pulse time
 of 6.8–63.8 s over a period of 23 h at 14°C. Gels were 
analysed visually and the epidemiological relationship between isolates was assessed using 
the criteria described by Tenover and colleagues (Tenover et al., 1995). 
 
 
2.4.1.5  Spa typing 
 
Amplification of the spa repeat region was performed using primers spa-1113f (5’-
AAGACGATCCTTCGGTGAGC-3’) and spa-1514r (5’-
CAGCAGTAGTGCCGTTTGCTT-3’) as previously described (Harmsen et al., 2003).   
PCR products were sequenced using BigDye v1.1 (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, USA) 
and spa types were determined using the Ridom StaphType 1.4.1 software (Harmsen et al., 
2003).  The BURP (based upon repeat patterns) algorithm was used to cluster resulting spa 
types into different groups.  Spa types with less than five repeats were excluded from the 
analysis. 
 
 
2.4.2 Meat and dried pig’s ear treat prevalence study 
2.4.2.1  Isolation of MRSA and MSSA 
 
As in the previously reported study (2.4.1.1), swabs were initially placed directly into 
Tryptone Soya Broth (TSB, Oxoid Ltd., UK) supplemented with 2.5% NaCl.  However, at 
this NaCl concentration, overgrowth of enterococci was observed, so the NaCl 
concentration was increased to 6.5% and all samples were re-incubated in the modified 
enrichment broth.  Broths were incubated at 37.1ºC for 48 hours and after enrichment, 
25µL was transferred to each of a 5% sheep blood agar (SBA) and MRSA-Select agar  
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(MRSA Select; BioRad, France) plate via pipette.  The innoculant was then spread over the 
plate using a sterile loop and these samples were incubated at 37ºC for 24 hours (SBA) and 
48 hours (MRSA-Select).  The MRSA-Select plates were assessed at 24 and 48 hours of 
incubation.   
 
Catalase production was assessed by mixing a loop of cells from the agar culture with a 
drop of 30% hydrogen peroxide on a glass microscope slide.  The immediate appearance of 
bubbles was indicative of the presence of catalase.  The presence of DNase was assessed 
using DNase agar plates (Oxoid Ltd, UK) and following the manufacturer instructions.  In 
short, isolates were inoculated onto the DNase agar, incubated at 37ºC for 24 hours.  After 
incubation, the plates were flooded with 10% HCl and those with zones of clearance 
around the colonies were classed as positive. 
 
 
2.4.2.2  Further identification 
 
Presumptive MRSA and MSSA colonies were confirmed as such using standard PCR 
techniques to identify mecA and nuc as described above (Section 2.4.1.3).  Antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing was carried out using the Vitek 1 system only and PFGE typing as 
described above (2.4.1.2 and 2.4.1.4) on all samples that were mecA and nuc positive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK 
OF ACQUISITION OF MRSA IN PET DOGS 
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3.1  Introduction 
 
The relationship between MRSA in humans and companion animals is poorly defined.  It is 
known that dogs may act as reservoirs of MRSA for humans and that the same strain is 
often found in dogs and humans inhabiting the same household, or veterinary workers in 
contact with infected dogs (Cefai et al., 1994; Manian, 2003; Leonard et al., 2006; Weese 
et al., 2006b). However, in contrast to the strains most commonly recovered in horses 
(Weese et al., 2005) and pigs (Voss et al., 2005), MRSA found in dogs are 
indistinguishable from the most common hospital acquired strains isolated from humans 
(predominantly EMRSA-15, but also EMRSA-16 in the UK) and as such, it has not been 
possible to describe the direction of transfer between humans and dogs thus far (Baptiste et 
al., 2005; Rich et al., 2005; Weese et al., 2006b; Leonard and Markey, 2007).  While it is 
commonly acknowledged that dogs are likely to be the recipients of MRSA from humans 
and act as a secondary reservoir for potential reinfection or colonisation, rather than 
providing their own host-adapted source (Duquette and Nuttall, 2004; Rich et al., 2005), no 
conclusive evidence exists to support this.  Consequently, the potential contribution of 
dogs that are colonised or infected with MRSA to the burden of disease in humans and 
conversely, the potential contribution of colonised or infected humans to canine carriage or 
disease, has not been directly quantifiable.  In order to begin to quantify these 
contributions, an initial assessment of the risk of acquisition of MRSA in dogs will 
facilitate the identification of important sources of the pathogen and the overall risk of 
acquisition of MRSA.     
 
Qualitative risk assessment is often used as the first step in assessing the risk from a 
putative hazard.  This chapter presents a qualitative assessment that aims to define the risk 
of acquisition of MRSA in a dog over any given 24 hour period. 
 
 
3.2  Materials and Methods 
 
Given the lack of alignment of the topic of this risk assessment with either of the OIE or 
CAC risk analysis frameworks (sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2), the qualitative study presented here 
was undertaken following a combination of the aforementioned structures (Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 1999; OIE, 2003).  The combined framework that was used is 
represented by the two main areas of hazard identification and characterisation and risk  
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estimation.  Exposure and consequence assessments were undertaken within the step of 
risk estimation.   
 
 
3.2.1 Hazard identification and characterisation 
 
In the current assessment, the hazard is defined as MRSA.  A generalisation of ‘MRSA 
positive’ or ‘MRSA negative’ is used consistently within this thesis for human, animal and 
environmental status and refers to a source from which MRSA can be cultured directly and 
that has the ability to contaminate, colonise or infect others.   
 
The term ‘MRSA positive’ makes no effort to distinguish between carriage, colonisation 
and infection with this organism, and these states are considered as a spectrum within the 
definition of the hazard.  It is acknowledged that colonisation and carriage states differ by 
the presence or absence of attachment of the bacteria to target areas (cells or extracellular 
matrices) respectively (Projan and Novick, 1997).  However, reference in this work to 
‘carriage’ does not preclude ‘colonisation’, as the resolution of the data are not sufficient to 
differentiate these states in much, if not all, of the literature.  Furthermore, as defined by 
Williams (1963), carriage of S. aureus (and consequently MRSA) may be considered to be 
persistent or intermittent.  Persistent carriers predominantly harbour a single strain of S. 
aureus, whereas intermittent carriers may carry any strain on an intermittent basis 
(Williams, 1963).  Again, while this information represents important epidemiological 
distinctions, the resolution of the data presented herein is not sufficient to differentiate 
between these states and as such they are considered in combination.  Similarly, while it is 
acknowledged that epidemiological differences exist, no attempt has been made to 
differentiate between different species or subtypes of MRSA within this qualitative 
assessment and the term MRSA encompasses CA-MRSA, HA-MRSA and all potential 
phenotypic and genotypic combinations.  
 
Finally, marked geographical disparity exists in prevalence estimates for MRSA in humans 
and animals and variation may occur at national, community, institutional and individual 
levels (Livermore and Pearson, 2007).  This is taken into account where possible in the 
current study.  
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3.2.2 Risk grading 
 
In all steps of the risk assessment, the pre-defined qualitative risk categories of negligible, 
low, moderate and high were used.  These categories were defined separately for the 
assessment of absolute risk (Table 3.1) and risk relative to a (qualitative) median 
approximation (Table 3.2).   
 
 
Table 3.1. Definitions of the qualitative descriptors used for the qualitative risk assessment 
of MRSA acquisition in pet dogs (Moutou et al., 2001). 
 
Term Definition 
Negligible  When the probability of exposure or transmission is 
sufficiently low to be ignored, or if the event is possible only 
in exceptional circumstances 
 
Low  When exposure or transmission may occur in some cases 
 
Moderate  When exposure or transmission may occur in all cases 
 
High  When exposure or transmission is likely to occur 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Definitions of the relative qualitative descriptors used for the qualitative risk 
assessment of MRSA acquisition in pet dogs. 
 
Term Definition 
Negligible  When the probability of exposure or transmission is 
sufficiently low to be ignored, or if the event is possible only 
in exceptional circumstances 
 
Low  When exposure or transmission is less than the qualitatively 
assessed median (central) level 
 
Moderate  When exposure or transmission is around the qualitatively 
assessed median (central) level 
 
High  When exposure or transmission is higher than the qualitatively 
assessed median (central) level 
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3.2.3 Risk estimation 
 
A conceptual model, representing a chain of potential events that may befall a single 
animal in any given 24 hour time period to result in becoming ‘MRSA positive’, was 
defined as the first step of risk estimation.   
 
Individual exposure assessments were undertaken to define the risk of exposure to MRSA 
through each potential route of acquisition outlined in the conceptual model.  A systematic 
qualitative review of the available appropriate literature was used to consider all influential 
factors for exposure of an individual dog to MRSA during a 24 hour period for each route.  
Following the exposure assessment, a consequence assessment was undertaken, also by 
consideration of available literature.  The consequence was defined as the likelihood of 
transmission of the organism over a 24 hour period, given that an individual dog is exposed 
to a MRSA positive individual, animal or environment.  Relevant literature was sought that 
addressed the dependence of the consequence on transmission dynamics of the organism, 
host defence mechanisms and interactions between the at-risk dog and source of the 
hazard.  An overall qualitative grading of risk of exposure and subsequent risk of transfer 
of MRSA (consequence) were derived using both absolute and relative categorical 
rankings (Tables 3.1, 3.2).   
 
The resulting rankings (exposure and consequence) were then combined for an overall 
estimation of risk using a matrix approach, modified from an approach used by EFSA 
(2007), whereby the probability of exposure was combined multiplicatively with the 
probability of transmission for each putative route of MRSA acquisition (Table 3.3).  This 
approach takes into account the reduction in probability that occurs with multiplicative 
combination, unlike other previously utilised methods (Sein, 1998; Moutou et al., 2001).  
This combination was undertaken separately for absolute and relative risk estimates 
(Tables 3.1 and 3.2).  As noted by Clough and colleagues (Clough et al., 2006), the 
assignment of each risk value is subjective and no attempt was made to interpret qualitative 
outcomes numerically at any stage.  
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Table 3.3. Matrix combination of qualitative categories (adapted from EFSA (2007)). 
Result of the assessment of parameter 1   
Result of the assessment 
of parameter 2 
Negligible Low Moderate High 
Negligible  Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Low  Negligible Negligible  - 
Low 
Low Low 
Moderate  Negligible Low  Low Moderate 
High  Negligible Low Moderate  Moderate 
 
 
 
3.3  Results 
 
A conceptual model, describing the potential routes or series of events that may occur 
leading to MRSA acquisition in a single dog over a 24 hour time period, was specified and 
is presented as Figure 3.1.  Seven non-sequential and non-mutually exclusive routes for 
acquisition of MRSA in a dog were defined.  Each pathway (A to G) represents a 
combination of the risk of exposure to a particular source of the pathogen and the risk of 
transmission of the organism to the at-risk animal.  This combination corresponds to an 
estimate of overall risk.   
 
It was assumed that exposure to MRSA could occur through direct contact with MRSA 
positive humans, dogs, other animals or through an environmental source. The 
environment was considered to be dependent on MRSA positive humans and dogs and 
alternative (non-canine) animal sources.  Exposure pathways were stratified into exposure 
through attendance at a veterinary hospital and those exposed through ‘the community’ in a 
given 24 hour period.  For the purpose of this thesis, ‘the community’ refers to any location 
outwith a veterinary hospital.  Similarly, the term ‘owner’ refers to the primary carer of the 
dog in any given 24 hours (this may change from day to day), while the term ‘secondary 
person’ refers to a non-owner and may be another member of the household, or a non-
household member.     
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Figure 3.1. Conceptual pathways for exposure assessment of MRSA acquisition in a dog 
for any given 24 hour period 
Y – yes, N – no, A-G – pathways resulting in MRSA acquisition.  Pathways A to D and E 
to G are interchangeable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMUNITY VETERINARY 
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For an individual dog in any given 24 hour period, consideration of the potential routes of 
acquisition of MRSA will depend on whether they have attended a veterinary hospital or 
not.  Animals that attend a veterinary hospital within the period of consideration also have 
the potential for exposure to MRSA through the community pathways if they are treated on 
an outpatient basis.  
 
 
3.3.1 Exposure assessment  
 
The risk of exposure to MRSA through any of the described routes is defined following 
consideration of previously published data. 
 
 
3.3.1.1  Veterinary clinic attendance 
 
A recent targeted questionnaire study found that 84% of dogs about which owners were 
questioned had attended a veterinary clinic at least once within the previous year, 62% had 
been vaccinated and 4% were presented for vomiting and diarrhoea (Westgarth et al., 
2008).  Another large questionnaire study has reported a vaccination rate of 98% for dogs 
that attended a veterinary clinic in the last year, with the vast majority of these dogs being 
vaccinated within the year prior to questioning (Edwards et al., 2004).  This study also 
reported signs of ill health in over 18% of the dogs during a 2 week period, while another 
study estimated 16% of animals (dogs and cats) had at least one ‘disease’ (encompassing a 
broad range of chronic and acute conditions) at a single point in time (Freeman et al., 
2006).  The proportion of ill animals that are presented for veterinary attention is not 
reported  and, given that only 12% of ill humans will seek medical care (Dwight et al., 
2005), it is likely that owner-reported illness is a vast overestimation of veterinary clinic 
attendance due to illness.  These data are further limited in their applicability for exposure 
assessment because detailed information on frequency and length of attendance and 
admission per disease and per animal at veterinary clinics are also lacking.  In general, and 
in the most basic sense, four groups of animals are likely to attend veterinary clinics: 
routine outpatients (predominantly to obtain vaccinations), routine inpatients (elective 
surgeries and procedures and boarding pets), ill animals that are treated as outpatients and 
ill animals that are admitted for inpatient treatment.   
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While these data reveal that most animals will attend a veterinary clinic at least once within 
a year, it is likely that on any given day the probability of an individual dog attending a 
veterinary clinic is low.  This estimate is absolute and it is not possible to obtain a relative 
estimate for this initial step for all potential routes of acquisition. 
 
 
3.3.1.2  Route A – Acquisition of MRSA through contact with a 
MRSA positive owner 
 
The prevalence of MRSA colonisation in human individuals in the general population in 
the UK has been estimated to be 1.5% (Abudu et al., 2001) and similar estimates (0.8% to 
3%) emanate from the USA (Jernigan et al., 2003a; Jernigan et al., 2003b; Kuehnert et al., 
2006).  Some demographic groups, such as health care workers, are more like to be 
colonised with MRSA than the general population and it has been estimated that MRSA is 
carried in the external nares of 6.2% of health care workers in the UK (Eveillard et al., 
2004).  Similarly, a review of the literature published globally has amalgamated the results 
of 104 geographically diverse studies to report a nasal carriage rate of 4.1% for health care 
workers (Albrich and Harbarth, 2008).     
 
A number of other studies, undertaken in various geographical regions, have identified 
additional demographic groups at greater risk of nasal colonisation.  Immunocompromised 
individuals, injection drug users, the elderly (Kuehnert et al., 2006), in particular those 
admitted to a nursing home (Jernigan et al., 2003a; Jernigan et al., 2003b), the young, 
those with a past history of MRSA, those with previous antimicrobial usage, in particular 
quinolones and macrolides (increasing with number of prescribed antibiotics) (Schneider-
Lindner et al., 2007; Tacconelli et al., 2008), and those hospitalised within the previous 
year (Jernigan et al., 2003a; Jernigan et al., 2003b; Furuno et al., 2006) have been 
identified to be at increased risk for clonisation with MRSA (Hidron et al., 2005; Furuno et 
al., 2006; Elston, 2007).  Similarly, risk factors for infection with MRSA include: MRSA 
colonisation, previous hospitalisation, surgery, immunosuppression, use of antibiotics and 
breach in epidermal integrity (Graffunder and Venezia, 2002; Safdar and Bradley, 2008).  
However, estimates of the magnitude of these risks, in the form of relative risk estimates, 
are not available for these groups of individuals.    
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The distribution of these risk factor groups with respect to dog ownership is unclear.   
While it has been shown that the presence of permanently sick/disabled persons in a 
household has been associated with increased odds of owning a dog and that households 
with adults over 60 years of age are less likely to own a dog (Westgarth et al., 2007), lack 
of detailed information on dog ownership does not allow stratification with respect to risk 
factors for carriage of MRSA.  Therefore, it must be assumed that dog owners are evenly 
distributed through risk factor groups. 
 
The number and types of interactions between dogs and their primary owner are difficult to 
quantify.  However, it is likely that all dogs have at least some form of close interaction 
with their owners on a daily basis, given the dependency of the relationship.  Westgarth 
and colleagues (Westgarth et al., 2008) report close dog-owner interaction, with their 
questionnaire study of the owners of 279 dogs revealing that 14% of these dogs slept on 
human beds, 45% lay on owners’ laps ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ and that sniffing, nudging 
with the nose and licking hands were commonly reported to occur ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’.    
 
Risk estimation 
 
These data show that, using an absolute scale (Table 3.1), the probability of exposure to an 
MRSA positive owner is low.  When considering risk relative to a median probability of 
exposure to a source of MRSA within the community, the estimate (Table 3.2) is high.    
 
 
3.3.1.3  Route B – Acquisition of MRSA through contact with a 
MRSA ‘secondary’ person 
 
‘Secondary’ people may be divided into those who are household members and those who 
are not.  The number of secondary contacts that an at-risk dog will have in a given 24 hour 
period will vary. It has been shown that households that own dogs are associated with a 
greater number of human occupants than those that do not (Eveillard et al., 2004; 
Westgarth et al., 2007) and also that, on average, a dog will have contact with between 
three and fourteen alternative (non-household member) humans per day (Westgarth et al., 
2008; Heller et al., 2009).   
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Again, due to insufficient demographic information, the likelihood that any of these 
secondary contacts is MRSA positive requires the same consideration as the prevalence 
information that has been presented for ‘contact with a MRSA positive owner’. However, 
it is expected that a correlation exists between the MRSA status of an owner and a 
secondary person within the same household (ie if one household member is colonised then 
the others are more likely to be colonised also) (Noble et al., 1967; Eveillard et al., 2004) 
but this is unlikely to extend to external contacts.  In one of the few studies undertaken that 
attempts to describe and quantify this correlation, the families of ten MRSA positive health 
care workers were investigated to find that members of four of the families were also 
colonised with the same strain of MRSA (Eveillard et al., 2004).  Similarly, in another 
study, the household contacts of eight out of 11 health care workers who were recolonised 
with MRSA subsequent to initial successful decolonisation were found to have at least one 
household member that was also colonised with MRSA (Kniehl et al., 2005).   
Environmental contamination was also found in the latter study and this will be addressed 
subsequently.  In addition, specific subpopulations of pets exist, including those involved 
in animal assisted interventions in hospitals and long-term care facilities, that are at greater 
risk of MRSA acquisition (Lefebvre et al., 2009) and, while these groups are likely to be 
small in number, they should be identified as high risk for exposure to MRSA 
contaminated persons and environments.   
 
Risk estimation 
 
The probability of exposure to a MRSA positive secondary person is low using absolute 
definitions.  However, the probability is reclassified as high if they are a household 
member and moderate if they are not when using measures relative to the median level of 
exposure to a source of MRSA within the community.  In addition, it is likely that a 
dependency exists between the MRSA status of household members. 
  
 
3.3.1.4  Route C – Acquisition of MRSA through contact with a 
MRSA positive animal within the community 
 
Little information is available regarding potential contacts between dogs and other animal 
species within the community.  However, small amounts of qualitative and quantitative 
data are available to define dog-to-dog interactions.  It has recently been shown that the  
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most common number of direct contacts of an at-risk dog with other dogs in a given 24 
hour period is between one and ten (Westgarth et al., 2008; Heller et al., 2009).  These 
estimates imply a high frequency of dog-to-dog contact and the common behaviours of 
‘being playful’ and ‘sniffing’ are reported to occur ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ in 59% and 81% 
of the dogs surveyed respectively (Westgarth et al., 2008).  While it is not possible to 
quantify the amount of nose-to-nose or other close contact with the data that are available, 
the nature of the contacts that have been reported is often superficial and it is unlikely that 
prolonged close contact occurs in many cases.  Furthermore, the prevalence of MRSA 
colonisation in dogs within the general community across a number of countries has been 
estimated to be between 0 and 1% (Murphy et al., 2006; Rich and Roberts, 2006; Vengust 
et al., 2006; Hanselman et al., 2008).  It is assumed that contact with other animals within 
the community will be less likely and less intimate than contact with dogs and therefore 
this species is used to identify the upper limit of contact with other animals within the 
community.   
 
Recent studies have identified farm animals (pigs and cattle) in The Netherlands and pigs 
in countries including Canada, Singapore, Germany, Austria and Denmark as having the 
potential to be colonised with MRSA ST398 (Guardabassi et al., 2007; Sergio et al., 2007; 
Witte et al., 2007; Khanna et al., 2008; Meemken et al., 2008).  Prevalence estimates vary 
between countries, but are as high as 39% of all slaughter pigs, representing 81% of farms 
in The Netherlands (de Neeling et al., 2007).  While data are not available regarding type 
and amount of contact between dogs and farm animals, it is possible that dogs housed on 
farms will have an increased risk of MRSA colonisation, similar to the findings of in-
contact humans such as farmers and veterinarians, in these geographical areas (Voss et al., 
2005; Wulf et al., 2006; van Loo et al., 2007b).  However, it must be noted that MRSA 
ST398 has not been cultured from a canine source.  Similarly, ST398 has not been 
identified in animals in many countries at the time of writing and there is no evidence that 
farm animals represent an increased risk for the source of these bacteria outside of the 
countries named above. 
 
Risk estimation 
 
The probability of exposure to a MRSA positive animal within the community is low using 
absolute and relative definitions.   
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3.3.1.5  Route D – Acquisition of MRSA through contact with a 
MRSA positive environment 
 
To the author’s knowledge, few estimates exist of the prevalence of environmental 
contamination with MRSA outside of veterinary and human hospitals.  One study, 
discussed previously with respect to household contact colonisation, screened the 
household environments of eight MRSA carrying health-care workers who were 
recolonised after initial eradication regimens, to find seven of the eight households 
contaminated with MRSA (Kniehl et al., 2005).  In this study, effective household 
decontamination was associated with eradication of carriage status in most cases, and 
household contamination was implied to be responsible for a number of re-colonisation 
scenarios (Kniehl et al., 2005).  In a potentially less biased study, the households of 35 
health-care and non health-care workers in the USA with unknown MRSA status and with 
pets or children, were screened for S. aureus and MRSA (Scott et al., 2008).  In this study, 
MRSA was isolated from 26% of the home environments and an association was found 
between owning a cat and presence of environmental MRSA, although only univariable 
analyses were undertaken and sample sizes were small (Scott et al., 2008).  Furthermore, a 
study undertaken in the USA concluded that antimicrobial resistant bioaerosols are 
commonly found in residential homes, and that resistant strains of S. aureus are present in 
higher concentrations within homes compared to outside (Gandara et al., 2006).  To the 
author’s knowledge, no studies of this nature have been undertaken with respect to 
colonised or infected dogs. 
 
In this risk assessment, exposure to food is considered an environmental source of MRSA 
for dogs.  While it is considered that the role of food in the transmission of MRSA to 
humans is minimal, it can be asserted that dogs have a very different relationship with food 
than humans, with far more prolonged and predominantly facial contact with some types of 
food, including bones and meat-based treats.  Some data exist to document pathogen 
transfer from pet treats to both dogs and their owners (Public Health Agency of Canada, 
2006), but this risk appears to be mediated through ingestion and faecal shedding.  Contact 
with and ingestion of raw diets has been shown to be associated with faecal shedding of 
salmonellae and E.coli, but not MRSA (Lefebvre et al., 2008).  MRSA has been isolated, at 
low prevalence, from meat products in Italy (Normanno et al., 2007; Simeoni et al., 2008) 
and The Netherlands (van Loo et al., 2007a).  As such, the risk of MRSA acquisition and 
shedding in dogs through ingestion can be regarded as negligible, although dogs fed raw  
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meat diets do have contact with the surface of the meat, and contaminated surfaces such as 
bowls, which may harbour MRSA and as such the potential for meat to act as an 
environmental source of the organism should not be discounted.      
 
 Risk estimation 
 
The probability of exposure to a MRSA positive environment within the community is low 
using absolute measures and moderate using relative definitions.  In addition, it is likely 
that a dependency exists between the MRSA status of household members (owners and 
secondary persons) and the community environment. 
  
 
3.3.1.6  Route E – Acquisition of MRSA through contact with a 
MRSA positive animal within a veterinary hospital 
 
It can be reasonably assumed that the probability of an at-risk dog contacting another dog 
directly at a veterinary hospital is low (the only situation should be in the waiting room).  
However, it is likely that the probability of waiting-room contact varies markedly between 
veterinary clinics and is dependent on the size of the clinic, density of patients and clinic 
operational procedures.  As presented for ‘contact with a colonised animal within the 
community’, the prevalence of MRSA colonisation in dogs has been estimated to be 
between 0 and 1% (Murphy et al., 2006; Rich and Roberts, 2006; Bagcigil et al., 2007; 
Hanselman et al., 2008) within the general community.  Two of these studies report a 
prevalence of 0 and 0.5% in dogs entering veterinary teaching hospitals in Denmark and 
Canada, respectively (Bagcigil et al., 2007; Hanselman et al., 2008) and another reports, 
without describing methods, a prevalence of 0.4% in dogs entering two first opinion 
veterinary clinics in the UK (Rich and Roberts, 2006).  A higher prevalence has been found 
in dogs sampled whilst hospitalised at a veterinary hospital (up to 8.9%) (Loeffler et al., 
2005) although this may represent an outbreak scenario.    
 
Risk estimation 
 
The probability of exposure to a MRSA positive animal within a veterinary clinic is 
defined as low using absolute definitions.  Similarly, the probability is also defined as low  
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when using measures relative to the median level of exposure to a source of MRSA within 
a veterinary clinic.   
 
 
3.3.1.7  Route F - Acquisition of MRSA through contact with a 
MRSA contaminated environment within a veterinary 
hospital 
 
The prevalence of environmental contamination with MRSA has been estimated to be 
around 10% in two studies of sites within small animal veterinary hospitals (Loeffler et al., 
2005; Murphy et al., 2006).  However, in a separate study undertaken in a geographical 
region associated with a low prevalence in veterinary staff, a markedly lower 
environmental prevalence of 1.4% was found (Heller et al., 2009).  As environmental 
contamination is unlikely to be independent of human and canine colonisation, these 
estimates are likely to be correlated.  Any dog attending a veterinary hospital will come in 
contact with the environment to some degree, although the extent and nature of contact will 
vary on a case-by-case basis.  In the current model, it is considered that the same risk is 
present for the clinical environment that will be contacted by an outpatient or inpatient, 
although the number and length of contacts in any given 24 hour period are likely to be 
greater for inpatients.    
 
Risk estimation 
 
The probability of exposure to a MRSA positive environment within a veterinary clinic is 
low using absolute and moderate to high relative to the median level of exposure to a 
source of MRSA within a veterinary clinic.   
 
 
3.3.1.8  Route G - Acquisition of MRSA through contact with 
MRSA positive veterinary staff within a veterinary 
hospital 
 
It is considered certain that a dog will come into contact with a member of veterinary staff 
while at a veterinary hospital, irrespective of whether the dog progresses to be an inpatient  
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or remains on an outpatient basis.  The type and extent of contact, including the number of 
staff members contacted, will vary depending on the severity of the illness and the nature 
of the intervention required.  Two studies undertaken at international veterinary 
conferences revealed colonisation rates of 4.4% (Hanselman et al., 2006a) (North America) 
and 9.8% (Deacon et al., 2006) (UK) in small animal veterinarians, and a cross-sectional 
study undertaken in staff at a tertiary referral veterinary hospital in London revealed a 
prevalence of 17.9% (Loeffler et al., 2005).  However, a similar study undertaken at the 
University of Glasgow revealed a markedly lower prevalence of 3.1% in their veterinary 
staff (Heller et al., 2009).  Again, although no objective data exist, it is well documented 
that, as in human hospitals, MRSA may transfer between veterinary staff and patients, and 
identical strains of MRSA have been identified in veterinary staff and dogs in a number of 
studies (Baptiste et al., 2005; Weese et al., 2006b; McLean and Ness, 2008).  
 
Risk estimation 
 
The probability of exposure to MRSA positive veterinary staff within a veterinary clinic is 
low using absolute measures and high using measures relative to the median level of 
exposure to a source of MRSA within a veterinary clinic.  In addition, it is likely that a 
dependency exists between the MRSA status of veterinary staff, patients and veterinary 
environmental contamination. 
 
 
3.3.2 Consequence assessment  
 
Definition of the consequence of exposure to a MRSA positive source requires 
consideration of a) the amount of pathogen that the dog is exposed to and b) the likely 
dose-response mechanism that occurs after exposure.  
 
 
3.3.2.1  Quantity of pathogen exposure 
 
Similar to factors considered for zoonotic transmission of disease, the likelihood of 
transmission of bacterial organisms to animals requires consideration of the number of 
MRSA positive sites, animals or humans that the dog is exposed to, the quantity of 
excretion of the bacteria from these sources (human and animal), mode of transmission of  
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the bacteria, the behavioral characteristics of the animal, the immune response of the 
animal and existing measures of prevention of pathogen transfer (Chomel and Arzt, 2000; 
Robinson and Pugh, 2002; Murphy, 2008).  The number of positive sites and behavioural 
characteristics of the at-risk dog may be addressed through knowledge of the number and 
nature of interactions that have been discussed throughout the exposure assessment.  In 
summary, it is likely that interactions are greater in number and intimacy between dogs and 
their owners or other household members than with other humans (Westgarth et al., 2008).  
Similarly, it is likely that intimate interaction exists between dogs and veterinary staff 
while an animal is hospitalised.  The use of mitigation strategies such as hand hygiene in 
any of these humans prior to dog contact is unknown but it may be postulated that hand 
washing is far more likely to occur after interacting with a dog than prior to interaction, in 
both community and veterinary hospital settings.   
 
The likelihood and quantity of excretion of MRSA from a colonised individual is not 
constant. The main routes of dissemination of MRSA from humans are via touch 
(primarily or through secondary contact with colonised nasal or other mucosae) and, less 
commonly, through aerosolisation (Sheretz et al., 1996; Shiomori et al., 2001; Bassetti et 
al., 2005; Wertheim et al., 2005).  The number of MRSA organisms excreted or 
disseminated is related to the number that are present in the anterior nares (or other area of 
the body) and increased dissemination has been associated with factors including persistent 
(as opposed to intermittent) carriage, concurrent perineal carriage and the presence of 
upper respiratory tract infections and allergies (White, 1961; Sherertz et al., 2001; 
Wertheim et al., 2005; Bischoff et al., 2006).  Similarly, it is widely accepted that use of 
antimicrobials to which MRSA is resistant will allow the population density of the bacteria 
to increase in the absence of competitive flora and this should be considered in addition to 
general individual variation for both human and animal sources (Smith et al., 2002).  
 
Once an animal is exposed to a colonising dose of MRSA, there is a proportional 
likelihood that those bacteria will be transferred to the animal and establish some form of 
residence (contamination, colonisation or infection).  As with excretion, transfer efficiency 
can be viewed as heterogeneous and is dependent on factors including the type of source, 
survival of the organism and nature of contact between the source and the at-risk animal 
(Rusin et al., 2002).  MRSA is known to transfer to humans via the primary route of touch 
or contact (Wertheim et al., 2005).  Other, less likely, routes include aerosolisation, 
although this route is of greater importance in dissemination of the bacteria as opposed to 
acquisition (Sheretz et al., 1996; Wertheim et al., 2005), and ingestion (Kluytmans et al.,  
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1995).  It must be noted that ingestion is only likely to result in colonisation or infection in 
exceptional circumstances, due to the protective presence of gastric acid, normal 
gastrointestinal flora, and a functional immune response, all of which work to prevent 
colonisation of transient microorganisms such as MRSA (Kluytmans et al., 1995).  
 
 
3.3.2.2  Dose-response considerations 
 
To the author’s knowledge, a dose-response relationship has not been defined for S. aureus 
or MRSA in humans or dogs.  In humans, a few studies have attempted to quantify the 
transfer efficiency of bacteria from various sources, and these report efficiencies of 42% 
between smooth fomites and the hand (Rusin et al., 2002), and 14-17% between MRSA 
positive patients and healthcare worker hands (non-gloved and gloved, respectively) 
(McBryde et al., 2004).  However, these studies are only minimally useful in the current 
assessment and do not allow inference of colonisation or infection secondary to transfer.   
 
It is prudent to consider host-defense mechanisms in the discussion of the potential 
consequence of exposure of a dog to MRSA.  While risk factors for colonisation and 
infection with MRSA in humans are well defined (discussed in section 3.3.1.2) and many 
of the MRSA isolates that have been reported from dogs have been obtained from surgical 
site and wound infections (Tomlin et al., 1999; Leonard et al., 2006; McLean and Ness, 
2008), formally defined risk factors are yet to be identified for MRSA infection in dogs, 
although studies are in progress (Pfeiffer et al., 2005).  Risk factors have been identified 
for MRSA colonisation in horses and these include prior colonisation and antimicrobial 
administration within 30 days (Weese and Lefebvre, 2007).  
 
Risk estimation 
 
The data available to inform a consequence assessment (presented above) are minimally 
useful for absolute categorical estimation of risk of organism transfer, given exposure to 
different sources.  However, using the absolute categorical definitions, and taking into 
account the extent and nature of contact with different sources, it can reasonably be 
postulated that the probability of transmission of MRSA to an individual dog, given that 
exposure to an MRSA positive source has occurred may be classed as moderate from an 
owner or veterinary staff, but low from all other routes as defined in Figure 3.1.  Using  
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relative measures, the probability of transmission may be classed as high for MRSA 
positive owners and other household members, moderate from an MRSA positive 
environment and low from MRSA positive animals and non-household member humans, 
when compared to the median probability of transfer of MRSA within the community.  The 
relative probability of transmission within veterinary clinics may be classed as high from 
veterinary staff, moderate from the environment and low from other animals, when 
compared to the median probability of transfer of MRSA within a veterinary hospital.  
 
 
3.3.3 Overall Estimation 
 
Taking into consideration all of the evidence presented above, the results of the exposure 
and consequence assessments are displayed (in absolute and relative qualitative terms) in 
Table 3.4 and overall estimates, representing matrix-based combinations of these results 
(Table 3.3), are presented in Table 3.5.   
  
 
8
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Table 3.4. Qualitative exposure and transmission risk estimations for community and veterinary routes of acquisition of MRSA in the dog. 
 
     Exposure  Transmission 
 Route    Absolute*  Relative*  Absolute  Relative 
  Goes to the vet    Low Low N/A N/A 
Community  MRSA positive Owner (A)    Low  High Moderate High 
 Household  Low High Low High 
 
MRSA positive secondary person (B)
Non-household  Low Moderate Low  Low 
  MRSA positive animal (C)    Low Low Low Low 
  MRSA positive environment (D)    Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Veterinary  MRSA positive animal (E)    Low Low Low Low 
  MRSA positive environment (F)    Low Moderate  - 
High 
Low Moderate 
  MRSA positive veterinary staff (G)    Low  High Moderate High 
 
* Absolute and relative refer to the qualitative risk categories defined in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively 
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Table 3.5. Qualitative overall risk estimation of acquisition of MRSA in a dog via differing routes. 
 
  Route    Absolute* risk estimation 
(combined with Low risk of 
veterinary attendance) 
Relative* risk estimation  
 
 
Community MRSA positive Owner (A)    Low Moderate 
 Household  Negligible - Low  Moderate 
 
MRSA positive secondary person (B) 
Non-household  Negligible - Low  Low 
  MRSA positive animal (C)    Negligible - Low  Negligible - Low 
  MRSA positive environment (D) 
 
  Negligible - Low  Low 
Veterinary  MRSA positive animal (E)    Negligible - Low 
(Negligible - Low) 
Negligible - Low 
  MRSA positive environment (F)    Negligible - Low 
(Negligible – Low) 
Low - Moderate 
  MRSA positive veterinary staff (G)    Low  
(Negligible - Low) 
Moderate 
 
* Absolute and relative refer to the qualitative risk categories defined in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively  
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3.4  Discussion 
 
This chapter has presented a qualitative assessment of the acquisition of MRSA in a dog 
over a 24 hour period.  This qualitative study provides an opportunity to obtain an estimate 
of the overall risk of MRSA acquisition, i.e. an exposure assessment for MRSA, in dogs 
and, more importantly, to attribute qualitative risk rankings to the various routes by which 
MRSA may be acquired.  Additionally and most importantly, the study has identified and 
prioritised data gaps and potential dependencies for use in future quantitative assessments. 
 
It is of great importance that the results of this chapter are interpreted in light of the 
specified categorical definitions (Tables 3.1 and 3.2) as these estimates are not intended to 
stand alone.  With that in mind, and focusing initially on the absolute categorical risk 
estimates defined in Table 3.1, the results show that the overall absolute risk of MRSA 
acquisition in a dog for any given 24 hour period is likely to vary from low (‘may occur in 
some cases’) to moderate (‘may occur in all cases’), depending on the route of acquisition.  
While fine resolution is not possible from these absolute categorical estimates, comparison 
between locations can be made and it was found that the greatest risk emanates from 
humans (owners and staff) in both community and veterinary settings and that, even when 
the probability of attending a veterinary clinic is taken into account, these risks are equally 
ranked.   
 
The use of relative risk categories in this study facilitates greater resolution of the risk 
estimates within each of the locations addressed (community and veterinary hospital).   
While comparison of risk between locations is not possible using relative measures (as the 
median values vary from setting to setting), these rankings improve discrimination between 
degrees of risk for different routes within each location.  The results of the relative risk 
analyses revealed that, within the community, household members posed the greatest risk 
for MRSA acquisition in dogs, followed by non-household members and the environment, 
while animals posed the least risk.  Similarly, within the veterinary clinic, staff were found 
to pose the greatest risk to dogs, followed by the environment and the least important route 
was through other animals.  These relative measures only have merit for use in 
combination with an absolute categorical estimate of risk, as they do not provide any 
insight into the overall measure of risk but simply allow for greater discrimination within 
absolute categories. 
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All of the results of this study require interpretation in light of the consequence of 
acquisition of MRSA for a dog, apart from the direct animal health consequences, and this 
can be assessed on two levels. Firstly, at a local level, the direct consequence of carriage, 
colonisation or infection of a dog with MRSA includes the presence of an additional source 
of environmental contamination within the veterinary hospital and in the community, along 
with the presence of a potential source of MRSA for in-contact humans. At a more general 
or global level, colonisation of a dog with MRSA represents the potential for development 
of a self-perpetuating non-human biological reservoir of MRSA. This has implications for 
an increased likelihood of exposure and subsequent colonisation or infection for humans 
and other animals, contamination of the environment and, while it is known that transfer of 
mecA occurs relatively rarely between bacterial species, the provision of a niche that 
provides the potential for transfer of resistance genes to other staphylococcal organisms, 
such as S. pseudintermedius should not be overlooked (Duquette and Nuttall, 2004).  
 
Although the results of this study may be intuitive, the value of the qualitative absolute 
measures and the use of a combination matrix in this study are questionable.  Within the 
definitions used for qualitative absolute measures (Table 3.1), the use and interpretation of 
the term ‘may’ results in the attachment of a variable component to each category.   
Probabilistically, if the likelihood of occurrence changes between groups (that is, the 
quantitative definition of the term ‘may’ is variable), it is possible that the numerical 
equivalents of the qualitative groups are, in fact, inverted, otherwise referred to as 
‘reversed rankings’ (Cox, 2005).  Furthermore, due to the lack of resolution within 
categories, the use of qualitative absolute risk estimates in the current assessment does not 
allow appropriate discrimination between the risk posed by different routes of MRSA 
acquisition (Cox, 2005).  The additional use of relative measures goes some way to 
addressing this limitation, although these measures do not allow for between-location 
comparisons.  Additionally, while it is acknowledged that it is not possible to obtain truly 
absolute categories of risk in qualitative studies (Peeler et al., 2004), in this study it was 
also not possible to obtain a combined categorical estimate of overall risk, as an 
appropriate algorithm could not be specified for additive combinations of qualitative 
categories where the categories are not mutually exclusive.  Simple adherence to the matrix 
combination method to produce an overall estimate would have resulted in spurious results 
in this case.  A further criticism of the method lies with the definition of categories.  It 
could be argued that this analysis would have benefited from the inclusion of additional 
categories such as ‘very low’ and ‘extremely low’, as employed by EFSA (2007), in order 
to provide greater detail and breakdown of risk rankings, particularly as there is clustering  
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of exposure and transmission estimates within the ‘low’ category currently.  However, 
differentiating between ‘low’, ‘very low’ and ‘extremely low’ exposure or transmission for 
MRSA would have been somewhat arbitrary and as such, this breakdown would have 
added a further level of uncertainty to the model.  Finally, the counterintuitive finding that 
consideration of the probability of attending a veterinary clinic on any given day (assessed 
as ‘low’) did not change any of the overall absolute risk estimates requires discussion.  
This finding is likely to be a result of a loss of information that has occurred with 
successive levels of qualitative coding and reflects inconsistency in the categorical coding 
process between steps (Cox et al., 2005).  A potentially marked loss of information is 
reflected in this finding and it highlights that a matrix combination is unable to account for 
vast variation in estimates if they fall within a single category (in some cases these 
variations may be in orders of magnitude).   
 
The method used in this study represents a reproducible and repeatable format for 
qualitative risk assessment procedure that, if utilised exclusively, would allow direct 
comparison between subsequent qualitative risk assessments (Dufour and Moutou, 2007).  
However, it is clear that these goals have not been met within the current study and that the 
prescribed structure is unsuitable for the topic area presented in this chapter, where a non-
modular, non-step-wise model has been specified.  Other broad areas of study, including 
food safety and import risk analysis, that can be represented by a modular, sequential 
process, appear to be more suitable to this method (Moutou et al., 2001; Clough et al., 
2006).  However, some of the methodological issues that have been highlighted in the 
current study, including loss of information with successive levels of coding and inability 
to account for marked variation in estimates within categories, are still relevant for these 
other areas (Cox et al., 2005).  
 
The key areas of uncertainty that have been identified in this study include contact 
information for dogs with all potential sources of MRSA, dose-response data for MRSA in 
humans and dogs, risk factors for MRSA colonisation or infection in dogs and temporal 
information on MRSA transmission.  These areas are important to be aware of prior to 
undertaking further analyses and should be addressed and quantified where possible in 
future studies.  Similarly, the identification of correlations in the form of dependencies 
between MRSA status of: a) in-contact humans (particularly household members), b) 
household members and the community environment to which the dog is exposed and c) 
veterinary staff, patients and the veterinary environment is important.  While it is not  
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possible to account for these dependencies in this, or any, qualitative study, it is important 
that this information is used and factored into future quantitative assessments. 
 
In this assessment it has been shown that humans represent the most important source of 
MRSA for dogs in both community and veterinary hospital settings.  The environment was 
found to be secondary to humans in terms of importance and other animals less still.  This 
study has highlighted some important methodological limitations of a technique that is 
heavily relied upon for qualitative risk assessments as the first step in the risk assessment 
process.  Given the limitations of the prescribed methods as applied to the problem under 
consideration, further validation or repudiation of the findings contained herein is called 
for using a more robust method.  A subsequent quantitative assessment applied to the same 
conceptual model of MRSA transmission is indicated to provide a more defensible 
appraisal, whilst also accounting for the variability, uncertainty and dependency that has 
been difficult to assess using the qualitative approach.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
FACT FINDING SURROUNDING MRSA IN PET 
DOGS 
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4.1  Introduction 
 
The qualitative risk assessment presented in Chapter 3 suggested a number of data gaps 
that require consideration prior to the implementation of a quantitative risk assessment in 
the same area.  Consideration of these data gaps may take many forms, one of which is 
dedicated data collection.  The funding of this PhD studentship is through a Defra VT0101 
research fellowship, the remit of which is not focused on data collection, but rather the 
development of quantitative epidemiological skills (Defra, 2006).  However, as part of the 
‘capacity building’ remit of the VT0101 programme, a number of undergraduate summer 
students and a graduate MSc student were available to be aligned with the author’s 
research fellowship and it was possible to undertake dedicated data collection through 
small projects that were supervised by the author.  The results of these projects were then 
analysed independently and included as a form of ‘fact finding’ within the risk assessment 
process. 
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4A: Prevalence and distribution of MRSA within the 
environment and staff of a university veterinary clinic 
 
Published as:  
 
Heller, J., Armstrong, S.K., Girvan, E.K., Reid, S.W.J., Moodley, A. and Mellor, D.J. 
(2009)  Prevalence and distribution of Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
within the environment and staff of a university veterinary clinic. Journal of Small Animal 
Practice, 50(4):168 – 173. 
 
 
This work was undertaken as part of a summer student project (2006) by Ms Susan 
Armstrong.  All genetic analyses were undertaken at the Scottish MRSA Reference 
Laboratory, with the exception of the spa typing, which was undertaken by Dr Arshnee 
Moodley, University of Copenhagen. 
 
 
4A.1 Introduction 
 
The contribution of contamination of the human hospital environment to hospital acquired 
infection is historically a controversial area (Boyce, 2007; Dancer, 2007).  However, there 
has been increasing attention to the possible role of the environment as a potential reservoir 
for MRSA infection.  Recent studies have demonstrated the presence of MRSA on various 
environmental surfaces within patient wards, contamination of hands and gloves with 
infectious doses of MRSA from these surfaces (McBryde et al., 2004) and patient infection 
subsequent to primary and secondary environmental contacts (Boyce et al., 1997; Hardy et 
al., 2006).  Certain environmental sites including door-handles, computer keyboards, 
patient bed surrounds and stethoscopes are considered more likely to harbour MRSA than 
others (Oie et al., 2002; Dancer, 2007).   
 
In one study of environmental contamination with MRSA in a small animal veterinary 
hospital, researchers sampled 30 environmental sites and reported a 10% prevalence 
(Loeffler et al., 2005).  This finding, along with the high carriage rate of MRSA reported in 
veterinary personnel and knowledge of the organisms’ ability to transfer between humans 
and animals (Manian, 2003; Weese et al., 2006b), highlights the potential for  
  92
environmental contamination to serve as an important reservoir for MRSA contamination, 
colonisation and infection within a veterinary hospital setting.  Given the small sample size 
and large prevalence reported in the previously quoted study (Loeffler et al., 2005), further 
quantification of the risk posed by veterinary hospital environmental contamination is 
required to ensure accurate representation within the quantitative risk assessment model.   
 
The aim of this study was to define the distribution of MRSA within the environment of a 
small animal veterinary hospital with respect to the departmental regions and colonisation 
status of the staff. 
 
 
4A.2 Materials and Methods 
 
Sampling of the hospital environment and staff was conducted at the University of 
Glasgow Small Animal Hospital on a single day (d1) within working hours.   
Environmental sampling was repeated 14 days later (d14).  No known cases of MRSA 
infection were present in hospitalised animals on the days of, or for six months prior to, the 
days of sampling. 
 
 
4A.2.1 Environmental sampling 
 
A sample size calculation, assuming an infinite ‘population’ of sample sites and using an 
estimated prevalence of 10% (Loeffler et al., 2005), with 95% confidence to detect 
prevalence to within +/-5%, indicated that 138 sites were required.  One hundred and forty 
sites were sampled on d1.  The clinic was classified into 14 areas: intensive care unit, pre-
theatre, theatre, canine wards (further classified as surgical, medical, chemotherapy and 
staff dogs/greyhounds), laundry, radiology, consulting rooms (further classified into 
medical and surgical), client waiting room and corridors.  Sites were chosen that were 
broadly replicable between areas (such as floors, door handles, work surfaces, taps, kennels 
and drains) to allow comparison.  Additional sites relevant and specific to each area were 
also included. 
  
Samples were collected using single use sterile cotton applicator swabs moistened with 
sterile distilled water.  Each swab was rotated and moved horizontally backwards and  
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forwards within a 10cm
2 area (defined by single use sterile cardboard square templates, 
where possible) for 10 seconds.  One sample was obtained for each site.    
 
A second sampling of environmental sites was undertaken on d14 to assess the temporal 
stability of the initial findings.  A total of 60 sites were sampled on this occasion, including 
all sites positive at d1, along with the remaining number of randomly selected sites that 
were initially negative.    
 
 
4A.2.2 Human sampling 
 
Approval was obtained from the University of Glasgow, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine 
Ethics Committee.  It was calculated that, based on a total population of 80 hospital staff 
and with an estimated prevalence of 10% (Loeffler et al., 2005; Hanselman et al., 2006b) 
and 95% confidence to detect prevalence to within +/-5%, a sample size of 51 was 
required.     
 
All staff members and students on clinical rotation at the University of Glasgow small 
animal hospital were approached to participate in the study via a letter that outlined the 
study and contained general information on MRSA. Participation was voluntary and signed 
informed consent was obtained from all participants.  Personal information was kept 
anonymous and information about role (veterinarian, veterinary nurse, veterinary student, 
administration), department within which the participant worked (medicine, surgery, 
theatre, other) and whether or not they had had recent contact with human healthcare 
workers, hospital patients or healthcare institutions, was documented.  A sterile cotton 
applicator swab was issued to each participant and they were instructed to rotate the swab 
in each nostril for 5 seconds under the supervision of the author. 
 
Results (presence or absence of MRSA) were made available to the participants through 
sealed letters addressed with the code of each participant.  Letters included information 
about MRSA carriage and advised further discussion with their own medical practitioner if 
concerned.  Positive individuals were invited to return for re-sampling with obvious loss of 
anonymity to the author. 
 
  
  94
4A.2.3 Isolation of MRSA 
 
All samples were enriched, cultured, and tested for antimicrobial susceptibility as outlined 
in sections 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2.  Genotypic analysis, PFGE and spa typing were also 
undertaken on each MRSA positive isolate using the methods described in sections 2.4.1.3, 
2.4.1.4 and 2.4.1.5.  
 
 
4A.3 Results 
4A.3.1 Environmental sampling 
 
Two environmental sites (2/140, 1.4%; 95% Confidence Interval 1.7-5.1%) were found to 
be positive for MRSA on d1.  These were a foam wedge used for positioning animals for 
radiography and a door handle located between the waiting room and the corridor leading 
to the wards.  One site (1/60, 1.7%; 95%CI 0.4-8.9%), the same corridor door handle that 
was positive on d1, was found to be positive for MRSA on d14.  The environmental 
isolates are referred to as E1, E2 and E3 respectively. 
 
 
4A.3.2 Human sampling 
 
Sixty four of the 69 personnel present on d1 (92.8%) agreed to provide nasal swab 
samples.  These personnel comprised veterinary nurses (n = 20), veterinary nursing 
students (n = 8), veterinarians (n = 28), veterinary students (n = 5) and receptionists (n = 
3).  All were working on a daily basis within the small animal clinic at the time.  Two 
samples (3.1%; 95%CI 0.4-8.4%), referred to as H1 and H2, were positive for MRSA.  
Both of these staff members were veterinarians who worked in the same department and 
had no known contact with human healthcare workers, hospital patients or healthcare 
institutions.  Neither of the positive staff members presented for re-sampling. 
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4A.3.3 Phenotypic and genotypic analyses  
 
The results of antimicrobial susceptibility testing and genotypic analyses are displayed in 
Table 4.1.  All MRSA isolates were typed as EMRSA-15 by PFGE, all were positive for 
the mec and nuc genes, while E1 was the only isolate positive for PVL.  Isolates E2, E3 
and H2 had indistinguishable PFGE patterns which differed from E1 by three bands and 
H1 by two bands (Figure 4.1, Table 4.1).  Isolates E1 and H1 differed by one band (Figure 
4.1).  These findings indicate a close relationship between all strains according to the 
Tenover criteria (Tenover et al., 1995). Sequence analysis of region X of the spa gene 
resulted in the detection of three distinct spa types (Table 4.1).  The same spa type was 
observed in two environmental samples and one human isolate. BURP cluster analysis 
concurred with the PFGE results, further illustrating that all strains are closely related. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. PFGE types identified in MRSA isolates from the environment (E1, E2, E3) 
and in veterinary staff (H1 and H2) from a university small animal veterinary hospital. 
E1 E2 E3 H1 H1 H2 
 
9
6
Table 4.1. Antimicrobial resistance and genotypic profiles of MRSA isolated from the environment (E1, E2, E3) and staff (H1 and H2) at a university 
small animal veterinary hospital. 
 
Isolate Origin  Antimicrobial 
susceptibility* 
mecA nuc  pvl  SCCmec  spa 
type 
PFGE profile 
 
E1 
 
Wedge 
 
Pn Cx 
 
P 
 
P 
 
P 
 
IV 
 
t849 
 
PF15-68/PF15-178 
 
E2  Door handle 
(d1) 
Pn, Mt, Cx, Cp  P  P  N  IV  t1977  PF15d/PF15-74/PF15-304 
E3  Door handle 
(d14) 
Pn, Mt, Cx, Cp  P  P  N  IV  t1977  PF15d/PF15-74/PF15-304 
H1  Human  Pn, Mt, Cx, Cp  P  P  N  IV  t1554  PF15a 
H2  Human  Pn, Mt, Cx, Cp  P  P  N  IV  t1977  PF15d/PF15-74/PF15-304 
* Resistance shown to listed antimicrobials.  All isolates tested against; Cefuroxime (Cx), chloramphenicol, clindamycin, ciprofloxacin (Cp), 
erythromycin, fusidic acid, gentamicin, kanamycin, methicillin (Mt), mupirocin, neomycin, penicillin (Pn), rifampicin, streptomycin, sulphamethoxazole, 
tetracycline, tobramycin, trimethoprim, vancomycin. 
 
P: positive result; N: negative result  
  97
4A.4 Discussion 
 
This study presents an assessment of the prevalence and distribution of MRSA in the 
environment and staff of a university referral small animal veterinary hospital.   
 
The estimates of prevalence of MRSA in the environment of this facility (1.4% and 1.7% 
on d1 and d14 respectively) were lower than have been previously reported (Weese et al., 
2004; Loeffler et al., 2005).  While it is prudent to consider that the repeat environmental 
sampling on d14 lacked power and the inclusion of previously positive sites for subsequent 
sampling may have artificially increased the prevalence on this occasion, estimates of 
prevalence obtained on d1 and d14 are similar and overlapping confidence intervals imply 
consistency.  The prevalence of MRSA in staff was similar to a single international study 
that obtained a prevalence of 4.4% in small animal veterinarians (Hanselman et al., 2006b) 
but lower than previously reported in the UK (Loeffler et al., 2005; Deacon et al., 2006).   
 
Previously published studies assessing environmental prevalence of MRSA in small animal 
hospital environments have used too few samples to be confident of inferential accuracy 
(Loeffler et al., 2005; McLean and Ness, 2008).  However, it is unlikely that this is also the 
case for prior estimates of carriage in veterinary staff, which were undertaken using larger 
sample sizes and in various geographical locations, allowing for increased confidence in 
interpretation of these results (Loeffler et al., 2005; Deacon et al., 2006).  Possible 
explanations for the disparity in the results of this study with those previously published 
include absence of MRSA-positive hospitalised animals on the day(s) of sampling and 
general temporal and/or geographical variation in MRSA colonisation associated with 
differences in human and animal population densities.  Repetition of this study with the 
inclusion of animal sampling would allow greater understanding of the contribution of 
these potential biases.      
 
The current study was designed to maximise MRSA yield through the use of enrichment 
culture to enhance recovery of MRSA isolates (Nahimana et al., 2006; Rich et al., 2007).  
Similarly, although estimates of sensitivity and specificity are high for the chromogenic 
media used in this study (MRSA Select; BioRad, France) when used to identify MRSA in 
samples from humans (Nahimana et al., 2006; Nsira et al., 2006), no objective data exist 
for accuracy of isolation of MRSA from animals or the environment, where a different 
spectrum of organisms may result in a change of accuracy for detection of MRSA.    
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Although these considerations may have an impact on the overall prevalence estimates 
obtained from the current study, the similarity of the methods used in this study to those 
previously published allows broad comparative interpretation.   
 
Inference regarding the source of dissemination of the environmental MRSA in this study 
can be made by considering the location and genotypes of the strains that were identified.  
Three isolates (one human (H2) and two environmental isolates (E2 and E3) that were 
obtained from the same site (corridor door handle) but sampled on two different occasions) 
exhibited indistinguishable resistance patterns, PFGE profiles and spa types (Table 4.1).  
The door handle source of E2 and E3 was inaccessible to animals and is unlikely to have 
been used by clients, who are infrequently allowed access to the wards (and are escorted by 
staff on the rare occasions that they are).  This doorway was considered to be a highly used 
thoroughfare for staff, and cleaning of the site was the responsibility of the general cleaners 
within the University at the time of the study, as opposed to the veterinary nurses, who 
were responsible for ward cleaning.  The staff member colonised with the same strain as 
E2 and E3 (H2) was a veterinarian.  It is unknown whether the door handle was re-
contaminated within the 14 days between samplings, or whether the strain remained viable 
over this period, both of which are plausible in this scenario (Huang et al., 2006).   
 
The two remaining MRSA isolates (E1 and H1) had very closely related PFGE patterns, 
which only differed from E2, E3 and H2 by two bands (Figure 4.1), implying a close 
relationship between all the strains (Tenover et al., 1995).  The spa types and sensitivity 
patterns of E1 and H1 isolates were different, but they were found to be related using 
BURP cluster analysis.  Additionally, E1 (a foam radiology positioning wedge) was 
positive for PVL, which has not previously been reported in MRSA isolated from a dog or 
cat in the UK, but may be a feature of community acquired MRSA strains in humans 
(Kluytmans-Vandenbergh and Kluytmans, 2006).  Although PVL is not commonly found 
in EMRSA-15, it has been previously reported in Scotland through the Scottish MRSA 
Reference Laboratory, accounting for <0.1% of the EMRSA-15 isolates submitted to this 
laboratory (Edwards, 2004). 
 
Taking into consideration the location of the MRSA isolates, along with their phenotypic 
and genotypic characteristics, it can be noted that a relationship exists between human and 
environmental samples within this facility.  Although it is not possible to rule out animals 
as a primary source of the H1 and H2 isolates, it is unlikely that any of the three 
environmental isolates were obtained directly from animals (without a human  
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intermediary, who may be colonised or contaminated, for the strains that were found on the 
door handle).  As such, it can be postulated that the most likely source for dissemination of 
the environmental isolates identified in the current study is human, and in particular, a 
member of staff within the clinic.  The two members of staff colonised with MRSA in this 
study were veterinarians from the same department.  Further studies with increased power 
are required to define whether veterinarians are of greater risk than other staff members for 
carriage of MRSA.   
 
Although the role of contaminated environmental surfaces in transmission of pathogens 
associated with hospital acquired infection is not fully elucidated, it is known that 
transmission of MRSA between contaminated surfaces and healthcare workers’ hands may 
occur independent of contact with infected patients (Boyce et al., 1997).  Furthermore, 
handwashing, along with environmental cleaning, has been associated with a reduction of 
incidence of hospital acquired infection in human hospitals (Pittet et al., 2000; Rampling et 
al., 2001) and has been found to be protective for MRSA nasal colonisation in equine 
veterinarians (Anderson et al., 2008).  Therefore, the implications of the findings of the 
current study are that infection control policies within small animal facilities should 
continue to focus on hand hygiene and review cleaning protocols to include all 
environmental ‘hot-spot’ sites.  
 
These findings contribute to a growing literature and knowledge base on MRSA in 
companion animals and, more specifically, in people and places closely exposed to these 
animals.  Of particular interest is the important difference in prevalence estimates 
(environmental and human) compared to previously published reports.  This hints at the 
existence of differing epidemiology of the pathogen in different places and/or settings 
which demands greater investigation and understanding in order properly to represent and 
manage the risk in different settings from an animal and public health viewpoint.  This 
putatively differing epidemiology requires consideration when parameterising variables 
such as these within a quantitative risk assessment.  Of importance is the inclusion of an 
adequate range of input distributions in order to reflect and account for potentially differing 
epidemiological scenarios that may be encountered, as identified in the current study.  
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4B: A questionnaire study of interactions between dogs, other 
animals and humans 
 
This work was undertaken as part of two summer student projects by Ms Britt Hyden and 
Ms Sarah Bierbaum.  The projects were devised and overseen by Ms Jane Heller and data 
analysis and write-up was undertaken by Ms Jane Heller. 
 
 
4B.1 Introduction 
 
In order to begin to quantify the risk of pathogen transfer to and from pets, factors 
including: number of infected, colonised or contaminated sources of the pathogen; extent 
of infection, colonisation or contamination at the source; mode(s) of transmission of the 
agent; behavioural characteristics of the animal and/or human and existing measures of 
prevention must be considered.  While many of these factors may be quantifiable for 
inclusion in risk analysis models, the behavioural interaction between companion animals 
and humans is poorly described.  This information is vital as the potential for transmission 
between these two populations will vary depending on the pathways available to the 
pathogen.  At the time of conception of this study, no published reports were available 
regarding type and frequency of pet dog and human interactions.  Recently, two studies, 
using census and non-census questionnaire techniques, have been published by the same 
authors that report on factors associated with dog ownership and human-dog and dog-dog 
interactions in a single community in England (Westgarth et al., 2007; Westgarth et al., 
2008). 
    
The project outlined in this chapter section aimed to define the nature and extent of 
interaction between humans (both dog-owners and non dog-owners) and pet dogs in 
Scotland, and to explore the differences in the dog-owning and non dog-owning population 
with respect to hygiene and knowledge of zoonotic disease.  Importantly, this study aimed 
to validate the results of previously published work in a different geographical area of the 
UK and using different sampling and questionnaire techniques (Westgarth et al., 2007; 
Westgarth et al., 2008).   
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4B.2 Materials and Methods 
 
A questionnaire was developed for oral interview administration based on recognised 
techniques (Dillman, 1991), as described in section 2.3, and pre-tested on eight individuals.  
The results of the pre-test questionnaires were used to modify the questions, include a 
projected time frame and develop an appropriate preamble for introduction of the 
questionnaire to members of the public who were approached.  A sample size calculation 
was undertaken and it was found that, to estimate prevalence of any single trait to within 
5% accuracy at the 95% confidence level, 385 completed questionnaires were required 
(calculated for the most conservative estimate of prevalence at 50% and reducing for 
higher or lower estimates).  The questionnaire (Appendix 1) consisted of a total of 25 
questions, divided into those for all respondents (N=12), those for dog owners only (N=10) 
and those for non dog-owners (N=3).  The questionnaires were colour coded for easy 
reference to dog-owner and non dog-owner material.  The questions were organised into 
the five sections of: i) interactions with your dog, ii) interactions with other dogs, iii) 
hygiene, iv) knowledge of disease and v) responder demographics and were formatted 
predominantly as 'yes/no' responses and estimations of numbers or proportions.  A single 
open-ended question was included.  Two third year veterinary students from the University 
of Glasgow, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, were trained to complete face-to-face 
questionnaire administration.  They were advised to use the same preamble on each 
occasion, to introduce themselves, identify their affiliation with the University of Glasgow 
and assure participants that their responses would remain anonymous.  The interviewers 
were clearly identified with name badges including picture identification and the official 
University of Glasgow crest, and a larger image of the academic crest was also on display 
on a clip-board at all times.   
 
Questionnaires were administered over a 10 day period, in public locations where the 
density of public was likely to be high, including parkland, shopping districts and town 
centres in randomly selected towns located within one and a half hours by train from 
Glasgow city centre.  Once identified, towns were randomly selected for each day and 
interviewing was either undertaken between 9am and 4pm or 12pm and 6pm on both week 
days and weekends to minimise bias and include as wide a demographic as possible. 
Permission was obtained for interviewers to conduct interviews on premises where 
necessary and appropriate. 
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Data were collated and entered into a database (Microsoft Access 2003, Microsoft 
Corporation; Seattle, USA).  Data entry was cross-checked by the two students and then 
double-entered by the author to ensure maximum accuracy.  Analyses were executed using 
Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Excel, 2003, Microsoft Corporation; Seattle, USA), Minitab 
(Minitab release 14.1, Minitab Inc. 2003), StatsDirect (StatsDirect Ltd, 2008) and R (R 
Development Core Team, 2008) programmes.  Proportions were compared using 
McNemars test for paired and Chi-square test for unpaired observations.  Statistical 
significance was set at P < 0.05. 
 
 
4B.3 Results 
 
A total of 300 questionnaires were completed.  Ninety four respondents (31.3%) were dog 
owners (DO) and of these, 18 (19.1%) also owned cats and 9 (9.6%) owned other pets.  
Seventy three DO (78.5%) reported that their dogs had regular close contact with other 
animals; 67 (91.8%) had contact with other dogs, 8 (11.0%) with cats, 6 (8.2%) with 
rabbits and 6 (8.2%) contacted other species, predominantly reported as ‘wildlife’.  A 
median of 3 (range 1-10) dog walks per day were reported by DO and an ‘average’ walk 
was reported to last a median of 30 minutes (range 10-120).  Within any one walk, a 
median of 4 (range 0-20) close contacts with other dogs and 5 (range 0-20) close contacts 
with humans occurred and a median of 6 alternative human contacts per week were also 
reported (whilst not on a walk).  An overall median of 14 (range 0-79) human contacts per 
day (on walks and elsewhere) and 9 (range 0-60) dog contacts per day (on walks) were 
calculated. 
 
Patting was the most common interaction between humans and dogs (Figure 4.2). A 
significantly higher proportion of DO reported that they played with (P<0.01), cuddled 
(P<0.01) and fed treats (P<0.01) to their own dogs compared to other dogs that they 
contacted.  Conversely, DO were no more likely to play with, feed treats or cuddle 
(P>0.05) a non-owned dog than non-DO.  Fifty six (59.6%) DO allowed their dog on the 
sofa, while 72 (76.6%) dogs were allowed to lick hands, 41 (43.6%) were allowed to lick 
faces, 39 (41.5%) slept on a household bed and 18 (19.1%) eat from household plates.  
Significantly lower proportions of non-DO reported that they would allow their dog to 
undertake the above activities if they owned one.  Handwashing practices reported by all 
respondents are presented in Figure 4.3.  No significant difference was found between DO  
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and non-DO for any handwashing scenario (P>0.05 for all).  The proportion of respondents 
that recognised zoonotic diseases varied depending on the disease process (Figure 4.4a).  
Subsequent correct identification of the recognised pathogen as zoonotic ranged from 
12.8% (Distemper) to 59.6% (Tapeworm) (Figure 4.4b).    
 
Figure 4.2. Interactions reported between humans and dogs in the human-canine interaction 
questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.  Handwashing practices after specified events reported by all respondents 
(N=300) in the human-canine interaction questionnaire.  
 
1
0
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. a) Recognition of pathogens by all respondents (N=300) of the human-canine interaction questionnaire. b) Correct classification of pathogens 
as (non)zoonotic by respondents who recognised each organism (refer to Fig 4.4a). 
 
 
 
 
a)  b)  
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4B.4 Discussion 
 
The results of the study presented in this chapter section require interpretation with respect 
to the aims of the study: i) validation of pre-existing studies (Westgarth et al., 2007; 
Westgarth et al., 2008) enabling estimation of dog-dog and dog-human interactions in the 
UK and ii) comparison of hygiene practices and knowledge of zoonotic disease between 
DO and non-DO. 
 
The estimate of dog ownership obtained in this study (31.3%) is higher than a previous UK 
estimate (Westgarth et al. 2007 estimated 24%) and commercial (22%, 
http://www.pfma.org.uk/overall/pet-population-figures-2.htm) and media-reported (19.8% 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4097716.stm) figures.  It is possible that this finding reflects 
the inclusion of parks and other open areas as sites for questionnaire administration in the 
current study which is likely to have introduced a selection bias with respect to the 
members of public that were targeted and approached.  Similarly, a response bias is also 
likely to be present in the current study, and may have affected prevalence estimates, with 
certain demographic groups more likely to agree to respond to veterinary students in a 
face-to-face scenario.  The findings of the current study should be interpreted with these 
biases in mind.   
 
The results of this study show that a large number of contacts are likely to occur on a daily 
basis between most dogs and humans.  This study reported a median of 14 (range 0-79) 
human and 9 (range 0-60) dog contacts per dog per day.  While these estimates seem very 
large, particularly in comparison with previous reports of a median of 3-5 (range 0 – 15+) 
human and 1-5 (range 0 – 15+) dog interactions per day (Westgarth et al., 2008), one must 
consider the nature of the ‘contacts’ reported.  While it could be argued that these 
discrepancies reflect the previously described bias, the ‘contacts’ estimated within the 
current study report all individual contacts and do not differentiate between multiple 
contacts with the same individual (e.g. interactions with dogs or humans that are walked at 
the same time each day or who are passed on a number of occasions per walk).  Therefore, 
it is possible that these estimates are not conflicting, but rather that they could be 
interpreted in combination to obtain a crude overall per-human or per-dog contact rate.  
The median number and length of walks per day were found to be similar between studies.  
The current study estimated a median of 3 walks per day and a median length of 30 
minutes per walk, while Westgarth et al. (2008) reported a median of 1-2 walks per day  
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with each walk reported to last between 16 minutes and an hour.  Again, the slightly 
greater estimates emanating from the current study are likely to reflect selection and 
response biases and should be interpreted as a maximum estimate. 
 
While Westgarth et al. (2008) reported that the frequency of contacts with non-owned dogs 
was greater for DO compared with non-DO, the current study found that, while closer 
contact occurred between DO and their own dogs compared with non-owned dogs, there 
was no appreciable difference in the type of interaction that DO had with non-owned dogs 
compared with non-DO.  This implies that the potential routes for pathogen transfer from 
non-owned dogs is similar for dog owning and non-dog owning humans, in contrast to the 
comparatively greater number of routes that are likely to be present between DOs and their 
own dogs.   
 
The most common interaction between humans and dogs that was reported in this study 
was patting.  Almost 70% of respondents reported that they washed their hands after 
patting a dog (Figure 4.3), which is slightly higher than the estimate of 58% obtained by 
Westgarth et al. (2008).  However, other hygiene estimates were found to be very similar, 
including 79.3% of respondents reporting handwashing before eating and 96.1% after 
picking up dog faeces in the current study, compared with 85% and 96% respectively in 
Westgarth  et al. (2008).  The absence of a significant difference that was found in 
handwashing practices between DO and non-DO implies that there is no difference in risk 
perception with respect to zoonotic disease in these two groups.  This is supported by the 
absence of a difference between these groups for both pathogen recognition and zoonotic 
identification (Figures 4.4a and 4.4b).  Correct identification of pathogens as (non)zoonotic 
was found to be particularly poor in the current study and highlights the lack of knowledge 
of potential adverse effects of dog ownership in putatively at-risk populations. 
 
The results of this study have broadly supported the results of a larger study undertaken at 
a similar time in a different geographical region using different questionnaire techniques 
(Westgarth et al., 2008).  Where differences have been found, these can be attributable to 
selection and response bias that is likely to be present in the current study, along with 
diminished power associated with a relatively small sample size.  The outcome of this 
questionnaire provides estimates that are of use, in combination with previously published 
data, in attempting to quantify human-dog and dog-dog exposure for potential infectious 
disease transfer.  It has also identified more intimate interactions between humans and their 
own dogs compared with those that are not owned and identified no difference between  
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DO and non-DO with respect to type of interactions with non-owned dogs, hygiene 
practices and recognition or classification of zoonotic pathogens. 
 
 
4C: Prevalence of Staphylococcus aureus and MRSA in meat 
and dog treats in Scotland 
 
This work was undertaken as part of two summer student projects by Ms Shona Gorman 
and Ms Erin Ward.  The projects were devised and overseen by Ms Jane Heller and data 
analysis and write-up was undertaken by Ms Jane Heller.  The genetic analyses were 
undertaken in part at the Scottish MRSA Reference Laboratory. 
 
 
4C.1 Introduction 
 
The conceptual model that is presented for the risk assessment process in this thesis 
considers potential routes of transmission of MRSA from humans, dogs and the 
environment in the community or within veterinary hospital settings (Chapter 3).  In this 
conceptual model, the putative route of transmission through food has not been considered 
independently to environmental sources (3.3.1.5).  While the author is confident of the 
argument put forward for this categorisation within Chapter 3, the dissemination of ST-398 
in animals (van Loo et al., 2007b; Khanna et al., 2008; Wulf and Voss, 2008) and food 
products (van Loo et al., 2007a; de Boer et al., 2008) in countries outwith the UK 
(discussed in 1.4.4.1) combined with minimal dedicated surveillance for ST-398 or other 
MRSA strains in pigs or other farm animals within the UK (European Food Safety 
Authority, 2007) is an indication to attempt to define the prevalence of MRSA in meat 
products to which dogs may be exposed.  In addition, as pig ear pet treats have previously 
been identified as sources of infectious pathogens and have been implicated as the point 
source of an outbreak of Salmonellosis in humans in Canada (White et al., 2003; Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2006; Finley et al., 2008), an indication exists to extend an 
assessment of prevalence of MRSA in meat-based food that dogs may encounter to include 
this putative pathogenic source.     
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The aims of this study were to conduct a pilot study to identify if and at what prevalence S. 
aureus and MRSA were present in butcher meat samples and dried pig ear treats in 
Scotland. 
 
 
4C.2 Materials and Methods 
 
As this was a pilot study that required the data collection to occur within a short period of 
time (10 days), the numbers of samples that were obtained were limited by the numbers 
that could be collected during this time frame.  A sample size calculation revealed that, in 
the absence of prior knowledge of prevalence (and therefore setting prevalence to 50%), 
with 95% confidence and 5% precision, a sample size of 384 was required for each of the 
meat and pig ear groups.  It was acknowledged prior to the commencement of the study 
that this sample size would not be reached in the period that was available.  Consideration 
of a lower likely prevalence of 5% reduced the required sample size to 72. 
 
Butchers, pet shops and supermarkets were identified in geographical locations that were 
randomly selected and within one and a half hours of Glasgow via public transport.  Bones 
(pork and beef), a small portion of steak, a pork chop and two rashers of bacon were 
requested from each butcher and a single pig ear sample (defined as a single loose, or 
smallest pre-packaged bag) was obtained from each pet-food site where possible.   
Information was obtained where possible on the source of the meat and pig ear treats.   
 
Samples were processed identically.  A sterile swab was moistened with sterile distilled 
water and rotated over all surfaces of the specimen for 10 seconds.  All samples were 
enriched and cultured on SBA and MRSA-Select as outlined in section 2.4.2.1.   
Assessment of growth and subculture was undertaken as described in 2.4.1.1 for the 
MRSA-Select plates and subculture onto SBA was also undertaken for any isolates with 
presumptive Staphylococcal colonies, i.e. white or cream colonies 1-3mm in diameter, on 
the initial SBA plates.  All subcultured isolates that displayed Staphylococcal morphology 
were assessed for catalase production (Section 2.4.2.1) and the pig ear isolates were also 
gram stained and assessed for the presence of DNase as described in Section 2.4.2.1.  All 
isolates obtained from pig ear samples that were catalase positive, DNase positive and 
displayed gram positive cocci morphology on gram stain, and isolates from meat that were 
catalase positive were subjected to PCR for mecA and nuc as described in section 2.4.1.3.   
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Isolates that were positive for mecA and nuc were subjected to antimicrobial susceptibility 
testing along with further genotypic analysis and PFGE as described in 2.4.2.2.  Isolates 
taken from meat samples that were mecA positive and nuc negative and all isolates from 
the pig ear samples that underwent PCR were typed using API ID 32-STAPH 
(BioMérieux). 
 
 
 4C.3 Results 
 
One hundred meat and 50 dried pig ear samples were obtained.  The meat samples were 
obtained from 36 butchers shops and consisted of 24 pork chops, 33 bacon samples, 27 
steak and 16 beef bone samples.  The pig ear treats were either loose (26 samples), pre-
packaged (15 samples) or packaged on the premises (nine samples) and were obtained 
from a total of 43 different premises.   
 
After 24 hours growth, three (6%) of the pig ear and 12 (12%) of the meat samples 
displayed pink colonies on MRSASelect plates.  This number increased to 14 (28%) and 40 
(40%) respectively after 48 hours of incubation.  However, only five of the possible 14 
isolates from pig ears and 30 of 40 meat samples were identified as presumptive 
Staphylococci after subculture on sheep blood agar.   
 
In total, including the isolates plated directly onto SBA, 26 (52%) of the pig ear (with a 
total of 28 separate isolates when initial SBA and MRSA-Select isolates were combined) 
and 92 (92%) meat samples (with a total of 117 separate isolates when initial SBA and 
MRSA-Select isolates were combined) had colonies that were identified as presumptive 
Staphylococcal isolates based on SBA colony morphology and positive catalase test, along 
with appropriate results of gram staining for pig ear samples.  Seven of the 26 isolates from 
pig ear samples were also found to be DNase positive and defined as presumptive S.aureus 
isolates.  All of the presumptive Staphylococcal isolates from the meat samples and only 
those that were also DNase positive from the pig ear samples were submitted for PCR.   
 
Two of the pig ear samples contained the nuc gene (in the absence of mecA) enabling 
identification as MSSA while the other isolates were negative for both nuc and mecA 
genes.  Two of the meat samples were found to be nuc and mecA positive (MRSA) and 
seven were nuc positive and mecA negative (MSSA).  Seven were nuc negative and mecA  
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positive (meticillin-resistant but not S. aureus) and typing with API ID 32-STAPH 
(BioMérieux) identified these as S. epidermidis.  All of these samples were identified from 
different original meat samples.  
 
The two meat samples that were identified as MRSA were obtained from a pork chop and a 
beef steak obtained from the same butcher shop.  Further phenotypic and genotypic 
evaluation revealed that both of these isolates were EMRSA15 but their PFGE profiles 
differed, one being PF15a and the other PF15c.  The antibiograms were the same for each 
isolate, with resistance recorded to penicillin, meticillin, cefuroxime, erythromycin and 
ciprofloxacin. 
 
 
4C.4 Discussion 
 
To the author’s knowledge, this pilot study represents the first study undertaken in the UK 
to assess the prevalence of S. aureus and, in particular, MRSA on meat and dried pig ear 
treats.         
 
In this study, two of the 100 samples (2%, 95%CI 0.2 – 7.0%) of meat from butchers were 
found to be contaminated with MRSA.  These samples were obtained from the same 
butcher, were isolated on different meat products (beef and pork) and, while they possessed 
identical phenotypic profiles, differed genotypically, with their reported types, PF15a and 
PF15c, representing distinguishable pulsotypes by PFGE.  Given the strain types of these 
isolates (EMRSA-15 represents the most common human strain in Scotland), geographical 
association between them and the similarity of the strains found on different meat products, 
it can be suggested that they are most likely to represent contaminants of the meat from a 
human source, rather than true colonisation or contamination of the animal prior to 
slaughter.   
 
The prevalence of MRSA reported in this study is similar to the findings of a study 
undertaken by Van Loo et al. (2007a) in The Netherlands, but lower than a more recent 
study that reported a higher prevalence of MRSA in meat in The Netherlands (11.9%) (de 
Boer et al., 2008).  All of the strains isolated by VanLoo et al. (2007a) and most of those 
isolated by de Boer (2008) were ST-398 and therefore likely to have been of animal origin, 
in contrast to the findings in this study, where the source is most likely to have been human  
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contamination.  ST-398 was not isolated in this study and, to the author’s knowledge, has 
not been isolated from an animal within the UK.  
 
In contrast to the low prevalence of MRSA on butcher meat and absence of MRSA isolated 
from pig ear treats, MSSA was present in greater numbers, with a prevalence of 7% 
(95%CI 2.9 – 13.9%) in butcher meat and 4% (95%CI 2.2 – 19.2%) in pig ear treats.  As 
further phenotypic and genotypic analyses were not undertaken on these isolates, their 
relatedness within and between premises is unknown.  Similarly, a large number of non-
aureus Staphylococcal isolates with mecA genes were found in this study.  However, as this 
study was not designed to isolate and identify all Staphylococcal species, the prevalence of 
these non-aureus isolates cannot be reported.  The results of this study do, however, 
support prior findings that meat products may be a source of non-pathogenic 
staphylococcal strains that carry resistance determinants (Simeoni et al., 2008).  
 
The methods used to isolate MRSA and MSSA in this study were employed to optimise the 
yield of both potential pathogens.  The enrichment step was included with the aim of 
limiting the overgrowth of non-Staphylococcal species whilst enhancing the likelihood of 
Staphylococcal yield.  In the course of this study, it was found that the addition of 2.5% 
NaCl was inadequate for inhibiting growth of contaminants, so the NaCl concentration was 
increased to 6.5% in line with other similar studies (de Boer et al., 2008).  It is known that 
increasing the NaCl concentration results in a reduced likelihood of yield of EMRSA-16 
strains, which display reduced salt tolerance with respect to other MRSA isolates (Jones et 
al., 1997).  However, these effects must be accounted for within the current study where a 
compromise has been made by increasing the NaCl concentration to enable a reduction in 
overgrowth and increased Staphylococcal yield whilst simultaneously acting to partially 
inhibit growth of EMRSA-16 isolates if they are present.   
  
MRSA-Select and SBA were used in combination (parallel) in an attempt to maximise the 
sensitivity for identification of meticillin-resistant strains, which may have been missed 
using SBA alone if a mixed population of Staphylococci grew on the non-selective agar.  
The subsequent use of catalase testing for both meat and pig ear samples, along with Gram 
staining and DNase testing allowed targeted application of the PCR and a subsequent 
increased specificity of the overall methods.  While it is known that the PCR for mecA and 
nuc genes may produce false positives if the culture contains a mixture of meticillin-
resistant coagulase negative Staphylococci and MSSA, PCR-based methods such as those  
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used herein are reported to perform extremely well when applied to pure cultures as in the 
current study (Francois and Schrenzel, 2008).   
 
In conclusion, this study found a low prevalence of MRSA in butcher meat and a low 
prevalence of S. aureus in both butcher meat and pig ear treats.  This study did not identify 
MRSA in pig ear treats, although the sample size used lacked power for identification of 
the organism at very low prevalence.  No ST-398 was isolated.  In addition, genes 
encoding for meticillin resistance (mecA) were identified in non-pathogenic Staphylococci 
in butcher meat and pig ear treats.  Given the likelihood of a human source of 
contamination of the meat, the inclusion of food (meat and pet treats) as a part of the 
general environmental contamination in the risk analysis that has been specified in this 
thesis seems reasonable, rather than including it as a separate important route.  However, 
future intermittent surveillance of butcher meat should be considered and raw meat should 
not be negated as a potential source (through contact rather than ingestion) of 
contamination with MRSA and S. aureus. 
 
 
4.2  Discussion 
 
The results of the three studies presented in this chapter have provided data with which to 
fill some of the gaps with respect to exposure to MRSA that were identified by the 
qualitative risk assessment that was presented in Chapter 3.  Section 4A has provided a 
contrasting estimate, with respect to a previously published study (Loeffler et al., 2005), of 
environmental contamination in a veterinary hospital where the prevalence of staff 
colonisation or contamination with MRSA was in line with what would be expected within 
the general population.  Section 4B has confirmed previous estimates of dog-dog and dog-
human interactions (Westgarth et al., 2008) and obtained greater insight into comparisons 
between dog-owners and non dog-owners with respect to interactions with dogs and 
knowledge of zoonotic disease.  Section 4C has obtained prevalence estimates for MRSA 
and MSSA on meat and pig ear treats in Scotland.  Although the studies presented in 
sections 4B and 4C represent pilot studies, the results (specified with surrounding 
uncertainty) of all three sections allow some inference to be made and input distributions to 
be extended and modified to encompass a greater range of potential scenarios for 
subsequent parameterisation of the quantitative risk assessment presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
EXPERT OPINION ELICITATION EXERCISE IN 
THE AREA OF MRSA IN PET DOGS 
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5.1  Introduction 
The difficulty associated with interpretation of the qualitative techniques presented in 
Chapter 3 along with the inability of these techniques to adequately address the risk 
assessment considered in this thesis suggested that a quantitative approach might provide a 
more informative analysis.  However, as stated in Chapter 3, the subject area of MRSA 
acquisition in pet dogs is data sparse and, while quantitative risk assessments are generally 
based on published data, in the absence of these, data may need to be sourced from 
elsewhere, including the judgement and opinion of individual experts, in order to 
adequately populate a defined model (Vose, 2000; Bedford and Cooke, 2001; Van der 
Fels-Klerx et al., 2005).   
The term expert opinion or expert judgement may be used to describe formal and informal 
use of information from someone skilled in a specific field (Otway and von Winterfeldt, 
1992).  The use of expert opinion in a risk assessment may range from interpretation of a 
model output or development of a model structure, in which the analyst or modeller acts as 
the expert, to elicitation of opinion-based data to populate model parameters using a 
structured and formalised approach.  The field of formal expert opinion elicitation through 
expert judgement exercises has been recognised for over 15 years and a number of 
methods have been developed to support its application (Otway and von Winterfeldt, 1992; 
Clemen and Winkler, 1999; Bedford and Cooke, 2001; Goossens et al., 2008).  Formal 
expert opinion techniques have gained popularity more recently in animal health, and in 
quantitative microbial risk assessment processes, and have been utilised to populate 
simulation, mathematical and conceptual models (Stärk et al., 2002; Van der Fels-Klerx et 
al., 2002; Gallagher, 2005; Gustafson et al., 2005; Van der Fels-Klerx et al., 2005). 
A number of data gaps in the conceptual model that was constructed to define the risk of 
acquisition of MRSA in dogs were identified in Chapter 3 and, while the work described in 
Chapter 4 attempted to fill some of these directly by collection of new data to augment 
preexisting information, many of the parameters required for the model remained 
undefined.  The aim of this chapter was to obtain expert estimates for the remaining data 
gaps identified in Chapter 3. 
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5.2  Materials and Methods 
5.2.1 Expert selection 
 
A multidisciplinary group of experts was selected using pre-defined criteria as follows:  At 
least one expert was selected to represent each paper published in the area of MRSA in 
animals over the previous 5 years.  Additional experts were selected using the delegate lists 
from the First International Conference in MRSA (2006), the American Society of 
Microbiology (ASM) Conference on Antimicrobial Resistance in Zoonotic Bacteria and 
Foodborne Pathogens (2008), and members of the Scottish Infection Research Network 
(SIRN).  Experts were selected with varied backgrounds and experiences, spanning areas 
of medical and veterinary microbiology, antimicrobial resistance and epidemiology.  
 
 
5.2.2 Questionnaire design 
 
A questionnaire was developed using principles outlined by Dillman (1991) in the form of 
the ‘Total Design Method’ and Vose (2000).  The questionnaire was written as a Microsoft 
Word 2003 (Microsoft Corporation; Seattle, USA) document and was available for 
completion by hand after printing, or directly on computer.  The questions were developed 
specifically for the current study and were based on, but not restricted to, data deficiencies 
that were identified through a qualitative risk assessment (Chapter 3) and were determined 
to be important for complete parameterisation of the quantitative model presented in 
Chapter 6.   
 
The questionnaire was formatted as a 21 page A4 document (Appendix 2).  The front page 
introduced the questionnaire as “Expert Opinion Elicitation: MRSA in dogs” and indicated 
the study’s affiliation with the University of Glasgow, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine.  A 
one-page introduction followed the title page with concise instructions for completion of 
the questionnaire.  Assumptions were clearly stated within this introduction as follows: 
 
1.  The term positive will be used to account for any bodily carriage of the organism 
(nasal, skin, perineal …).  It does not attempt to distinguish between 
colonisation (intermittent or consistent) and temporary carriage.  This term will 
also encompass any infection with MRSA. 
 
2.  Please answer all questions for the average situation expected within the UK.  
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The body of the questionnaire followed and comprised seventeen questions, divided into 
the subheadings of prevalence of MRSA (6 questions), environmental contamination (5 
questions, each with two parts) and transmission of MRSA (5 questions, each with between 
4 and 8 parts).  Each of the questions (or each part of the question for those with multiple 
parts), requested the estimation of minimum, maximum and most likely values, along with 
a level of the expert’s confidence in their estimate, between 1 (very unsure) and 10 
(absolutely certain).  It was stated that the level of certainty would be ascribed as 4 if left 
blank.  All questions were worded to obtain whole number estimates rather than 
proportions or percentages, consistent with published recommendations and previous 
expert elicitation exercises (Stärk et al., 2002; Gallagher, 2005) and the minimum and 
maximum estimates were requested prior to the most likely to avoid adjustment and 
anchoring bias (Vose, 2000).  Two of the questions in the questionnaire did not adhere to 
the previously defined structure.  These were: a) a single question within the prevalence 
section which requested identification of groups at increased risk of carriage by placing a 
‘x’ on lines (visual analogue scale) next to potential risk groups and b) the final question 
which requested a self-rating of the expert’s specialisation (on a scale of 1 to 10) in 11 
areas (veterinary microbiology, human microbiology, small animal medicine, large animal 
medicine, human medicine, MRSA, public health, zoonotic disease, epidemiology, food 
safety and communicable disease control).  For the final question (question 17), 
participants were instructed that a rating of 1 represented equivalent knowledge to a 
member of the general public and a rating of 10 represented the knowledge of a specialist 
at the top of the particular field.  An area for additional comments from experts was also 
included.   
 
 
5.2.3 Pre-testing 
 
The questionnaire was pre-tested among a group of 10 (non-expert) veterinary 
epidemiologists at the University of Glasgow and the feedback used to modify the 
questionnaire appropriately.  The participants were asked to comment on the content, 
layout, ease of comprehension and time for completion of the questionnaire.  All 
participants reported the time for completion of the questionnaire to be between 15 and 25 
minutes, which allowed the inclusion of a projected time frame on the accompanying 
request for completion.  Results of the pre-test questionnaires were not included in the  
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analyses and none of the participants in the pre-test were subsequently administered the 
questionnaire. 
 
 
5.2.4 Implementation 
 
The questionnaire was emailed on two occasions, at time zero to all experts and 
subsequently at five weeks to non-responders to the previous request.  All requests were 
emailed with a covering letter which was modified for each mailing (Appendix 3).  A 
single additional questionnaire was delivered personally with an accompanying cover 
letter. 
 
 
5.2.5 Analysis 
 
All responses were entered into a database (Microsoft Access 2003, Microsoft 
Corporation; Seattle, USA) and analyses were performed using Microsoft Access 2003, 
Microsoft Excel 2003 (Microsoft Corporation; Seattle, USA), @RISK 4.5 Professional 
Edition (Pallisade Corporation; Middlesex, UK) and R (R Development Core Team, 2008). 
 
An initial assessment of expert specialisation was undertaken, based on the results of 
question 17.  Information relating to the expert’s level of self-reported expertness or 
specialisation was graphed to visually assess both within expert and between expert 
grading and variation, using bar graphs, for each specialty category recorded.  For all other 
questions (excluding question 4), the responses given by each expert (minimum, most 
likely, maximum and confidence values) were converted to proportional estimates and 
used to specify individual modified beta distributions (also described as a modified PERT 
distributions by Vose (2000)).  A description of the information that was obtained by the 
expert opinion questionnaire for each question is presented in Table 5.1.    
 
1
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Table 5.1. Information obtained using the expert opinion questionnaire (Appendix 2) for MRSA in dogs. 
 
Section Question  Information  obtained 
1  Prevalence of MRSA in general population  Prevalence of 
MRSA  2  Prevalence of MRSA in health care workers 
  3  Prevalence of MRSA in veterinarians 
  4*  Identification of risk groups for MRSA carriage 
  5  Prevalence of MRSA in dogs in general population 
  6  Prevalence of dogs hospitalised in veterinary clinics 
7  Proportion of houses positive for any environmental contamination with MRSA  Environmental 
Contamination  7a  Proportion of environmental sites (10cm x 10cm) contaminated with MRSA within a house with MRSA contamination 
  8  Proportion of houses with ≥1 MRSA positive household member that are positive for any environmental contamination with MRSA  
  8a  Proportion of environmental sites (10cm x 10cm) contaminated with MRSA within a house with MRSA contamination and ≥1 MRSA 
positive household member 
  9  Proportion of veterinary clinics positive for any environmental contamination with MRSA 
  9a  Proportion of environmental sites (10cm x 10cm) contaminated with MRSA within a MRSA positive veterinary clinic 
  10  Proportion of veterinary clinics with ≥1 MRSA positive member of staff that are positive for any environmental contamination with 
MRSA 
  10a  Proportion of environmental sites (10cm x 10cm) contaminated with MRSA within a MRSA positive veterinary clinic with ≥1 MRSA 
positive member of staff 
  11  Proportion of veterinary clinics with ≥1 MRSA positive canine patient that are positive for any environmental contamination with 
MRSA 
  11a  Proportion of environmental sites (10cm x 10cm) contaminated with MRSA within a MRSA positive veterinary clinic with ≥1 MRSA 
positive canine patient 
12a  Proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive after a single average contact with an MRSA positive owner  Transmission 
of MRSA  12b  Proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive after a single average contact with an MRSA positive human (not owner) 
  12c  Proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive after a single average contact with an MRSA positive dog in the household 
  12d  Proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive after a single average contact with an MRSA positive dog outwith household 
  12e  Proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive after a single average contact with an MRSA positive veterinarian 
  12f  Proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive after a single average contact with an MRSA positive veterinary staff member (non-
veterinarian) 
  12g  Proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive after a single average contact with an MRSA positive household environmental site 
(10cm x 10cm) 
  12h  Proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive after a single average contact with an MRSA positive veterinary hospital environmental 
site (10cm x 10cm)  
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Table 5.1(ctd)  Information obtained using the expert opinion questionnaire (Appendix 2) for MRSA in dogs 
 
* These questions were the only questions that did not request minimum, maximum and most likely estimates along with a level of confidence
Section Question  Information  obtained 
13a  Proportion of humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive spouse or live-in partner  Transmission 
of MRSA (ctd)  13b  Proportion of humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive non-co-habiting partner 
  13c  Proportion of humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive household member <15 
years old 
  13d  Proportion of humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive household member >15 
years old 
  13e  Proportion of humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive non-household member 
  13f  Proportion of humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive household environment 
(10cm x 10cm) 
  13g  Proportion of humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive dog 
  13h  Proportion of humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive food 
  14a  Proportion of hospitalised humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive patient 
  14b  Proportion of hospitalised humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive doctor 
  14c  Proportion of hospitalised humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive (non-doctor) 
health care worker 
  14d  Proportion of hospitalised humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive visitor 
  14e  Proportion of hospitalised humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive hospital 
environment (10cm x 10cm) 
  14f  Proportion of hospitalised humans that become positive for MRSA after a single average contact with a MRSA positive dog (therapy 
animal) 
  15a  Proportion of transmission of MRSA to humans that occurs by direct contact (humans or animals) 
  15b  Proportion of transmission of MRSA to humans that occurs by aerosolisation 
  15c  Proportion of transmission of MRSA to humans that occurs by environmental contact 
  15d  Proportion of transmission of MRSA to humans that occurs by food 
  16a  Proportion of transmission of MRSA to dogs that occurs by direct contact (humans or animals)  
  16b  Proportion of transmission of MRSA to dogs that occurs by aerosolisation 
  16c  Proportion of transmission of MRSA to dogs that occurs by environmental contact 
  16d  Proportion of transmission of MRSA to dogs that occurs by food 
  17*  Specialisation level in 11 separate areas  
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Modified beta distributions (Equation 5.1) were specified using equations 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, 
defined by Vose (2000) and implemented through a user-defined R code (Appendix 4). 
 
a a c Beta c b a PERT + − = ) ( * ) , ( ) , , ( mod 2 1 α α  (Equation  5.1) 
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Where a = minimum, b = most likely, c = maximum estimate, γ = certainty 
 
These individual expert distributions were explored graphically in R and combined using a 
discrete distribution (Vose, 2000) in the form of: Discrete({xi},{pi}), where {xi} are the 
expert opinions for experts i = 1 to n  and {pi} are the weights given to each expert 
opinion. 
 
 
Six questions were selected to test the validity of the expert responses.  These questions 
(Questions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 10a) represented variables for which published data were 
available.  The uncertainty distributions of individual experts, along with the combined 
expert opinion distribution, with each opinion given an equal weighting, were graphed and 
compared visually to each other and to the distribution specified by the published data for 
four of the questions (Questions 1, 2, 5 and 10a) in which an appropriate combination 
algorithm could be defined (Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2. Distributions specified from published data used to check validity of expert 
opinon responses in the expert opinion questionnaire of MRSA in dogs. 
 
Question Distribution  Inputs  References 
1  Beta(s+1,n-s+1)  s = 4 
n = 274 
Abudu et al. (2001) 
2  Betapert(min,ml,max)  min = 0.015 
ml = 0.065 
max = 0.15 
Abudu et al. (2001) for min, composite 
published UK estimate for ml (Eveillard 
et al. (2004)) and arbitrary max 10 times 
greater than general population 
5 Discrete({p1,p2,p3},{1,1,1}) 
(pi = beta(si+1,ni-si+1) for 
i=1,2,3) 
 
s1 = 1, n1 = 255 
s2 = 0, n2 = 188 
s3 = 2, n3 = 203 
Rich and Roberts (2005)  
Murphy et al. (2006) 
Hanselman et al. (2008) 
10a Discrete({p1,p2},{1,1}) 
(pi = beta(si+1,ni-si+1) for i=1,2) 
 
s1 = 3, n1 = 27 
s2 = 2, n2 = 158 
 
Loeffler et al. (2005) 
Heller et al. (2009) 
 
    
 
 
Two separate convergence analyses were undertaken to identify the number of random 
samples required to be run for each of the specified modified beta distributions to obtain 
representative expert distributions, and the number of random samples required to be run 
for the discrete distributions to obtain a representative combination distribution.  The 
convergence analyses were based on the results of a ‘moving average’, whereby the 
‘running mean’ for successive iterations (random samples) was plotted against the number 
of iterations used.   
 
The running mean was calculated for the i
th iteration using the following formula: 
 
i
rm x
rm rm
i i
i i
1
1
−
−
−
+ =  
 
Where rm is the running mean, i is the i
th iteration of the model, resulting the sequence of 
outcome values  i x x x ,... , 2 1 .   
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The overall mean for n iterations in total was calculated using the formula: 
 
n
x x x
m
n ... 2 1 + +
=  
 
Where m is the overall mean, n is the total number of iterations that the convergence 
analysis is run over, resulting in the sequence of outcome values  n x x x ,... , 2 1 . 
 
Convergence was assessed visually in comparison with the overall mean for all iterations 
considered. 
 
 
5.3  Results 
5.3.1 Questionnaire return 
 
Thirty four experts were emailed initially, 17 from the UK, 11 from elsewhere in Europe, 
three from North America, and one from each of Turkey, Hong Kong and Japan.  Of these, 
one address was incorrect and could not be updated, which reduced the number of experts 
to 33.  Fifteen replies (45%) were obtained prior to the reminder email and two (6%) were 
obtained afterwards, bringing the total response rate to 52%.  Of the responders, seven 
were from the UK, five from elsewhere in Europe, three from North America and one from 
each of Turkey and Hong Kong.  Two experts contacted the author to explain that they did 
not have the time to complete the questionnaire and 14 experts did not respond at all.  Two 
of the returned questionnaires were incomplete.  One of the incomplete questionnaires was 
entirely unusable due to partial completion of all questions, while the other had seven 
useable question responses.  The results of both of these questionnaires were excluded 
from the analyses.  The fifteen experts that returned useable questionnaires were coded as 
experts A through O. 
 
Written comments that accompanied the returned questionnaires varied, but predominantly 
related to the difficulty of the exercise and the unease that experts felt in completing many 
of the questions.  A sample of quotations is included in Appendix 5.  Notably, the expert 
that returned the unusable questionnaire with partial completion of all questions, intimated 
that he/she was concerned about misuse of the results and the potential for media  
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exploitation (justifying his/her non-completion of any ‘maximum’ estimates).  Despite 
reassurance via return email, the upper ranges were not completed by this expert. 
 
 
5.3.2 Convergence analysis 
 
The convergence analysis that was undertaken to determine the number of iterations 
required to accurately represent the expert opinion distributions produced fifteen graphs 
(one for each expert) for each of the 44 questions that were estimated numerically, 
resulting in a total of 660 graphs.  A single example of a randomly selected expert from a 
randomly selected question is displayed as Figure 5.1.  Similarly, 45 separate graphs were 
generated for the convergence analysis of expert opinion combination, using equally 
weighted combinations. A single random example is shown as Figure 5.2.  These graphs 
show clearly that convergence is reached in all instances, for the generation of expert 
opinion distributions and the combination of these distributions, by 5000 (expert) 
iterations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Convergence analysis for the number of iterations required to obtain a 
representative distribution for a single expert and a single question from the Expert 
Opinion questionnaire for MRSA acquisition in dogs. 
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Figure 5.2. Convergence analysis for the number of iterations required to obtain a 
representative distribution for the combination of the results from all experts of a single 
question in the Expert Opinion questionnaire for MRSA acquisition in dogs. 
 
 
5.3.3 Expert profiles 
 
The experts were coded in colour for ease of graphical analysis.  Specialist profiles were 
obtained for each expert based on the eleven specialist fields detailed in Question 17 of the 
questionnaire.  Graphical representations of these profiles for each field and each expert, 
respectively, are displayed in full in Appendix 6 and examples of each are included as 
Figure 5.3 and 5.4.  As expected, most experts graded themselves very highly in expertise 
in MRSA, but greater variation was present for more specialist fields beyond the general 
subject area, such as human medicine (Figure 5.3).  When the ratings of each expert are 
assessed independently, some experts ranked themselves very high in many fields while 
others ranked themselves much lower across all fields (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.3. Levels of specialisation self-estimated by experts (coded A-O) in areas of human medicine, MRSA, public health and zoonotic disease within 
the expert opinion questionnaire.  The solid horizontal line represents the median and dashed lines represent 25
th and 75
th percentiles.  
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Figure 5.4. Levels of specialisation estimated by four experts (coded A-D) within the expert opinion questionnaire.  The solid line represents the median 
and dashed lines represent 25
th and 75
th percentiles for all experts.  
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5.3.4 Expert distributions 
5.3.4.1  Validity 
 
The results of the questionnaire for each of the questions on prevalence estimation, for 
which published data were available, were analysed using a separate graphical procedure 
and are displayed in Figure 5.5.  These graphs show that, for these questions, a single 
expert (Expert A, coloured beige) consistently provided estimates markedly outwith the 
range of other expert judgements and, where appropriate combination paradigms were 
available (questions 1, 2, 5 and 10a), the published data (represented as a black line in the 
figures).  The removal of this expert resulted in a marked reduction in the tail of all of the 
combined expert distributions (red dashed lines) for each of these questions (Figure 5.6a 
and 5.6b).  As a result of these findings, along with the low confidence estimates of this 
expert for all questions and low self-perception of ‘expertness’ (Fig 5.4), this expert was 
removed from subsequent analyses.  All results from hereon will refer to the analysis of 
Experts B-O. 
 
Comparison of the expert opinion distributions combined using equal weightings with 
distributions specified from published data are presented for questions 1, 2, 5 and 10a 
(Figure 5.7).  A better fit was found between the expert opinion distributions and published 
data for question 10a when only the data that were available to the experts (i.e. published) 
at the time of questionnaire completion was compared (Figure 5.8).  
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Figure 5.5. Expert uncertainty distributions (coloured lines) for questions for which 
published data are available.  Black lines represent published data (Table 5.2).  
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Figure 5.6a) Uncertainty distributions for Experts A (pink) and B-O (grey) for questions testing validity of responses in the Expert Opinion 
Questionnaire.  Red dashed line represents combined expert opinion distribution with (left) and without (right) Expert A.  
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Figure 5.6b) Uncertainty distributions for Experts A (pink) and B-O (grey) for questions testing validity of responses in the Expert Opinion 
Questionnaire.  Red dashed line represents combined expert opinion distribution with (left) and without (right) Expert A.  
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Figure 5.7. Comparison of combined expert distributions (red dashed line) with published 
or known data (black line) for Expert Opinion questionnaire questions 1, 2, 5 and 10a. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Comparison of combined expert distributions (red dashed line) with data 
published at the time of Expert Opinion questionnaire administration (black line) for 
Question 10a. 
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5.3.4.2  Expert estimations 
 
The results of the expert estimations for each expert and each question are presented in full 
in Appendix 7. 
 
In all sections of the questionnaire (prevalence, environmental contamination and 
transmission), variation was present between questions for the agreement or similarity 
between individual expert estimations.  Expert confidence also varied markedly within and 
between questions.  Responses for questions estimating prevalence have been presented in 
section 5.3.4.1 and, in general, showed similarity in estimates between experts, resulting, in 
most cases, in narrow composite distributions.  The responses for questions estimating 
environmental contamination were found to exhibit marked discrepancy between experts at 
both the premises level (house or veterinary clinic) and within-premises level (estimated by 
number of contaminated 10cm x 10cm sites) (e.g. Figure 5.9).  Experts displayed greater 
agreement and demonstrated more confidence in their estimates when asked about ‘an 
average’ premesis (e.g. Question 7 and 7a), in contrast with those in which there were 
occupants that were ‘positive’ for MRSA (e.g. Question 8 and 8a).   
 
Responses to questions that required estimation of the probability of transmission of 
MRSA per contact to dogs, (non-hospitalised) humans and hospitalised humans from 
various sources generally produced estimates with an increasing range of uncertainty and 
reducing estimates of confidence when considering estimates for dogs and humans 
respectively (e.g. Figure 5.10). The questions relating to probability of transmission of 
MRSA to dogs predominantly resulted in composite estimates that were concentrated 
around very low probabilities (e.g. Figure 5.10 ai), aii)) 
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Figure 5.9. Differences in uncertainty, confidence and absolute estimates for questions 
estimating environmental contamination at the house level (Questions 7 and 8) and within-
house site (10cm x 10cm) level (Questions 7a and 8a) and for an average house (Questions 
7 and 7a) and those with at least one known MRSA positive occupants (Questions 8 and 
8a). 
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Figure 5.10. Increasing uncertainty and reduced confidence for estimates of probability of 
transmission per contact from a) a MRSA positive i) owner ii) household environmental 
site (10cm x 10cm) to a dog, b) an MRSA positive i) spouse or partner ii) household 
environmental site (10cm x 10cm)  to a human. 
 
 
Questions estimating the routes of transmission of MRSA to humans and dogs obtained 
responses that showed marked variation in confidence, uncertainty and absolute estimate 
values, resulting in very wide and poorly informative composite distributions, examples of 
which are shown in Figure 5.11. 
 
a ii)  a i) 
b i)  b ii)  
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Figure 5.11. Estimations of proportion of transmission of MRSA that occurs by direct 
contact in a) humans, b) dogs. 
 
 
A summary table of all of the resulting composite distributions is presented as Table 5.3.  
This table displays the median, interquartile range and a representation of the shape of the 
distributions resulting from equally weighted combinations of all expert opinions.   
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Table 5.3. Summary results for the composite distributions resulting from an expert 
opinion questionnaire on MRSA in dogs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Section Question
† Median Interquartile  range  Distribution  shape 
1 
 
0.020  
 
0.014 - 0.030 
  Prevalence of 
MRSA 
2  0.062  0.033 – 0.093 
 
  3  0.072  0.045 – 0.097 
 
  4*      
  5  0.011  0.006 – 0.028 
 
  6  0.042  0.021 – 0.081 
 
7  0.023  0.010 – 0.041 
  Environmental 
Contamination 
7a  0.139  0.097 – 0.231 
 
 
8  0.400  0.220 – 0.583 
 
 
8a  0.243  0.118 – 0.449 
 
 
9  0.096  0.046 – 0.140 
 
 
9a  0.215  0.109 – 0.381 
 
 
10  0.367  0.202 – 0.553 
 
 
10a  0.235  0.115 – 0.460 
 
 
11  0.197  0.116 – 0.345 
 
 
11a  0.199  0.115 – 0.346  
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Table 5.3 (ctd) Summary results for the composite distributions resulting from an expert 
opinion questionnaire on MRSA in dogs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section Question
† Median Interquartile  range  Distribution  shape 
12a  0.026  0.005 – 0.103 
  Transmission of 
MRSA 
12b  0.008  0.003 – 0.033 
 
 
12c  0.060  0.025 – 0.215 
 
 
12d  0.017  0.003 – 0.064 
 
 
12e  0.032  0.005 – 0.069 
 
 
12f  0.024  0.004 – 0.060 
 
 
12g  0.014  0.003 – 0.042 
 
 
12h  0.015  0.003 – 0.043 
 
 
13a  0.068  0.019 – 0.156 
 
 
13b  0.038  0.010 – 0.089 
 
 
13c  0.049  0.010 – 0.114 
 
 
13d  0.036  0.006 – 0.080 
 
 
13e  0.017  0.004 – 0.038 
 
 
13f  0.018  0.004 – 0.041 
 
 
13g  0.039  0.010 – 0.089  
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Table 5.3 (ctd) Summary results for the composite distributions resulting from an expert 
opinion questionnaire on MRSA in dogs 
† Refer to Table 5.1 for question subject 
* Distributions could not be specified for these questions  
 
 
 
Section Question
† Median Interquartile  range  Distribution  shape 
 
13h  0.003  0.001 – 0.018 
 
 
14a  0.064  0.009 – 0.141 
 
 
14b  0.081  0.028 – 0.151 
 
 
14c  0.088  0.037 – 0.151 
 
 
14d  0.046  0.009 – 0.096 
 
 
14e  0.044  0.011 – 0.147 
 
 
14f  0.075  0.026 – 0.170 
 
 
15a  0.565  0.431 – 0.810 
 
 
15b  0.047  0.018 – 0.130 
 
 
15c  0.303  0.146 – 0.440 
 
 
15d  0.135  0.003 – 0.040 
 
 
16a  0.561  0.354 – 0.760 
 
 
16b  0.059  0.016 – 0.180 
 
 
16c  0.251  0.157 – 0.439 
 
 
16d  0.016  0.001 – 0.048 
 
  17*       
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5.4  Discussion 
 
This chapter has presented the results of an expert opinion elicitation exercise that was 
undertaken to enable parameterisation of the identified data gaps within a risk assessment 
of acquisition of MRSA in dogs.  These gaps were identified in the work described in 
Chapter 3 and could not be filled by direct collection of new data, as described in Chapter 
4.  The outcome of this questionnaire was a set of composite distributions (Appendix 7) 
that represent expert opinion of the parameters that are required to complete the 
quantitative risk assessment that is presented in Chapter 6.  
 
The technique used in this expert opinion elicitation assessment represents a novel 
approach adapted from previously published techniques.  The use of an emailed expert 
opinion questionnaire is distinct from the predominantly workshop-based expert opinion 
elicitation that has been published for prior risk assessments within the veterinary field 
(Stärk et al., 2002; Hotchkiss, 2004; Gallagher, 2005; Van der Fels-Klerx et al., 2005; 
Boone et al., 2008).  The questionnaire was emailed in this case to enable the inclusion of 
geographically dispersed experts, allowing greater inclusion of current experts in the field, 
rather than a convenience sample that may have otherwise been required, given that no 
dedicated MRSA conferences were scheduled for the period within which this study was 
undertaken.  Additionally, funds were not available to run a workshop specifically for this 
study.  The use of workshop-based exercises undoubtedly presents greater opportunity for 
open dialogue and interaction between individual experts and between experts and the 
questionnaire facilitator.  Similarly, workshop-based exercises also provide the opportunity 
to use techniques that result in opinion convergence such as the Delphi or Kaplan’s expert 
information approach, whereby controlled feedback and reassessment and Bayes’ theorem 
applied to rigorous expert-based evidence, are utilised respectively to result in a single 
combined expert distribution (Kaplan, 1992; Kaplan, 2000; Van der Fels-Klerx et al., 
2002).  However, the implementation of this questionnaire by email, use of accompanying 
personalised letter and follow-up reminder after 5 weeks all provided opportunity for 
expert-facilitator interactions.  Furthermore, in this case, expert opinion convergence was 
not sought.  While experts were requested to respond for the situation in the UK, it was 
anticipated that, given the geographical variation in the prevalence of MRSA, the resulting 
estimates of prevalence, environmental contamination and transmission would be informed 
by the literature from or relating to the UK, but would also be updated or tempered with 
individual regional expert considerations, resulting in potentially important differences in  
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response.  Had a greater number of experts been available, a meaningful comparison of 
response based on geographical location of the respondents could have been undertaken 
and trends potentially identified (Stärk et al., 2002).   
 
A small number of variables for which published data already existed have been used in 
this study to assess the validity of the expert estimates.  This is loosely based on the use of 
‘seed’ or calibration variables as defined in the ‘Classical model’ by Cooke and Goosens 
(2000) that allow assessment of experts’ performance, enable performance-optimised 
combinations of opinion, and evaluate and validate expert judgement combination.   
However, the current study differs markedly from the classical model, given that only a 
few calibration variables could be defined in the area assessed, all of which were based to 
some degree on published data potentially known to the expert.  Therefore, in the current 
study, the variables used only allow putative validation of expert judgements and 
combinations.  The use of the validation variables in this study identified a single expert 
(Expert A) to have poor agreement with other experts and previously published data 
(Figure 5.5).  While the omission of divergent opinions should not be the rule, the 
combination of poor estimation of validation variables, along with low confidence and low 
self-reported ‘expertness’ implied that this respondent may have been a source of 
estimation inaccuracy (Vose, 2000).  Consequently, Expert A was excluded from 
subsequent analyses.  With the exclusion of Expert A, assessment of the validation 
variables showed that there was general agreement between experts and between experts 
and current knowledge for those variables where prior information was available.  Using 
the assumption that future performance of experts can be judged based on past 
performance (Cooke and Goossens, 2000), this validation procedure resulted in the 
acquisition of overall confidence in the validity of subsequent expert estimates.   
 
It is regrettable that an appropriate number of calibration variables were not available to 
enable performance-optimised expert opinion combination as described in the classical 
model (Cooke and Goossens, 2000).  It has been shown that this method of expert 
weighting is the least refractory to expert inaccuracy and opinion divergence (Bedford and 
Cooke, 2001) and its use has been found to result in defensible objectivity in previous 
expert judgement studies (Van der Fels-Klerx et al., 2005; Boone et al., 2008).  However, 
these recent comparative studies also found that, while self-assessed expertise was 
unsatisfactory (Boone et al., 2008), equal-weighted combinations performed adequately 
(Van der Fels-Klerx et al., 2005; Boone et al., 2008).  In the current study, while self-
assessed expertise was available for eleven areas of specialisation, it was difficult to align  
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these specialist areas adequately to the expertise required to answer each question, creating 
further complication of the use of self-assessed expert weighting.  Consequently, the use of 
equally weighted combinations in the form of discrete distributions were used for all 
composite estimates and it could be argued that, while qualitatively interesting, the 
addition of question 17 did not provide any additional quantitative information for use 
within analyses.  Future inclusion of targeted expertness on a per-question basis might 
allow greater utilisation of this information. 
 
Criticisms of the implementation of this questionnaire were indirectly obtained from the 
recipients, in the form of written comments alluding to the difficulty in completion 
(Appendix 5).  While these comments are valid, it is difficult to consider an easier and less 
“uncomfortable” way in which to phrase the questions to obtain the intended output and 
further reduce epistemic uncertainty.  In the case of the subject of this questionnaire and in 
particular the questions relating to transmission, one must consider that there are no 
published data or prior studies and it is unlikely that the expert would have any data on 
which to base an estimate, other than their own (expert) experience.  While this concept 
has formed the basis of many prior expert opinion questionnaires, and indeed represents 
the definition of circumstances in which expert opinion is sought, the lack of confidence 
reported from the experts, in addition to the marked variation in absolute estimates 
between experts for many of the questions on transmission (Figure 5.11), highlights the 
need to avoid over-interpretation or over-reliance on the results as absolute values.  Indeed, 
the results of this questionnaire should, as with other previously completed expert opinion 
exercises (Stärk et al., 2002), be viewed as the first step in parameter estimation that 
requires refinement and updating for future use.  Notwithstanding this, the use of a discrete 
distribution with equal weighting to combine individual expert distributions has resulted in 
the specification of composite outcomes with marked uncertainty and a tendency towards a 
uniform distribution, in which marked inter-expert discrepancies and large individual 
uncertainties were reported (e.g. Figure 5.11)  As such, while the resulting input 
distributions for any future quantitative analysis are unlikely to be particularly informative 
in these cases, they are equally unlikely to be misrepresentative.  Perhaps of greater 
concern is over-reliance of the experts on published data that may or may not be 
misrepresentative of the real world.  This potential bias is evidenced in the putative over-
estimation of the proportion of contaminated sites within a veterinary hospital (Figures 5.7, 
5.8), whereby a single published estimate based on small sample size and in a non-
representative tertiary referral hospital (Loeffler et al., 2005) appears to over-inform the 
expert estimates.  In a data sparse area such as this, only future research and updating or  
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replacement of the composite estimates will enable accurate assessment of the true 
representativeness of the results of this elicitation process.  However, given the nature of 
the data gaps, it is difficult to conceive of observational studies or ethical experiments that 
could provide data in many of the cases. 
 
Otway and von Winterfeldt (1992) reviewed potential biases that may occur in an expert 
judgement procedure, including unstated assumptions and mindsets, and motivational, 
structural and cognitive biases.  It is likely that unstated assumptions and mindsets were 
present for the experts that were questioned in this study, an example of which was seen in 
the unwillingness to include upper estimates from one of the experts, representing a 
mindset that the results of the questionnaire might be inappropriately analysed and 
exploited.  It is difficult to assess the presence of other mindsets and, similarly, while every 
effort was made to avoid unstated assumptions, it is not possible to assess whether any 
remained and if so, what they were, without further expert-facilitator discussion.  It is 
hoped that motivational biases, representing an expert’s stake in the outcome, were 
minimal, given that it was unclear to the expert how the results of this process would 
influence future research, and that structural biases, representing undue influence of 
question structure, were also minimal.  The use of whole number estimates, e.g., number of 
dogs out of 1000, were chosen instead of proportions or percentages to avoid structural 
bias.  Nevertheless, while experts were given the option of reporting fractions, it is likely 
that it was heuristically difficult to estimate a fraction of a person or dog, inadvertently 
leading to the expert reporting on a confined linear scale, potentially resulting in some loss 
of information where composite distributions are very narrow, such as the probability of 
transmission of MRSA to dogs (Figure 5.10 ai) and aii)).  Similarly, one expert commented 
on the likelihood of variation in his/her results if differing time scales had been used to 
elicit estimates of transmission (Appendix 5).  As such, the estimation of a per contact 
transmission rate may have inadvertently introduced structural bias whilst trying to avoid 
it, by removing the necessity for experts to estimate average contacts per time period as 
well as probability of transmission.   
 
Finally, cognitive biases may be expressed in the current study through availability bias, 
whereby easily recalled events are likely to be overestimated, overconfidence bias, 
whereby experts are more certain in estimates than their knowledge can justify and 
anchoring bias, where the expert holds to an original estimate despite new information to 
the contrary.  Availability bias is likely to be reflected through individual experience with 
MRSA, given that this is a low prevalence pathogen (in dogs) with high emotional,  
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infection control and public health implications (Leonard and Markey, 2008).  While this 
realisation of availability bias is unlikely to have had a detrimental effect on the results, 
given that individual expert experience is what was sought, it may be reflected in the 
increased certainty and confidence displayed in responses for dogs (when compared with 
humans) for questions on probability of transmission (Figure 5.10).  While the expert 
selection was undertaken with the aim of obtaining a heterogenous panel, it may be that 
experts were more likely to respond to a veterinary study if they had veterinary interests 
(response bias), potentially supported by the low overall specialisation scores given for 
human medicine (Figure 5.3).  The availability and use of recently published literature may 
represent a more tangible form of availability bias that may be exhibited in this study.  
Recent literature is readily available to all experts, and the effects of its potential influence 
may result in widespread variation of estimates, an example of which was putatively 
demonstrated in the estimation of environmental contamination in a veterinary hospital 
(Figures 5.7, 5.8).  The magnitude of the detrimental (or beneficial) effect of this bias is 
dependent on the quality, power and representativeness of the available published studies 
which can only be evaluated on a per-study basis and where the likely source is known.  
Further evidence of availability bias in the current study is potentially found with the 
increased confidence, certainty and agreement when estimates of environmental 
contamination were requested for average houses and sites when compared to those with a 
known MRSA positive occupant (Figure 5.9).  It is possible that this reflects the general 
nature in which prevalence estimates are obtained in experimental studies, although this 
could also be reflective of the uncertainty surrounding the wording of the question, in 
which “at least one MRSA positive” dog or human was identified, which represents a 
source of measurement bias (Dillman, 1991).  A further source of bias, overconfidence 
bias, was limited in the current study by elicitation of measures of expert confidence in 
addition to upper and lower parameter bounds, which could be reflected in the resulting 
composite distributions by the use of discrete combination methods (Vose, 2000).   
However, the question reporting specialisation of respondents does show discrepancy 
between respondents in terms of self-reported ‘expertness’ (Figure 5.4) which may affect 
confidence in question estimates.  Without a baseline or non self-reported measure to 
compare this to, it is not possible to know if overestimation or underestimation due to 
general over or underconfidence is reflected in the responses.  The use of facilitator of 
other (non-self) expert-based assessment of knowledge may have been beneficial in 
providing a comparative measure to which the experts’ estimates could be compared.   
Similarly, anchoring bias was limited by provision of minimum and maximum estimates 
prior to most likely estimates for distribution specification (Vose, 2000).  However, this  
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bias may inadvertently have been present in the overall question structure which requested 
estimates in different species or environments sequentially, potentially resulting in 
anchoring of estimates to the response for the initial question.  If the questionnaire were to 
be repeated, questions would be sequenced in an unrelated manner to reduce this bias 
further. 
 
In conclusion, whilst acknowledging the limitations of a study such as this, this chapter has 
provided numerous composite expert estimates of prevalence, environmental 
contamination and transmission variables for parameterisation of a simulation-based 
quantitative risk assessment model on the acquisition of MRSA in dogs (Chapter 6).  The 
results of this study are not intended to replace the results of dedicated research in the areas 
explored, but represent the first step in a fully updateable process. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF 
ACQUISITION OF MRSA IN PET DOGS 
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6.1  Introduction 
 
Risk analysis is widely accepted and prescribed as a set of technical approaches that can be 
used to explore the combined effects of multiple factors implicated in a risk pathway.  
Critically, it is claimed that the first purpose and greatest strength of risk assessment is its 
ability to rank, in order of importance, the effect of multiple inputs on a single output and 
thus identify high priority data gaps, or priority candidate mitigation targets (Saltelli, 2000; 
Vose, 2000).  In order to begin to quantify the contributions of dogs and humans to 
zoonotic transfer of MRSA, an initial assessment of the risk of acquisition of MRSA in 
dogs will allow the identification of important sources of the pathogen and the overall risk 
of acquisition of MRSA.  Given the data-sparse nature of this field, a further aim was to 
assess the ability of risk assessment to identify priority data gaps for future research.     
 
While qualitative risk assessment is often used as the first step in assessing the risk from a 
putative hazard such as MRSA, an initial qualitative risk assessment in this area proved 
unsatisfactory due to a) failure of conformity of the specified model to sequential stepwise 
progression through defined events or modules and b) numerous complex dependencies 
between parameters and permutations that required consideration (Chapter 3).  In the 
absence of a rigorous qualitative assessment, a quantitative risk assessment is now 
specified with the aim of defining important data gaps and influential areas for future 
research in this data-sparse field. 
 
 
6.2  Materials and Methods 
6.2.1 Simulation model 
 
A stochastic simulation model was developed to simulate the proportion of dogs that would 
acquire MRSA, as carriage, colonisation or infection (defined in the hazard identification 
in section 3.2.1) over a 24 hour period.  The model structure was based on the conceptual 
model defined and described in detail in Chapter 3 that outlined the likely pathways of 
acquisition of MRSA for a single dog over a 24 hour time period.  Briefly, seven pathways 
for acquisition were specified and stratified to represent human family member, non-family 
member or veterinary worker; animal, limited to dogs in the community or at veterinary 
clinics; and environmental sources of MRSA that could be accessed through community  
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and veterinary hospital routes.  The seven separate pathways for acquisition that were 
specified were considered to be non-sequential and were not mutually-exclusive.  A 
number of dogs were simulated in this study, although these multiple dogs do not represent 
individual entities, rather multiple realisations of a single dog.  The pathways available for 
each of the dogs that were simulated in the model depended on the result of an initial 
simulation of whether or not the dog in question attended a veterinary clinic in the 24 hours 
under consideration.  All of the identified potential routes of acquisition of MRSA were 
accessible if a veterinary clinic was attended in the 24 hours under consideration, but 
pathways were restricted to the community routes only if a veterinary clinic had not been 
attended during this period. 
 
Two sub-steps were considered within each pathway: first the risk of exposure to a positive 
source of MRSA (human, animal or environmental) and, secondly, the risk of transmission 
of MRSA from that source, given that exposure had occurred.  Simplified scenario 
pathway models showing different factors considered in the risk of MRSA acquisition at 
each sub-stage of the conceptual model are presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)  
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Figure 6.1. Scenario pathway models for a) human, b) animal and c) environmental sources 
of MRSA 
 
 
 
 
(c) 
(d)  
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The simulation model was structured as a second-order nested stochastic model, 
accounting for uncertainty and dog-dependent variability.  Variability was accounted for 
by the use of binomial distributions that were run for each dog using probabilities drawn 
from independent uncertainty distributions based on prior data (published, unpublished and 
expert opinion) and specified as beta or modified beta (PERT) distributions (equations 5.1 
– 5.4), run over a number of iterations.  The probability of transmission (over 24 hours) 
was calculated using a scenario tree approach (Figure 6.2) and defined by: 
 
contacts
contact h t P t P )) ( 1 ( 1 ) ( 24 − − =  
 
Where P(t24h) is the probability of transmission per 24 hours, P(tcontact) is the probability of 
transmission per contact, and contacts is the number of contacts per 24 hours. 
 
The model was repeated, using the same input values, to obtain probabilistic, as opposed to 
dichotomous, results for colonisation of each dog over a number of ‘days’ with no 
variation in environmental factors.  As veterinary attendance is a rare event, the model was 
also re-run in full with the probability of a dog attending a veterinary clinic specified as 1 
to obtain results for this population of animals separately.   
 
 
6.2.2 Parameterisation 
 
The results of the expert opinion elicitation exercise presented in Chapter 5 were used to 
populate the model at all steps where experimental or observational studies were 
unavailable.  Published material was used where possible and, where numerous published 
studies were available, these data were combined using expert weightings, either obtained 
through the results of the expert opinion questionnaire or, where necessary, through the 
consideration of the author and supervisors.  The input distributions used to characterise 
uncertainty are presented in Table 6.1, while those used to characterise variability are 
presented in Table 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2. Example of a scenario tree for defining the probability of contact over a 24 
hour period with three contacts (in this case) with a source of MRSA. 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Uncertainty and Sensitivity analyses 
 
An uncertainty analysis was undertaken using summary statistics and graphical analysis of 
the output of the model.  The model was specified as a second order model to take into 
account both variability (modelled between realisations of dogs) and uncertainty (modelled 
over iterations) although uncertainty was also unavoidably present within the variability 
distributions.  The model was specified to result in an output that was structured as a three-
dimensional matrix, with the number of rows representing realisations of dogs (enabling 
inclusion of variability) and number of columns representing iterations of the model 
(reflecting uncertainty), all repeated 50 times to produce a probabilistic outcome from the 
1/0 outputs at the dog/iteration level.  Uncertainty was assessed by comparing the results 
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for all realisations of dogs between iterations, while variability was assessed by comparing 
the results for all iterations across realisation of dogs.   
 
A sensitivity analysis was undertaken using LR to identify the steps of the simulation 
model associated with the greatest risk of MRSA acquisition.  A subset of the model 
outcome, using the first repeat only to define the model outcome, was obtained by 
selecting all dogs that became positive for MRSA, classed as cases, and then an equal 
number of randomly selected entries that did not become positive for MRSA, classed as 
controls, to enable the sensitivity analysis to be implemented in the form of a case-control 
study.  Two separate LR models were run, assessing exposure and transmission 
explanatory variables respectively, for each of the simulation models, modelling all 
animals irrespective of veterinary attendance and only animals that had attended a 
veterinary clinic over the 24 hours in question, resulting in a total of four regression 
models.  For all regression models, outcome was specified as MRSA positive or negative 
and explanatory variables considered for inclusion in each model are presented in Table 
6.3.  The continuous variables were checked for linearity by categorising them and 
graphing the log odds of the outcome.  Those that were not linear were included in the 
models as factors.  Exploration of the data within these subsets was undertaken using two-
way tabulation and graphical analysis using mosaic plots.  Initial univariate analyses were 
not undertaken as the purpose was to assess all variables within the multivariable models 
for the aim of sensitivity analysis.  The regression models were fitted using a backwards 
stepwise algorithm, with reduction in Akaikie’s Information Criterion (AIC) used as the 
criterion for inclusion of variates in the final model. 
 
 
6.2.4 Assumptions 
 
In the current assessment, the hazard was defined as MRSA.  A generalisation of ‘MRSA 
positive’ or ‘MRSA negative’ was used for human, animal and environmental status and 
refers to a source from which MRSA can be cultured directly and that has the ability to 
contaminate, colonise or infect others.  This definition encompasses any limitations in test 
sensitivity and specificity that may be reflected in the real world.  All assumptions 
presented in the hazard identification in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.1) hold for the current 
assessment.   
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Table 6.1. Parameterisation of uncertain distributions for input to the stochastic simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs.* 
Model step  Input variable  Distribution  Inputs  Reference 
1  i  P(dog attends vet in 1yr)  Beta(s+1, n-s+1)  s=234 
n=279 
Westgarth et al. (2008) 
  ii  P(dog attends vet in 24h)  1-(1- P(dog attends vet in 1yr))^(1/365)    
Exposure        
A / B  i  P(human is a health care worker)  Beta(s+1,n-s+1) s=89 
n=2118 
Westgarth et al. (2008) 
  ii  P(human is a vet)  Beta(s+1,n-s+1)  s = 15671           
n = 37804500 
RCVS annual report 
www.statistics.gov.uk** 
  iii  P(human is in other high risk group)  Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0.01 
ml=0.02 
max=0.05 
JH after consideration of 
literature 
  iv  P(human is in normal risk group)  1-(P(human is a health care 
worker)+P(human is a vet)+P(human is in 
other high risk group)) 
  
  v  P(health care worker is MRSA 
positive) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  vi 
 
P(veterinary worker is MRSA positive)  Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  vii  P(other high risk goup is MRSA 
positive) 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0.015 
ml=0.05 
max=0.15 
JH opinion after 
consideration of literature 
  viii  P(general population is MRSA 
positive) 
Beta(s+1,n-s+1) s=4 
n=274 
Abudu et al. (2001) 
 
  ix  P(number of other people in 
family=0,1,2,3,4,5,6) 
Dirichlet(α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6)  α0=39 
α1=86 
α2=51 
α3=57 
α4=27 
α5=4 
α6=3 
(Westgarth, 2008) (personal 
communication)  
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Table 6.1. (ctd) Parameterisation of uncertain distributions for input to the stochastic simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs.* 
Model step  Input variable  Distribution  Inputs  Reference 
  x  P(person MRSA positive if lives with 
MRSA positive person) 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0.02 
ml=0.1 
max=0.5 
JH opinion after 
consideration 
C  i  P(exposure to other dogs in 24h)  Beta(s+1,n-s+1) s=246 
n=272 
(Westgarth, 2008) 
    P(community dog is MRSA positive)(1) Beta(s+1,n=s+1)  (pC1) s=1 
n=255 
Reported in Rich & Roberts 
(2006) 
    P(community dog is MRSA positive)(2) Beta(s+1,n=s+1)  (pC2) s=0 
n=188 
(Murphy et al., 2006) 
    P(community dog is MRSA positive)(3) Beta(s+1,n=s+1)  (pC3) s=2 
n=203 
(Hanselman et al., 2008) 
  ii  P(community dog is MRSA positive)  Discrete({pC1,pC2,pC3},{1,1,1})   
D  i  P(house contaminated with MRSA | at 
least one positive family member) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  ii  P(house contaminated with MRSA | no 
positive family members) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  iii  P(environmental site contaminated | at 
least one positive family member ) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  iv  P(environmental site contaminated | no 
positive family members) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
E    P(dog at vet is MRSA positive) (1) Beta(s+1,n=s+1)  (pE1) s=4 
n=200 
Loeffler (personal 
communication) 
    P(dog at vet is MRSA positive) (2) Beta(s+1,n=s+1)  (pE2) s=3 
n=287 
(Abbott et al., 2006) 
    P(dog at vet is MRSA positive) (3) Beta(s+1,n=s+1)  (pE3) s=7 
n=230 
(Abbott et al., 2006)  
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Table 6.1. (ctd) Parameterisation of uncertain distributions for input to the stochastic simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs.* 
Model step  Input variable  Distribution  Inputs  Reference 
    P(dog at vet is MRSA positive) (4) Beta(s+1,n=s+1)  (pE4) s=4 
n=45 
(Loeffler et al., 2005)  
  i  P(dog at vet is MRSA positive)  Discrete({pE1,pE2,pE3,pE4},{1,1,1,1})    
F    P(veterinary environment 
contaminated) (1) 
Beta(s+1,n=s+1) (pF1) s=3 
n=27 
Loeffler et al. (2005) – 
considered as outbreak data 
    P(veterinary environment 
contaminated) (2) 
Beta(s+1,n=s+1) (pF2) s=2 
n=158 
Heller et al. (2009) 
  i  P(veterinary environment 
contaminated) 
Discrete(pF1,pF2),(0.1,1)    
G    P(small animal veterinary worker is 
MRSA positive) (1) 
Beta(s+1,n=s+1) (pG1) s=12 
n=271 
Hanselman et al. (2006b) 
    P(small animal veterinary worker is 
MRSA positive) (2) 
Beta(s+1,n=s+1) (pG2) s=5 
n=51 
Deacon et al. (2006) 
    P(small animal veterinary worker is 
MRSA positive) (3) 
Beta(s+1,n=s+1) (pG3) s=14 
n=78 
Loeffler et al. (2005) – 
considered as outbreak data 
    P(small animal veterinary worker is 
MRSA positive) (4) 
Beta(s+1,n=s+1) (pG4) s=2 
n=64 
Heller et al. (2009) 
  i  P(small animal veterinary worker is 
MRSA positive) 
Discrete({pG1,pG2,pG3,pG4},{1,1,0.1,1})      
Transmission        
A 
 
 
 
P(transmission from MRSA positive 
family member per contact) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  ii  Number of contacts with family member 
per 24h 
betapert(min,ml,max) min=0 
ml=5 
max=20 
JH opinion after 
consideration 
  iii  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
family member per 24h) 
1-(1- P(transmission from MRSA positive 
family member per contact))^ Number of 
contacts with family member per 24h 
  
B  i  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
non-family member per contact) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5)  
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Table 6.1. (ctd) Parameterisation of uncertain distributions for input to the stochastic simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs.* 
Model step  Input variable  Distribution  Inputs  Reference 
  ii  Number of contacts with non-family 
member per 24h 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0 
ml=1 
max=10 
JH opinion after 
consideration 
  iii  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
non-family member per 24h) 
1-(1- P(transmission from MRSA positive 
non-family member per contact))^ Number 
of contacts with non-family member per 24h 
  
C  i  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
community dog per contact) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  ii  Number of contacts with community dog 
per 24h 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0 
ml=1 
max=10 
Consideration of (Westgarth 
et al., 2008) and results of 
Chapter 4 to account for 
intimate contacts 
  iii  P(transmission from community dog 
per 24h) 
1-(1- P(transmission from MRSA positive 
community dog per contact))^ Number of 
contacts with community dog per 24h 
  
D  i  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
home environment per contact) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  ii  Number of contacts with home 
environment per 24h 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0 
ml=1 
max=100 
JH opinion after 
consideration 
  iii  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
home environment per 24h) 
1-(1- P(transmission from MRSA positive 
home environment per contact))^ Number 
of contacts with home environment per 24h 
  
E  i  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
dog at veterinary clinic per contact) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  ii  Number of contacts with a dog at a 
veterinary clinic per 24h 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0 
ml=1 
max=10 
JH opinion after 
consideration  
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Table 6.1. (ctd) Parameterisation of uncertain distributions for input to the stochastic simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs.* 
Model step  Input variable  Distribution  Inputs  Reference 
  iii  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
dog at veterinary clinic per 24h) 
1-(1- P(transmission from MRSA positive 
dog at veterinary clinic per contact))^ 
Number of contacts with a dog at a veterinary 
clinic per 24h 
  
F  i  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
veterinary environment per contact) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinon (Chapter 5) 
  ii  Number of veterinary environment 
contacts per 24h 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=1 
ml=10 
max=25 
JH opinion after 
consideration 
  iii  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
veterinary environment per 24h) 
1-(1- P(transmission from MRSA positive 
veterinary environment per contact))^ 
Number of veterinary environment contacts 
per 24h 
  
G  i  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
veterinary staff member per contact) 
Random samples using latin hypercube 
sampling of length ‘iterations’ from 
previously defined combination of expert 
opinion distributions 
  Expert opinion (Chapter 5) 
  ii  Number of veterinary staff contacts per 
24h 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0 
ml=3 
max=20 
JH opinion after 
consideration 
  iii  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
veterinary staff member per 24h) 
1-(1- P(transmission from MRSA positive 
veterinary staff member per contact))^ 
Number of veterinary staff contacts per 24h 
  
              JH = Jane Heller 
              * Colours within table used for ease of follow through for Table 6.2. 
              ** Population estimate taken from www.statistics.gov.uk – estimate here is 60,975,000 but only 62% are of working age, equating to 37,804,500 
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Table 6.2. Parameterisation of variability distributions for input to the stochastic simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs. 
Reference within table to uncertainty distributions specified in Table 6.1 (in bold and colours) 
Model step  Input variable  Distribution  Inputs  Reference 
1  Attendance at veterinary clinic 
(attend.vet) 
Binomial(1, P(dog attends vet in 24h))    
Exposure        
A  Owner MRSA status (O.status) 
 
Binomial(1,P(MRSA positive given the specified risk group))    
B  Number of non-owner family 
members  
(n.non.O.fam) 
sample(0,1,2,3,4,5,6) with probabilities taken from the dirichlet distribution 
specified in Exposure A/B(ix) (Table 6.1) 
  
  Number of MRSA positive non-
owner family members 
(n.pos.non.O.fam) 
Binomial(n.non.O.fam, P(MRSA positive given the specified risk 
group)) OR binomial(n.non.O.fam, P(person MRSA positive if lives with 
MRSA positive person)) depending on if there is a MRSA positive family 
member present in the house 
  
  Number of non-family humans 
exposed to per day  
(n.non.fam) 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0 
ml=4 
mx=15 
(Westgarth 
et al., 2008) 
  Number of MRSA positive non-
owner family members exposed to 
per day (n.pos.non.fam) 
Binomial(n.non.fam, P(MRSA positive given the specified risk group))    
C  Is at-risk dog exposed to other dogs 
in 24h  
(exp.dog) 
Binomial(1, P(exposure to other dogs in 24h))    
  Number of dogs in the community 
that at-risk dog is exposed to in 24h  
(n.c.dogs) 
exp.dog*Betapert(min,ml,max) min=1 
ml=2 
max=15 
(Westgarth 
et al., 2008) 
  Number of MRSA positive 
community dogs contacted in 24h  
(n.pos.c.dog) 
Binomial(n.c.dogs, P(community dog is MRSA positive))    
D  Is house contaminated with MRSA  
(house.contam) 
Binomial(1, P(house contaminated with MRSA | at least one positive 
family member)) or binomial(1, P(house contaminated with MRSA | no 
positive family members)) depending on if there is a MRSA positive 
family member present in the house 
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Table 6.2. (ctd) Parameterisation of variability distributions for input to the stochastic simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs. 
Reference within table to uncertainty distributions specified in Table 6.1 (in bold and colours) 
Model step  Input variable  Distribution  Inputs  Reference 
  Number of sites at-risk dog is 
exposed to in house (n.env.sites) 
Betapert(min,ml,max) min=1 
ml=20 
max=200 
JH opinion  
  Number of contaminated sites in 
house  
(n.pos.env.sites) 
Binomial(n.env.sites,P(environmental site contaminated | at least one 
MRSA positive family member) OR P(environmental site contaminated 
| no MRSA positive family members)) depending on if there is a MRSA 
positive family member in the house 
  
E  Number of dogs contacted at 
veterinary clinic  
(n.vet.dogs) 
attend.vet*Betapert(min,ml,max) min=0 
ml=1 
max=10 
JH opinion 
  Number of MRSA positive dogs 
contacted at veterinary clinic in 24h  
(n.pos.vet.dog) 
Binomial(n.vet.dogs, P(dog at vet is MRSA positive))    
F  Number of veterinary environmental 
sites contacted in 24h  
(n.vet.env) 
attend.vet*Betapert(min,ml,max) min=1 
ml=10 
max=100 
JH opinion 
  Number of contaminated veterinary 
environmental sites contacted in 24h  
(n.pos.vet.env) 
Binomial(n.vet.env, P(veterinary environment contaminated))   
G  Number of veterinary staff contacted 
in 24h  
(n.vet) 
attend.vet*Betapert(min,ml,max) min=1 
ml=2 
max=5 
JH opinion 
  Number of MRSA positive 
veterinary staff contacted in 24h 
(n.pos.vet) 
Binomial(n.vet, P(small animal veterinary worker is MRSA positive))    
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Table 6.2. (ctd) Parameterisation of variability distributions for input to the stochastic simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs. 
Reference within table to uncertainty distributions specified in Table 6.1 (in bold and colours) 
Model step  Input variable  Distribution  Inputs  Reference 
Transmission        
A   Binomial(O.status, P(transmission from MRSA positive family member per 24h)) 
B   Binomial(n.pos. non.O.fam, P(transmission from MRSA positive family member per 24h)) 
Binomial(n.pos. non.fam, P(transmission from MRSA positive non-family member per 24h)) 
C   Binomial(n.pos.c.dog, P(transmission from community dog per 24h))  
D   Binomial(n.pos.env.sites, P(transmission from MRSA positive home environment per 24h)) 
E   Binomial(n.pos.vet.dog, P(transmission from MRSA positive dog at veterinary clinic per 24h)) 
F   Binomial(n.pos.vet.env, P(transmission from MRSA positive veterinary environment per 24h)) 
G   Binomial(n.pos.vet, P(transmission from MRSA positive veterinary staff member per 24h)) 
JH = Jane Heller 
              * Colours within table used for ease of follow through from Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.3. Explanatory variables considered for logistic regression models used in the 
sensitivity analysis for acquisition of MRSA in dogs (all for a 24 hour time period) 
Regression model  Simulation 
model  Exposure Model  Transmission model 
All dogs  Number of MRSA contaminated 
environmental sites 
P(transmission from environment) 
  Number of MRSA positive family 
members 
P(transmission from family member) 
 
  Number of MRSA positive non family 
members 
P(transmission from non family member) 
  Number of MRSA positive dogs  P(transmission from dog) 
  Attendance at veterinary clinic  P(attendance at veterinary clinic) 
Number of MRSA contaminated 
environmental sites 
P(transmission from environment) 
Number of MRSA positive family 
members 
P(transmission from family member) 
Number of MRSA positive non family 
members 
P(transmission from non family member) 
Number of MRSA positive dogs  P(transmission from dog) 
Dogs attending 
veterinary 
clinics only 
Number of MRSA positive veterinary staff P(transmission  from veterinary staff) 
  Number of MRSA contaminated 
veterinary environmental sites 
P(transmission from environment at 
veterinary clinic) 
  Number of MRSA positive dogs at 
veterinary clinic 
P(transmission from dog at veterinary 
clinic) 
 
 
6.2.5 Convergence 
 
Prior to model implementation, a convergence analysis was undertaken to define the 
number of simulation samples required to be taken for the uncertainty distributions to reach 
convergence.  These analyses were undertaken by plotting the running mean for successive 
iterations against the number of iterations used and convergence was assessed by visual 
comparison with the overall mean. 
 
All simulation and statistical models were specified, implemented and analysed using R (R 
Development Core Team, 2008) and statistical significance was set at P < 0.05.  The 
complete code for the simulation model is presented in Appendix 8.   
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6.3  Results 
6.3.1 Convergence 
 
The results of the convergence analysis showed that, for the full simulation model, 
adequate convergence was reached by 1000 iterations (Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.3. Convergence analysis for number of iterations (samples from uncertainty 
distributions) required for the overall simulation model of MRSA acquisition in dogs. 
 
 
6.3.2 Overall uncertainty analysis 
 
The model was run for 200 at-risk dogs (realisations of the same dog) over 1000 iterations, 
using 5000 samples to combine expert opinions, as defined by the convergence analyses 
(sections 5.3.2, 6.3.1).  This model was repeated 50 times using the same input variables 
for each dog, resulting in an output in the form of a 200*1000*50 (dogs*iterations*repeats) 
matrix with each entry taking a binary form.  Summing across the repeats allowed 
conversion of binary estimates to proportions.   
 
The outcome of the model predicted the mean proportion of dogs that become positive for 
MRSA over any given 24 hour period to be 0.042.  The uncertainty surrounding this 
estimate is reflected in Figure 6.4 and is defined by the 95% simulation interval 0.038 -  
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0.046, and 5
th, 50
th and 95
th percentiles of 0, 0.015 and 0.19, respectively.  The variability 
surrounding this estimate is reflected in Figure 6.5 and is defined by the 95% simulation 
interval for the mean 0.041 - 0.043 and 5
th, 50
th and 95
th percentiles of 0.031, 0.043 and 
0.052, respectively. 
 
Figure 6.4. Proportion of dogs positive for MRSA in 24 hours for a single model run with 
1000 iterations of the simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs. 
 
Figure 6.5. Proportion of iterations positive for MRSA in 24 hours for a single model run 
with 1000 iterations and 200 dogs modelled for the simulation model for MRSA 
acquisition in dogs. 
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The uncertainty is plotted in Figure 6.6, using the proportion of repeats of the model in 
which a dog will be positive for MRSA and showing the probability that a single dog will 
become positive for MRSA on any given day.  Each line on the graph represents one of 
100 random samples of iterations (N=1000) and each iteration plots all realisations 
(N=200) of a single dog, with independent input variables, representing variability, over a 
given 24 hour time period, averaged across 50 repeats (i.e. the probability that that dog will 
be MRSA positive on any 24 hour period, given the input variables that are assigned to that 
iteration). 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Probability that a dog will become MRSA positive on any given day.  Each line 
represents one of 100 random samples of iterations (N=1000) and each iteration plots all 
realisations (N=200) of a dog (with independent input variables) over a given 24 hour time 
period, averaged across 50 repeats. 
 
 
 
The confidence intervals associated with the uncertainty analysis are displayed as 
cumulative distribution graphs in Figure 6.7 and 6.8 and show the uncertainty (slope) and 
variability (width) to increase with an increase in probability of MRSA acquisition.  This is 
similarly reflected in Figure 6.9 which plots the confidence intervals as histograms to allow 
visualisation of the distribution associated with the confidence intervals.  
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Figure 6.7. 95% Confidence intervals of the distributions representing the probability that a 
dog will become MRSA positive on any given day, given a certain set of input parameters. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Percentile cumulative distributions of the distributions representing the 
probability that a dog will become MRSA positive on any given day, given a certain set of 
input parameters. 
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Figure 6.10 shows the independent uncertainty distributions averaged over realisations of 
dogs (N=200).  Each line represents one of 100 random samples of iterations (N=1000) 
and each iteration plots all repeats (N = 50) of an iteration, with the same uncertain input 
variables, over a given 24 hour time period, averaged across 200 dogs.  This shows that 
there is marked variability between some input variables, reflected in differences between 
distributions for each iteration, and that some variables or variable combinations may be 
very influential in output scenarios. 
 
 
6.3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
When the simulation model was run for all dogs, and taking into account all realisations of 
dogs and all iterations, 8446 outcomes (4.2%) were found to be positive for MRSA and 
when the model was run for dogs that attended a veterinary clinic only, 38194 outcomes 
(19.1%) were positive for MRSA.  Therefore, 16892 and 76388 records were used for the 
LR models run for all dogs and for those who had attended a veterinary clinic, respectively.  
The results of the data exploration found that some of the continuous variables were non-
linear in the logit.  To enable accurate comparison between variables, all transmission 
variables were included as factors.  After assessment of mosaic plots revealed very low 
numbers of observations in successive categories of exposure variables (e.g. Figures 6.11, 
6.12) and to enable ease of comparative interpretation, all exposure variables were 
dichotomised and included as factors. 
 
The results of the separate exposure and transmission LR models that were specified for all 
dogs (irrespective of veterinary attendance) are presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.  The 
exposure and transmission LR models for dogs that attended a veterinary clinic over the 24 
hours are presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7.  The transmission variables were categorised 
into five levels, the first of which represents a probability of 0 and the other four 
representing quartiles of the remaining probabilities.    
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Figure 6.9. Histograms of the confidence intervals of the probability that a dog will 
become MRSA positive on any given day, given a certain set of input parameters. 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Proportion of realisations of a dog (N=200) that will become MRSA positive 
on any given day.  Each line represents one of 100 random samples of iterations (N=1000) 
and each iteration plots all repeats (N=50) of the model run over a given 24 hour time 
period, averaged across all realisations of the dog. 
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Figure 6.11. Mosaic plot of MRSA status of dogs, for the observations selected from the 
simulation model for the logistic regression model, stratified by the number of MRSA 
positive family members that they are exposed to over a given 24 hour period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12. Mosaic plot of MRSA status of dogs, for the observations selected from the 
simulation model for the logistic regression model, stratified by the number of MRSA 
positive dogs that each is exposed to over a given 24 hour period. 
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Table 6.4. Results of a multivariable logistic regression model with the outcome specified 
as MRSA status and explanatory variables specified as exposure variables for all dogs 
under consideration in the simulation model for acquisition of MRSA in dogs 
Log-likelihood = -4288.203 
No. of observations = 16892 
Akaike's information criterion = 8588.40 
Residual deviance = 8576.4 on 16886 df 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model  Explanatory variable  Odds Ratio  95%Confidence 
Interval 
P value 
Exposure 
model 
Number of MRSA contaminated 
environmental sites 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
354.53  
 
 
 
292.28 – 430.03 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA positive family 
members 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
74.85  
 
 
 
62.75 - 89.29 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA positive non 
family members 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
35.56  
 
 
 
30.76 - 41.11 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA positive dogs 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
1 
40.13  
 
 
33.24 - 48.46 
 
 
<0.001 
  Attendance at veterinary clinic 
      No 
      Yes 
 
1 
56.94 
 
 
38.8 - 83.57 
 
 
<0.001  
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Table 6.5. Results of a multivariable logistic regression model run with the outcome 
specified as MRSA status and explanatory variables specified from transmission variables 
for all dogs under consideration in the simulation model for acquisition of MRSA in dogs. 
Log-likelihood = -4250.2759 
No. of observations = 16892 
Akaike's information criterion = 8536.5517 
Residual deviance = 8500.6 on 16874 df 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Explanatory  variable  Odds 
Ratio 
95%Confidence 
Interval 
P value 
Transmission 
model 
 
P(transmission from environment) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile  
 
1 
30.67  
101.81 
483.39 
1.70 x 10
9 
 
 
23.15 - 40.63 
77.6 - 133.59 
325.4 - 718.08 
0 - 3.36 x 10
174 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.913 
  P(transmission from non family member) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.64 
3.31   
12.88 
83.3 
 
 
0.36 - 1.16 
2.42 - 4.53 
10.34 - 16.04 
67.65 - 102.58 
 
 
0.139 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  P(transmission from family member) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
2.72  
16.2 
75.41 
331.8 
 
 
1.42 - 5.19 
10.9 - 24.09 
50.13 - 113.43 
163.53 - 673.2 
 
 
0.002 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  P(transmission from dog) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.55 
3.99 
15.59 
109.39 
 
 
0.21 - 1.48 
2.54 - 6.27 
11.1 - 21.89 
77.43 - 154.53 
 
 
0.239 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  Attendance at veterinary clinic 
     No 
     Yes 
 
1 
28.74  
 
 
19.78 - 41.75 
 
 
<0.001  
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Table 6.6. Results of a multivariable logistic regression model with the outcome specified 
as MRSA status and explanatory variables specified from exposure variables for dogs who 
have attended a veterinary clinic in the simulation model for acquisition of MRSA in dogs. 
Log-likelihood = -38757.3143 
No. of observations = 76388 
AIC value = 77530.6286 
Residual deviance = 77515 on 76380 df 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Explanatory  variable  Odds 
Ratio 
95%Confidence 
Interval 
P value 
Exposure 
model 
Number of MRSA contaminated 
veterinary environmental sites 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
11.07  
 
 
 
10.65 – 11.51 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA contaminated 
environmental sites 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
16.09 
 
 
 
14.76 – 17.54 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA positive veterinary 
staff 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
4.84  
 
 
 
4.62 – 5.08 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA positive dogs at 
veterinary clinic 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
5.16  
 
 
 
4.88 – 5.46 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA positive family 
members 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
2.65  
 
 
 
2.43 – 2.89 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA positive non family 
members 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
 
1 
1.88  
 
 
 
1.77 – 2.00 
 
 
 
<0.001 
  Number of MRSA positive dogs 
      0 
      ≥1 
 
1 
1.83  
 
 
1.66 - 2.01 
 
 
<0.001  
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Table 6.7. Results of a multivariable logistic regression model with outcome specified as 
MRSA status and explanatory variables specified from transmission variables for dogs who 
have attended a veterinary clinic in the simulation model for acquisition of MRSA in dogs. 
Log-likelihood = -25657.32 
No. of observations = 76388 
AIC value = 51373 
Residual deviance = 51315 on 76359 df 
 
 
 
 
Model Explanatory  variable  Odds 
Ratio 
95%Confidence 
Interval 
P 
value 
Transmission 
model 
P(transmission from environment at 
veterinary clinic) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
1 
1.73 
8.7 
27.82 
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1.56 – 1.91 
8.14 – 9.29 
26.05 – 29.71 
152.82 – 182.5 
<0.001 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  P(transmission from veterinary staff) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.9 
2.71 
10.01 
67.08 
 
 
0.77 – 1.05 
2.45 – 2.99 
9.12 – 10.99 
60.1 – 74.87 
<0.001 
 
0.190 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  P(transmission from environment) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
2.63 
14.09 
72.25 
1638.78 
 
 
2.19 – 3.17 
 11.89 – 16.68 
58.588 – 89.12 
778.76 – 3448.55 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  P(transmission from dog at veterinary 
clinic) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
1 
1.42 
3.42 
11.33 
121.5 
 
 
 
1.19 – 1.68 
3.02 – 3.88 
10.06 – 12.76 
102.43 – 144.12 
<0.001 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  P(transmission from non family member) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.69 
1.24 
1.94 
15.51 
 
 
0.55 – 0.87 
1.07 – 1.43 
1.68 – 2.24 
13.42 – 17.92 
<0.001 
 
0.001 
0.004 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  P(transmission from family member) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.76 
2 
14.21 
138.41 
 
 
0.52 – 1.12 
1.56 – 2.54 
10.94 – 18.45 
81.4 – 235.34 
<0.001 
 
0.162 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
  P(transmission from dog) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.6 
1.37 
2.04 
16.8 
 
 
0.4 – 0.88 
1.07 – 1.75 
1.61 – 2.58 
13.49 – 20.93 
<0.001 
 
0.010 
0.011 
<0.001 
<0.001  
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6.4  Discussion 
 
The results of this simulation study should be interpreted with care, given the lack of data, 
reliance on expert opinion estimates and complexity of the simulation model required to 
represent a largely undocumented biological process.  Although iterative communication 
was maintained with experts in MRSA and risk analysts throughout the model-building 
process to ensure that any assumptions and parameterisations were well justified, caution 
in interpretation of outputs is still required.  However, the aim of the study in this instance 
was not to rely heavily on the absolute values of the outputs, but to use the results of the 
sensitivity analysis to define the most important and influential inputs with respect to the 
acquisition of MRSA in dogs and to inform the direction of future research activity in what 
might be considered a priority area. 
 
The output of the full simulation model shows that, on average, 4.2% of dogs will become 
positive for MRSA (carriage, colonisation or infection) over any given 24 hour period.  
While there is marked uncertainty associated with this estimate, reflected in the wide 95% 
uncertain simulation interval (0.038 - 0.046), the estimate for variability is smaller (95% 
variable simulation interval 0.041 - 0.043).  The median estimate for MRSA acquisition in 
a given 24 hour period is 1.5% and represents a value that is far smaller than the mean and 
is a more accurate reflection of the model output, given the marked right skew to the output 
distribution displayed in Figure 6.4.  Taking into account the overall output, along with the 
individual uncertainty distributions in Figure 6.10, the model also is found to predict that, 
while most dogs will be negative on most occasions, a small proportion will be positive all 
of the time depending on their input parameters, that is, there are some parameters, 
corresponding to exposures to and transmissions from certain sources, that are highly 
associated with the acquisition of MRSA.  The graphical analysis of the confidence 
intervals associated with the uncertainty distributions (Figures 6.7 and 6.8) reveals that the 
overall uncertainty within this model is clustered at the upper end of the distributions, with 
both uncertainty and variability increasing as the probability of becoming MRSA positive 
increases.   
 
It is difficult to corroborate or repudiate the results of this model using data collection, 
given the temporal specification of the model along with the definition of ‘MRSA positive’ 
to encompass intermittent carriage.  However, the median model output (1.5%) falls within 
the 95% binomial confidence intervals calculated for four studies of MRSA carriage in  
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dogs in the community; i) 0.1 – 2.2% reported in Rich and Roberts (2006), ii) 0 – 1.9% 
(Murphy et al., 2006), iii) 0.1 – 3.5% (Hanselman et al., 2008) and iv) 0 – 1.8% (Vengust 
et al., 2006) (intervals calculated using biconf.exe as described in Chapter 1).  The 
structure of the simulation model used is dependent on individual estimation of contact and 
transmission information that was, for some parameters, collected by expert opinion and 
subsequently likely to encompass marked uncertainty.  While this uncertainty is modelled 
to the best of our ability, the possibility of expert estimates to deviate from reality largely 
remains and, in the case of probability of transmission, is likely to continue to be 
unquantifiable given the inability to perform further data collection in this area due to 
ethical restrictions.  Notwithstanding this, the output of the model presented herein is 
consistent with prior reports, is biologically plausible and allows the implementation of a 
sensitivity analysis, the output of which is the focus of this work. 
 
The results of the LR models show that the most influential predictors for MRSA 
acquisition in dogs include exposure to MRSA positive environments, family members and 
veterinary clinic attendance.  Exposure to an MRSA positive home environment was also 
found to be highly influential for dogs that attended veterinary clinics.  For exposures 
within a veterinary clinic, the greatest level of influence was found to be associated with 
exposure to the environment at a veterinary clinic, followed by exposure to dogs at a 
veterinary clinic and then exposure to the veterinary staff.  Within the regression models 
fitted to assess transmission parameters, attendance at a veterinary clinic was found to be 
highly influential, although all routes of transmission were also found to be influential, 
particularly when the higher quantiles of the probabilities of transmission were assessed.  
In comparing the influence of transmission variables, the probability of transmission from 
the community environment was associated with the greatest influence, followed by 
transmission from family members, dogs and non-family members.  Similarly, for animals 
that attended veterinary clinics, the probability of transmission from the community 
environment was also the most influential variable, followed by the probability of 
transmission from the veterinary clinic environment, dogs at a veterinary clinic and from 
veterinary staff members, respectively.  Transmission from family, non-family and dogs 
outside of the vet clinic was found to be less influential than the within-clinic factors. 
The use of LR for sensitivity analysis as presented in this chapter is a novel application of a 
technique that is widely used in statistical modelling.  Regression analysis has been 
proposed for use as a tool for sensitivity analysis (Kleijnen, 1987; Kleijnen and Sargent, 
2000) and LR, along with linear regression and probit analysis, has been utilised in 
combination with experimental design methods as a metamodelling technique undertaken  
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on simulation models previously published in the veterinary literature (Vonk Noordegraaf 
et al., 2003; de Vos et al., 2006).  However, to the author’s knowledge, the direct 
application of a LR model to a simulation model has not previously been reported in the 
veterinary literature.  As previously discussed (Chapter 1), metamodelling describes the 
use of a regression model as a tool to model the I/O relationships of a simulation model, 
allowing a formalised approximation of the relationships between input and output factors.  
The regression models that are applied to the current scenario can not strictly be termed 
metamodels as they do not attempt to approximate the entire I/O transformation implied by 
the simulation model, but rather enable the quantification of the relationship between 
selected intermediate input variables and the output for differing scenarios.  
 
While the regression models that have been implemented are informative in defining inputs 
to which the output of the model is most sensitive, and therefore most deserving of 
accurate quantification (Helton and Davis, 2000), this sensitivity analysis could be 
considered to be incomplete as many of the input variables of the simulation model have 
not been included in their primary form.  This type of analysis does not facilitate inclusion 
and analysis of distributional or other basic input assumptions and while the effect of all 
variables are accounted for in the regression models through the inclusion of variables that 
are composites of many inputs, these inputs themselves cannot be examined.  For example, 
in this study it is not possible to define whether the effect of a variable such as exposure to 
MRSA positive family members, to which the output is highly sensitive, is evenly 
distributed across all family members, whether it is greater for the primary owner, or 
whether it is dependent on owner risk group, all of which are included in the simulation 
model but cannot easily be included in the LR sensitivity analysis due to their fine 
resolution, collinearity and potential for confounding.  Similarly, interactions between 
input variables in the LR have not been assessed in this analysis.  The notion of global 
sensitivity analysis encompasses the ability to assess the sensitivity of the model output to 
each input variable, whilst also considering the potential effects of all other variables 
within the model.  As such, while LR allows the generation of results with respect to the 
other variables considered in the model, the inclusion of interactions may allow specific 
consideration of the magnitude of effect, effect modification or confounding, that is 
conferred by the inclusion of two-way or higher order interaction terms. 
 
The interpretation of the results generated by this LR is difficult.  The aim was to define 
variables to which the output of the model was highly sensitive.  However, the inclusion of 
explanatory variables in the exposure models as dichotomous, whilst satisfying the  
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assumptions for LR modeling and allowing accurate quantification of the effect size of 
each variable, results in loss of information regarding the variance of these parameters and, 
as such, limits the inference that can be made from the model output.  Notwithstanding 
this, the output of a LR model that uses dichotomised input variables allows comparison 
and ranking of importance of those input variables based on an objective measure.   
Conversely, the inclusion of categorical predictors with more than one category, as 
implemented in the transmission models in the current study, results in a loss of ability to 
compare accurately between explanatory variables whilst maintaining the ability to account 
for variance in the input factors.  Neither of these representations is ideal. 
 
In this study, the finding that both veterinary and non-veterinary routes of acquisition are 
highly influential for MRSA acquisition in dogs is relevant and highlights the importance 
of continued research into the interaction between dogs and humans with respect to the 
zoonotic potential for MRSA.  The exposure variables to which the output is highly 
sensitive provide information about where mitigation strategies might best be targeted, but 
the use of information about influential transmission parameters in the model raises a more 
difficult problem.  While these variables, e.g. probability of transmission from the 
environment, are likely to benefit from further study and more accurate quantification, the 
practicality of undertaking these studies must be considered.  The use of expert opinion, on 
which many of the input distributions for probabilities of transmission are based, resulted 
in marked uncertainty, reflected in large variation in expert responses, low confidence 
estimates and written comments imparting low assurance in the validity of the observations 
(Chapter 5) and is confirmed with the results of the LR models.  Given the expert 
comments (Appendix 5), it is unlikely that this uncertainty is reducible by refinement of 
the expert opinion technique.  Furthermore, observational studies are likely to be 
inadequate for obtaining microorganism transfer data, and experimental studies are not 
ethically tolerated and rarely represent real world situations with respect to this biological 
area.  As such, the question is raised: does the identification of highly influential 
transmission variables merely quantify an unresolvable lack of knowledge? 
 
The quantitative assessment and attendant sensitivity analysis that have been conducted in 
this data-sparse area have improved on a previous qualitative assessment (Chapter 3) 
which returned unsatisfactory results due to the complexity of the specified model and lack 
of modular, sequential form.  The approach that has been taken has identified veterinary 
and non-veterinary routes as important for the acquisition of MRSA in dogs and has 
allowed the identification of influential exposure, i.e. MRSA positive environments, family  
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members and veterinary clinic attendance, and transmission, i.e. home and veterinary 
environment, variables, but has been unable to rank these effects objectively or defensibly, 
and has raised many questions with respect to the subsequent use of this information.  The 
results of this chapter highlight the need for further research, directed towards expanding 
the sensitivity analysis presented herein by assessing interactions between the variables in 
the LR models and by implementing alternative sensitivity analysis techniques, such as 
factorial analysis, to account for a greater number and finer resolution of input variables.  
Consideration of the application and results of the current analysis highlights the practical 
complexity that limits the application of a truly global sensitivity analysis to a biological 
model such as this. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR THE 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE 
ACQUISITION OF MRSA IN PET DOGS 
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7.1  Introduction 
 
Sensitivity analysis may be defined as the study of how the variation in the output of a 
mathematical model can be apportioned, qualitatively or quantitatively, to different sources 
of variation in the input of a model (Saltelli, 2000).  The use of sensitivity analysis is 
considered to be an integral and essential component of the modelling process, the results 
of which may be used for numerous purposes including model validation, optimisation and 
calibration (Saltelli, 2000; Trocine and Malone, 2000; Borgonovo, 2008).  In risk analysis, 
sensitivity analysis is primarily used to identify risk-governing parameters, important for 
both the implementation of mitigation strategies and direction of future research in the 
form of data collection and/or surveillance (Saltelli, 2000; Frey and Patil, 2002; Saltelli, 
2002). 
 
Appropriate selection of sensitivity analysis technique is complex and, as outlined in 
Chapter 1, may depend on many factors, including the intended goal of the analysis, the 
structure and methods of the underlying model to which it is applied and the computational 
cost of its implementation (Saltelli, 2000).  The sensitivity analysis that was presented in 
Chapter 6 represents a novel application to a risk assessment scenario of multivariable LR 
modelling.  While the results of the LR models presented in Chapter 6 were informative, 
the potential to increase their global capacity may exist through consideration of 
interaction terms.  In addition, consideration of additional sensitivity analysis techniques 
that assess input variables at a differing resolution within the stochastic model to the LR 
models will allow comparison of outcomes and consideration of results in parallel.  
 
This chapter presents the results of further sensitivity analyses undertaken on the risk 
assessment model described and implemented in Chapter 6 and aims to compare and 
compile the results of different methods of sensitivity analysis when applied to the same 
scenario. 
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7.2  Materials and Methods 
7.2.1 LR with interactions 
 
The LR models that were completed for transmission parameters in Chapter 6 were 
repeated with the inclusion of two-way interaction terms between environmental factors 
and all other possible sources of MRSA (family, non-family and environment) for each of 
the community and veterinary clinic settings.  As described in Chapter 6, two separate LR 
models were run for each of the simulation models, modelling all animals irrespective of 
veterinary attendance and only animals that had attended a veterinary clinic over the 24 
hours in question.  Simulation output data were selected and input variables were 
categorised as described in Chapter 6.  For all regression models, outcome was specified as 
MRSA positive or negative and explanatory variables considered for inclusion in each 
model are presented in Table 6.3.  The regression models were fitted using a backwards 
stepwise algorithm, with reduction in AIC used as the criterion for inclusion of variates in 
the final model. 
 
 
7.2.2 OAT sensitivity analysis 
 
Twenty eight potentially influential input factors were identified for inclusion in the one-
at-a-time sensitivity analysis.  The input distributions associated with each of these factors 
(presented in Chapter 6, Table 6.1 and 6.2) were assessed and each factor was assigned a 
minimum, most likely and maximum value (Table 7.1). 
 
A OAT analysis was undertaken, using all 28 of the input factors defined in Table 7.1.  The 
model was run initially with all input variables set to their most likely value to obtain a 
baseline result and then the model was re-run 56 times with each factor changed to their 
maximum and minimum values in turn, while all other factors were set at their baseline 
(median) value, resulting in a total of 57 model runs.  Each model run was specified for 
1000 iterations and the output was defined as the distribution (over 1000 iterations) of 
proportion of realisations of dogs that became positive for MRSA on that run.  The results 
for each of the variables of the OAT analysis were ranked based on their variation from the 
baseline mean and 90
th percentile values, by dividing the results of each run by the results 
of the baseline run.     
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7.2.3 P-B fractional factorial sensitivity analysis 
 
Initially, a P-B fractional factorial design was specified for each of the 28 input parameters 
specified in Table 7.1.  This design was a two-level design, using the minimum and 
maximum estimates for each factor, described in Table 7.1 and defined herein as ‘-’ and 
‘+’.  As the P-B design for k factors requires at least k+1 design points, provided that k+1 
is divisible by 4, this analysis required 32 design points, which increased to 64 when a 
foldover was incorporated (Law and Kelton, 2000; Beres and Hawkins, 2001).  This design 
matrix was specified using DOE++ software (version 1.0.3, Reliasoft corporation, 
http://www.reliasoft.com/doe/) and is displayed in Table 7.2.  However, the results of the 
analysis using this 28 factor design were unsatisfactory due to the instability of effects 
found for the within veterinary clinic variables, and, on consideration of this design with 
respect to the specification of the simulation model, it became apparent that some of the 
factors specified within the factorial design were mutually exclusive.  Consequently, the 
analysis was re-run for two separate scenarios: 1) All dogs, allowing inclusion of factors 
F1 to F19, described in Table 7.1 and 2) Dogs that attended a vet in the given 24 hour 
period, allowing, with the exclusion of F1, assessment of all community and veterinary 
factors (F2 – F28).  The first scenario utilised a 19 factor, 40 design point (foldover of 20 
design points) P-B design, while the second utilised a 27 factor, 64 design point (foldover 
of 32 design points) P-B design, both matrices of which were specified using DOE++ 
software (version 1.0.3, Reliasoft corporation, http://www.reliasoft.com/doe/) and are 
displayed in Appendix 9.  For design point 1 in the P-B matrix, the simulation model was 
parameterised according to the + / - combination of variables dictated by the matrix and 
run for 1000 iterations (as per convergence analysis presented in Chapter 6) of 200 dogs.  
These were used to derive a distribution of the probability of becoming MRSA positive in 
24 hours, given the specified combination of inputs.  The mean (and 90
th percentile) of the 
distribution were used as alternative summary output measures for design point 1 in the P-
B matrix.  This procedure was repeated for all other design points in both P-B analyses.   
 
The main effects for each factor included in the P-B designs were then calculated as 
described by Beres and Hawkins (2001).  The signs from the P-B matrix column associated 
with that factor were attributed to the output values obtained after running the P-B analysis 
(as described above), row by row (that is, run by run).  Each of these values were then 
summed and divided by the design size (number of runs) to obtain a P-B main effect value 
for each variable.  
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7.2.4 Implementation 
All analyses were undertaken using R (R Development Core Team, 2008).  To enable the 
use of maximal iterations with reduced run time, the OAT and P-B analyses were run using 
a computer cluster utilising 26 x 2.3GHz G5 processors (13 dual processor machines) that 
were linked via xgrid software (Apple Inc; California, USA, 
http://www.apple.com/server/macosx/technology/xgrid.html).   
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Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics for input for sensitivity analysis of the simulation model for MRSA acquisition in dogs. 
Factor Variable*  Minimum  25
th 
Percentile 
Median 75
th 
Percentile 
Maximum 
F1  P(dog attends vet in 24 hours)  4.01 x 10 
-3   4.71 x 10 
-3  4.96 x 10 
-3  5.22 x 10 
-3  6.43 x 10 
-3 
F2  P(health care worker is MRSA positive)  5.24 x 10 
-3  3.30 x 10 
-2  6.23 x 10 
-2  9.02 x 10 
-2 0.460 
F3  P(veterinary worker is MRSA positive)  3.97 x 10 
-3  4.39 x 10 
-2  7.12 x 10 
-2  9.41 x 10 
-2 0.217 
F4  P(other high risk goup is MRSA positive)  1.61 x 10 
-2  4.18 x 10 
-2  5.66 x 10 
-2  7.42 x 10 
-2  1.61 x 10 
-2 
F5  P(general population is MRSA positive)  2.09 x 10 
-3  1.20 x 10 
-2  1.68 x 10 
-2  2.22 x 10 
-2  4.64 x 10 
-2 
F6  P(person MRSA positive if lives with MRSA positive person)  2.06 x 10 
-2  9.46 x 10 
-2  0.142 0.205 0.430 
F7  P(transmission from MRSA positive family member per contact)  7.36 x 10 
-6  4.91 x 10 
-3  2.51 x 10 
-2 0.102  0.921 
F8  Number of contacts with family member per 24h  0  4  6  9  19 
F9  P(transmission from MRSA positive non-family member per contact)  4.77 x 10 
-7  3.00 x 10 
-3  8.09 x 10 
-3  3.46 x 10 
-2 0.446 
F10  Number  of  contacts  with  non-family  member  per  24h  0 1 2 3 9 
F11  P(community dog is MRSA positive)  3.71 x 10
-5  3.32 x 10 
-3  6.94 x 10 
-3  1.31 x 10 
-2  5.02 x 10 
-2 
F12  P(transmission from MRSA positive community dog per contact)  9.05 x 10
-6  3.37 x 10 
-3  1.83 x 10 
-2  6.42 x 10 
-2 0.373 
F13  Number of contacts with community dog per 24h  0  1  2  3  9 
F14  P(house contaminated with MRSA | at least one positive family 
member)  1.23 x 10 
-2  0.218 0.388 0.575 0.995 
F15  P(house contaminated with MRSA | no positive family members)  4.29 x 10
-5  9.59 x 10 
-3  2.33 x 10 
-2  4.20 x 10 
-2 0.181 
F16  P(environmental site contaminated | at least one positive family member 
)  6.06 x 10 
-3  0.119 0.250 0.471 0.983 
F17  P(environmental site contaminated | no positive family members)  1.27 x 10 
-3  9.53 x 10 
-2  0.140 0.237 0.953 
F18  P(transmission from MRSA positive home environment per contact)  7.48 x 10
-6  3.37 x 10 
-3  1.47 x 10 
-2  1.47 x 10 
-2 0.908 
F19  Number of contacts with home environment per 24h  0  6  14  14  95 
F20  P(dog at vet is MRSA positive)  1.95 x 10
-3  1.66 x 10
-2  2.87 x 10
-2  5.30 x 10
-2 0.248 
F21  P(transmission from MRSA positive dog at veterinary clinic per 
contact)  1.1 x 10
-4  2.73 x 10
-2  6.04 x 10
-2 0.211  0.968 
F22  Number of contacts with a dog at a veterinary clinic per 24h  0  1  2  3  9 
F23  P(veterinary environment contaminated)  1.17 x 10
-3  1.15 x 10
-2  1.83 x 10
-2  2.77 x 10
-2 0.460 
F24  P(transmission from MRSA positive veterinary environment per 
contact)  1.69 x 10
-6  3.16 x 10
-3  1.54 x 10
-2  4.30 x 10
-2 0.928 
F25  Number of veterinary environment contacts per 24h  1  8  11  14  25 
F26  P(small animal veterinary worker is MRSA positive)  5.72 x 10
-3  3.95 x 10
-2  5.68 x 10
-2  9.09 x 10
-2 0.255 
F27  P(transmission from MRSA positive veterinary staff member per 
contact)  4.97 x 10
-6  4.14 x 10
-3  3.04 x 10
-2  6.55 x 10
-2 0.647 
F28  Number of veterinary staff contacts per 24h  0  3  5  7  19 
* P(..) refers to probability 
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Table 7.2. Design matrix for a two-level, 28 factor, 32 design point, Plackett-Burman design with foldover. 
  Factor 
Design 
point  F 1 
F 
2 
F 
3 
F 
4 
F 
5 
F 
6 
F 
7 
F 
8 
F 
9 
F 
10 
F 
11 
F 
12 
F 
13 
F 
14 
F 
15 
F 
16 
F 
17 
F 
18 
F 
19 
F 
20 
F 
21 
F 
22 
F 
23 
F 
24 
F 
25 
F 
26 
F 
27 
F 
28 
1  +  +  +  +  +  -  -  +  +  - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + 
2  +  +  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + 
3  +  +  -  +  -  -  +  -  - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + 
4  +  -  -  +  -  -  -  -  +  - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - 
5  -  +  -  +  +  +  -  +  +  - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - 
6  -  +  -  +  -  +  +  +  -  + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + 
7  -  -  +  +  +  +  +  -  -  + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - 
8  -  -  -  +  +  +  +  +  - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + 
9  +  -  +  -  -  +  -  -  - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + 
10  +  -  -  -  +  +  +  +  +  - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + 
11  +  +  +  +  -  -  +  +  -  + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - 
12  -  +  -  -  -  -  +  -  +  - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + 
13  -  +  +  -  +  -  -  +  - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + 
14  +  - - - -  +  -  +  - + + + - + + -  -  - + + + + + -  - + + - 
15  +  -  +  -  +  +  +  -  +  + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - 
16  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  +  +  + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + 
17  -  +  +  -  -  -  +  +  +  + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - 
18  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
19  -  -  +  +  -  +  -  -  +  - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + 
20  -  +  +  +  -  +  +  -  - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - 
21  +  +  -  -  +  +  -  +  - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - 
22  +  +  +  -  -  +  +  -  +  - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - 
23  +  -  +  +  +  -  +  +  - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - 
24  -  +  +  +  +  +  -  -  +  + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + 
25  -  -  +  -  +  -  +  +  +  - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - 
26  -  -  +  -  -  -  -  +  -  + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + 
27  -  -  -  -  +  -  +  -  +  + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + 
28  -  -  -  +  -  +  -  +  +  + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - 
29  +  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  +  + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - 
30  -  +  -  -  +  -  -  -  -  + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - 
31  +  +  -  -  -  +  +  +  +  + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + 
32  +  -  -  +  +  -  +  -  -  + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - +  
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Table 7.2 (ctd). Design matrix for a two-level, 28 factor, 32 design point, Plackett-Burman design with foldover. 
  Factor 
Design 
point  F 1 
F 
2 
F 
3 
F 
4 
F 
5 
F 
6 
F 
7 
F 
8 
F 
9 
F 
10 
F 
11 
F 
12 
F 
13 
F 
14 
F 
15 
F 
16 
F 
17 
F 
18 
F 
19 
F 
20 
F 
21 
F 
22 
F 
23 
F 
24 
F 
25 
F 
26 
F 
27 
F 
28 
33  -  -  -  -  -  +  +  -  -  + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - 
34  -  -  -  +  -  -  +  +  +  - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - 
35  -  -  +  -  +  +  -  +  +  + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - 
36  -  +  +  -  +  +  +  +  -  + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + 
37  +  -  +  -  -  -  +  -  -  + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + 
38  +  -  +  -  +  -  -  -  +  - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - 
39  +  +  -  -  -  -  -  +  +  - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + 
40  +  +  +  -  -  -  -  -  +  + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - 
41  -  +  -  +  +  -  +  +  +  + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - 
42  -  +  +  +  -  -  -  -  -  + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - 
43  -  -  -  -  +  +  -  -  +  - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + 
44  +  -  +  +  +  +  -  +  -  + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - 
45  +  -  -  +  -  +  +  -  +  + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - 
46  -  +  +  +  +  -  +  -  +  - - - + - - +  +  + - - - - - +  + - - + 
47  -  +  -  +  -  -  -  +  - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + 
48  -  +  -  -  +  +  +  -  - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - 
49  +  -  -  +  +  +  -  -  - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + 
50  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
51  +  +  -  -  +  -  +  +  -  + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - 
52  +  -  -  -  +  -  -  +  +  + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + 
53  -  -  +  +  -  -  +  -  +  + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + 
54  -  -  -  +  +  -  -  +  -  + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + 
55  -  +  -  -  -  +  -  -  +  + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + 
56  +  -  -  -  -  -  +  +  - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - 
57  +  +  -  +  -  +  -  -  -  + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + 
58  +  +  -  +  +  +  +  -  +  - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - 
59  +  +  +  +  -  +  -  +  - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - 
60  +  +  +  -  +  -  +  -  - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + 
61  -  -  +  -  -  +  +  +  - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + 
62  +  -  +  +  -  +  +  +  +  - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + 
63  -  -  +  +  +  -  -  -  - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - 
64  -  +  +  -  -  +  -  +  +  - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + -  
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 LR with interactions 
 
The results of the analysis of deviance are presented in Table 7.3 and 7.4 and show that 
significant interactions exist between: i) probability of transmission from the home 
environment and probability of transmission from family members, dogs and non-family 
members, respectively when all dogs are considered and ii) probability of transmission 
from the veterinary clinic environment and veterinary staff and dogs at a veterinary clinic, 
respectively.  Significant interactions were also present between the home environment and 
family and non-family members for dogs that attend veterinary clinics during the 24 hours 
in question.  The pattern of the interactions was assessed by graphical representation of the 
proportion of observations in each cell of the interaction table that are positive for MRSA.  
Graphs representing each interaction term are presented in Appendix 10 and an example of 
one for each analysis are displayed in Figures 7.1 and 7.2.  These graphs show that the 
probability of transmission from the environment reduces as the magnitude of the positive 
association between the proportion of dogs that become MRSA positive and probability of 
transmission from each of the explanatory variables considered, i.e. humans and dogs in 
the community and hospital setting respectively, increases.  The full outcomes of the LR 
models are presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.6.   
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Table 7.3. Analysis of deviance table to assess significance of model terms for the multiple 
logistic regression model implemented with the outcome ‘acquisition of MRSA’ and 
explanatory variables representing transmission variables with two-way environmental 
interactions run for all dogs. 
 
Explanatory variable  Df  Deviance  Residual 
Df 
Residual 
deviance 
P 
value 
Null      16891 23417.3   
P(transmission from environment)  4  8687.9  16887  14729.4  <0.001 
P(transmission from non family member)  4  2569.7  16883  12159.7  <0.001 
P(transmission from family member)  4  1642.2  16879  10517.4  <0.001 
P(transmission from dog)  4  1658.9  16875  8858.6  <0.001 
Attendance at veterinary clinic  1  358.0  16874  8500.6  <0.001 
P(transmission from environment)* 
P(transmission from family member)  14 91.1  16860  8409.5  <0.001 
P(transmission from environment)* 
P(transmission from dog)  11 32.5  16849  8377.0  <0.001 
P(transmission from environment)* 
P(transmission from non family member)  13 30.7  16836  8346.3  0.004 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.4. Analysis of deviance table to assess significance of model terms for the multiple 
logistic regression model implemented with the outcome ‘acquisition of MRSA’ and 
explanatory variables representing transmission variables with two-way environmental 
interactions run for dogs that visit a veterinary clinic. 
 
Explanatory variable  Df  Deviance  Residual 
Df 
Residual 
deviance 
Pvalue 
Null     65534  89045   
P(transmission from environment at veterinary clinic)  4  22712  65530  59452  <0.001 
P(transmission from veterinary staff) 4  6881  65526  59452  <0.001 
P(transmission from environment)  4  6598  65522  52854  <0.001 
P(transmission from dog at veterinary clinic)  4  6581  65518  46274  <0.001 
P(transmission from non family member)  4  1452  65514  44822  <0.001 
P(transmission from family member)  4  1187  65510  43635  <0.001 
P(transmission from dog)  4  676  65506  42958  <0.001 
P(transmission from environment at veterinary clinic)* 
P(transmission from veterinary staff)  14 857  65492 42101  <0.001 
P(transmission from environment at veterinary clinic)* 
P(transmission from dog at veterinary clinic)  14 637  65478 41465  <0.001 
P(transmission from environment)*P(transmission 
from family member)  14 107  65464 41357  <0.001 
P(transmission from environment)*P(transmission 
from non family member)  13 31  65451  41326  0.004  
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Figure 7.1. Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from family members and from the environment with regards to MRSA 
acquisition in a dog. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from veterinary staff members and from the veterinary environment with 
regards to MRSA acquisition in a dog. 
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Table 7.5. Output for multiple logistic regression model implemented with outcome 
‘acquisition of MRSA’ and explanatory variables representing transmission variables with 
two-way environmental interactions run for all dogs. 
Explanatory variable*  Odds 
Ratio 
95%Confidence Interval  P value 
P(transmission from environment) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile  
 
1 
36.42 
131.82 
726.11 
1.22 x 10
9 
 
 
26.96 – 49.19 
97.90 – 177.48 
156.38 – 1155.24 
8.04 x 10
-128 – 1.88 x 10
145 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.896 
P(transmission from non family member) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.67 
3.53 
13.77 
88.45 
 
 
0.37 – 1.22 
2.57 – 4.84 
11.04 – 17.19 
71.68 – 109.14 
 
 
0.187 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from family member) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
3.46 
22.99 
102.44 
554.81 
 
 
1.80 – 6.66 
15.07 – 35.06 
64.94 – 161.60 
228.22 – 1348.78 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from dog) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.45 
4.50 
16.59 
121.02 
 
 
0.15 – 1.38 
2.87 – 7.05 
11.79 – 23.36 
20.63 – 43.58 
 
 
0.163 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Attendance at veterinary clinic 
     No 
     Yes 
 
1 
29.99 
 
 
20.63 – 43.58 
 
 
<0.001 
P(transmission from environment) * 
P(transmission from non family member) 
      25-50
th%ile * 0 - 25
th %ile  
      0 - 25
th %ile * 25-50
th%ile 
      25-50
th%ile * 25-50
th%ile 
      50 - 75
th %ile * 25-50
th%ile 
      0 - 25
th %ile  * 50 - 75
th %ile 
      50 - 75
th %ile * 50 - 75
th %ile 
      25 - 50
th %ile * 75 - 100
th %ile 
      50 - 75
th %ile * 75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
0.024 
0.092 
0.038 
0.014 
0.043 
0.006 
0.006 
0.005 
 
 
0.01  – 0.412 
0.028 – 0.296 
0.010 – 0.145 
0.002 – 0.114 
0.012 – 0.156 
0.002 – 0.024 
0.001 – 0.035 
5.50 x 10
-4 – 0.045 
 
 
0.017 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from environment) * 
P(transmission from dog) 
      25-50
th%ile * 25-50
th%ile 
      25-50
th%ile * 50 - 75
th %ile 
      25-50
th%ile * 75 - 100
th %ile 
      50 - 75
th %ile * 75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
0.028 
0.035 
0.009 
0.003 
 
 
0.004 – 0.18 
0.004 – 0.298 
0.001 – 0.068 
4.27 x 10
-4 – 0.027 
 
 
<0.001 
0.002 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from environment) * 
P(transmission from family member) 
      50 - 75
th %ile * 50 - 75
th %ile 
      25 - 50
th %ile * 75 - 100
th %ile 
      50 - 75
th %ile * 75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
0.036 
0.026 
0.016 
 
 
0.008 – 0.162 
0.003 – 0.197 
0.002 – 0.124 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
* Non-significant interaction terms are not displayed 
AIC = 8458.3 
Log likelihood = -4173.163 
Residual deviance = 8346.3 on 16836 df 
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Table 7.6. Output for multiple logistic regression model implemented with outcome 
‘acquisition of MRSA’ and explanatory variables representing transmission variables with 
two-way environmental interactions run for dogs who visit a veterinary clinic. 
Explanatory variable  Odds 
Ratio 
95%Confidence 
Interval 
P value 
P(transmission from environment at veterinary clinic) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
2.53 
16.35 
52.70 
3.4.78 
 
 
2.23 – 2.86 
15.05 – 17.76 
48.63 – 57.10 
275.30 – 337.41 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from veterinary staff) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
1.13 
5.89 
23.12 
130.09 
 
 
0.88 – 1.45 
5.16 – 6.73 
20.72 – 25.80 
114.86 – 147.33 
 
 
0.324 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from environment) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
3.33 
25.44 
122.67 
3579.11 
 
 
2.67 – 4.16 
20.97 – 30.86 
97.86 – 153.76 
1482.47 – 8640.98 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from dog at veterinary clinic) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
2.40 
7.23 
26.20 
243.42 
 
 
1.89 – 3.05 
6.16 – 8.49 
22.82 – 30.08 
200.71 – 295.24 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from non family member) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.76 
1.23 
2.02 
24.03 
 
 
0.60 – 0.96 
1.06 – 1.43 
1.73 – 2.37 
20.63 – 28.00 
 
 
0.021 
0.008 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from family member) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
1.16 
3.19 
30.84 
229.12 
 
 
0.78 – 1.74 
2.38 – 4.29 
22.58 – 4.21 
129.29 – 406.04 
 
 
0.466 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from community dog) 
     0 
     0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile 
 
1 
0.63 
1.37 
2.09 
25.14 
 
 
0.42 – 0.94 
1.06 – 1.76 
1.64 – 2.67 
20.03 – 31.56 
 
 
0.024 
0.016 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  190
Table 7.6 (ctd) Output for multiple logistic regression model implemented with outcome 
‘acquisition of MRSA’ and explanatory variables representing transmission variables with 
two-way environmental interactions run for dogs who visit a veterinary clinic. 
Explanatory variable  Odds 
Ratio 
95%Confidence 
Interval 
P value 
P(transmission from environment at veterinary clinic)* 
P(transmission from veterinary staff) 
     0 - 25
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
    25 - 50
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
    50 - 75
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile  
    75 - 100
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
    25 - 50
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
    50 - 75
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
    75 - 100
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
0.48 
0.24 
0.21 
0.17 
0.15 
0.07 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
 
 
0.30 – 0.77 
0.19 – 0.30 
0.16 – 0.28 
0.08 – 0.35 
0.12 – 0.20 
0.06 – 0.09 
0.02 – 0.05 
0.02 – 0.09 
0.02 – 0.04 
0.02 – 0.04 
 
 
0.003 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from environment at veterinary clinic)* 
P(transmission from dog at veterinary clinic) 
     0 - 25
th %ile*0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile*0 - 25
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile* 25 - 50
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
     25 - 50
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
     50 - 75
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
     75 - 100
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
0.55 
0.41 
0.20 
0.15 
0.02 
0.11 
0.08 
0.04 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
 
 
0.36 – 0.83 
0.27 – 0.63 
0.15 – 0.26 
0.11 – 0.22 
0.01 – 0.08 
0.08 – 0.16 
0.06 – 0.11 
0.02 – 0.06 
0.01 – 0.2 
0.01 – 0.03 
0.01 – 0.04 
 
 
0.005 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from environment)* P(transmission 
from family member) 
      0 - 25
th %ile*0 - 25
th %ile 
      0 - 25
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
      25 - 50
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
      50 - 75
th %ile*25 - 50
th %ile 
      0 - 25
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
      25 - 50
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
      50 - 75
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
      25 - 50
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
0.10 
0.33 
0.13 
0.05 
0.38 
0.11 
0.06 
0.07 
 
 
0.02 – 0.37 
0.16 -0.65 
0.06 – 0.29 
0.01 – 0.17 
0.17 – 0.85 
0.06 – 0.21 
0.02 – 0.17 
0.01 – 0.32 
 
 
<0.001 
0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.019 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
P(transmission from environment)* P(transmission 
from non family member) 
      75 - 100
th %ile*50 - 75
th %ile 
      25 - 50
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
      75 - 100
th %ile*75 - 100
th %ile 
 
 
0.02 
0.12 
0.01 
 
 
0.002 – 0.16 
0.04 – 0.37 
0.002 – 0.12 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
AIC = 49627 
Log likelihood = -24729.75 
Residual deviance = 49459 on 76304 df 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  191
7.3.2 OAT sensitivity analysis 
 
When the simulation model was run with all factors set to their baseline value, the mean 
probability that a dog would become positive for MRSA in a 24 hour period was 0.0014 
(95%SI 9.31 x 10
-4 - 0.0019).  The results of the OAT analysis are presented in Table 7.7.  
The effect on the outcome was greatest for factors representing transmission from family 
members, non-family members, home environment and dogs within the community, in 
decreasing order.  The number of contacts with the home environment, the probability of 
house contamination given the presence absence of MRSA positive family members, the 
number of contacts with MRSA positive family members and non family members along 
with the probability that a member of the general population was MRSA positive, and the 
probability that a healthcare worker was MRSA positive were also found to be influential 
to the outcome.  The only veterinary factors that were found to be influential were the 
probability that the veterinary environment is contaminated and the probability of 
transmission from an MRSA positive veterinary environment. 
 
Although the results of this initial analysis were plausible, on closer consideration of the 
conceptual model, along with the initial spurious results of the P-B analysis using 28 
factors (section 7.2.2), it became apparent that the same issues that were encountered with 
the P-B design, i.e., mutual exclusivity, was likely to be present in the OAT analyses.  In 
addition, within-veterinary clinic factors were poorly represented, due to the low 
prevalence of veterinary attendance.  To overcome these limitation, the OAT analyses were 
re-run twice, using the factors F1 – F19 to assess main effects for all dogs (irrespective of 
veterinary attendance) in the given 24 hours and F2 – F28 for those that attended a 
veterinary clinic during the 24 hours under consideration.  When the models were run with 
all factors set to their baseline value, the mean probability that a dog would become 
positive for MRSA in a 24 hour period was 1.16 x 10
-3 (95%SI 1.02 x 10
-3 – 1.30 x 10
-3) 
and 9.69 x 10
-3 (95%SI 9.26 x 10
-3 – 10.12 x 10
-3) respectively.  The results of the final 
OAT analyses are presented in Table 7.8 and Table 7.9.  The results of the OAT analysis 
run for all dogs and assessing community variables only were qualitatively identical to the 
initial OAT analysis run with 28 factors (Table 7.8).  However, specification of the model 
for only those dogs that attended a veterinary clinic revealed that the most influential 
within veterinary clinic factors were those associated with the probability of transmission 
from the veterinary environment and the probability that the veterinary environment was 
contaminated.  The next most influential variables were probability of transmission from  
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veterinary staff and the probability of transmission from a dog at a veterinary clinic.  The 
probability of transmission from family members was still influential for animals that 
attended a veterinary clinic, along with the probability of transmission from non family 
members. 
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Table 7.7. Results of the OAT sensitivity analysis for the simulation model for acquisition 
of MRSA in dogs. 
Factor
† Level  Mean 
probability 
(x 10
-3) 
90
th percentile Mean 
probability/Baseline 
mean probability 
(rank
#) 
90
th 
percentile/Baseline 
90
th percentile 
F1  - 1.04  0.005  1.05  1 
  + 1.23  0.005  1.24  1 
- 1.04  0.005  1.05  1  F2 
+ 2.13  0.005  2.14*  (10) 1 
- 1.02  0.005  1.03  1  F3 
+ 1.11  0.005  1.12  1 
- 1.17  0.005  1.17  1  F4 
+ 1.17  0.005  1.18  1 
- 5.15  0  0.52  0  F5 
+ 3.12  0.01  3.14*  (8) 2* 
- 1.14  0.005  1.15  1  F6 
+ 1.16  0.005  1.17  1 
- 0.55  0.005  0.55  1  F7 
+ 28.05  0.045  28.19*  (1) 9* 
- 0.60  0.005  0.60  1  F8 
+ 3.27  0.01  3.29*  (7) 2* 
- 0.97  0.005  0.97  1  F9 
+ 25.79  0.04  25.91*  (2) 8* 
- 0.89  0.005  0.89  1  F10 
+ 2.50  0.005  2.51*  (9) 1 
- 1.13  0.005  1.14  1  F11 
+ 1.68  0.005  1.68  1 
- 1.10  0.005  1.10  1  F12 
+ 5.29  0.01  5.31*  (4) 2* 
- 1.11  0.005  1.12  1  F13 
+ 1.30  0.005  1.31  1 
- 1.01  0.005  1.01  1  F14 
+ 1.49  0.005  1.50  1 
- 0.90  0.005  0.90  1  F15 
+ 4.61  0.01  4.63*  (6) 2* 
- 1.10  0.005  1.11  1  F16 
+ 1.10  0.005  1.10  1 
- 1.10  0.005  1.07  1  F17 
+ 1.07  0.005  1.08  1 
- 0.75  0.005  0.75  1  F18 
+ 16.08  0.03  16.16*  (3) 6* 
- 0.84  0.005  0.84  1  F19 
+ 4.82  0.01  4.84*  (5) 2* 
- 1.13  0.005  1.14  1  F20 
+ 1.35  0.005  1.36  1 
- 1.15  0.005  1.16  1  F21 
+ 1.25  0.005  1.26  1 
- 1.07  0.005  1.07  1  F22 
+ 1.02  0.005  1.02  1 
- 0.95  0.005  0.95  1  F23 
+ 2.09  0.005  2.10*  (11) 1 
- 0.99  0.005  0.99  1  F24 
+ 2.03  0.005  2.04*  (12) 1 
- 1.04  0.005  1.05  1  F25 
+ 1.23  0.005  1.24  1 
- 1.01  0.005  1.01  1  F26 
+ 1.29  0.005  1.29  1 
- 1.05  0.005  1.05  1  F27 
+ 1.51  0.005  1.52  1 
- 1.23  0.005  1.23  1  F28 
+ 1.27  0.005  1.27  1 
† With reference to Table 7.1; * Factors that increased or reduced the outcome by a factor of two or greater; 
# Rank of factors marked with * 
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Table 7.8. Results of the OAT sensitivity analysis run for all dogs for the simulation model 
for acquisition of MRSA in dogs. 
Factor
† Level  Mean 
probability  
(x 10
-3) 
90
th percentile Mean 
probability/Baseline 
mean probability 
(rank
#) 
90
th 
percentile/Baseline 
90
th percentile 
-  1.91 0.005  1.64  1  F1 
+  2.13 0.005  1.83  1 
-  1.63 0.005  1.40  1  F2 
+  2.8 0.01  2.41* (10)  2* 
-  1.68 0.005  1.44  1  F3 
+  1.84 0.005  1.58  1 
-  1.67 0.005  1.44  1  F4 
+  1.81 0.005  1.56  1 
-  1.43 0.005  1.23  1  F5 
+  3.85 0.01  3.32* (8)  2* 
-  1.81 0.005  1.56  1  F6 
+  1.84 0.005  1.59  1 
-  1.19 0.005  1.02  1  F7 
+  28.43 0.045  24.51* (1)  9* 
-  1.29 0.005  1.11  1  F8 
+  3.90 0.01  3.36* (7)  2* 
-  1.68 0.005  1.44  1  F9 
+  26.23 0.04  22.61* (2)  8* 
-  1.53 0.005  1.31  1  F10 
+  3.35 0.01  2.88* (9)  2* 
-  1.80 0.005  1.55  1  F11 
+  2.58 0.005 2.22* (11)  1 
-  1.74 0.005  1.50  1  F12 
+  5.85 0.015  5.04* (4)  3* 
-  1.82 0.005  1.56  1  F13 
+  2.17 0.005  1.87  1 
-  1.82 0.005  1.56  1  F14 
+  2.16 0.005  1.86  1 
-  1.64 0.005  1.41  1  F15 
+  5.33 0.01  4.59* (6)  2* 
-  1.74 0.005  1.50  1  F16 
+  1.77 0.005  1.53  1 
-  1.75 0.005  1.51  1  F17 
+  1.74 0.005  1.50  1 
-  1.58 0.005  1.36  1  F18 
+  16.51 0.03  14.23* (3)  6* 
-  1.51 0.005  1.30  1  F19 
+  5.78 0.015  4.98* (5)  3* 
† With reference to Table 7.1; * Factors that increased or reduced the outcome by a factor of two or greater; 
# Rank of factors marked with * 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  195
Table 7.9. Results of the OAT sensitivity analysis run for dogs that have attended a 
veterinary clinic in the 24 hours under consideration only for the simulation model for 
acquisition of MRSA in dogs. 
Factor
† Level  Mean  probability 
(x 10
-3) 
90
th 
percentile 
Mean probability/Baseline 
mean probability 
(rank
#) 
90
th percentile/Baseline 
90
th percentile 
- 9.99  0.02  1.03  1  F2 
+ 10.65  0.02  1.10  1 
- 9.97  0.02  1.03  1  F3 
+ 9.58  0.02  0.99  1 
- 10.53  0.02  1.09  1  F4 
+ 10.18  0.02  1.05  1 
- 9.32  0.02  0.96  1  F5 
+ 11.95 0.0205  1.23  1.025 
- 9.74  0.02  1.00  1  F6 
+ 10.54  0.02  1.09  1 
- 9.42  0.02  0.97  1  F7 
+ 37.18  0.055  3.84*  (5) 2.75* 
- 9.42  0.02  0.97  1  F8 
+ 11.935  0.025  1.23  1.25 
- 10.12  0.02  1.04  1  F9 
+ 34.08  0.05  3.52*  (6) 2.5* 
- 10.11  0.02  1.04  1  F10 
+ 11.25  0.02  1.16  1 
- 9.56  0.02  0.99  1  F11 
+ 10.61  0.02  1.09  1 
- 10.29  0.02  1.06  1  F12 
+ 14.48  0.025  1.49  1.25 
- 10.06  0.02  1.04  1  F13 
+ 10.00  0.02  1.03  1 
- 9.85  0.02  1.02  1  F14 
+ 10.39  0.02  1.07  1 
- 9.69  0.02  1.00  1  F15 
+ 13.76  0.025  1.42  1.25 
- 9.93  0.02  1.02  1  F16 
+ 10.13  0.02  1.04  1 
- 10.19  0.02  1.05  1  F17 
+ 10.07  0.02  1.04  1 
- 9.47  0.02  0.98  1  F18 
+ 24.34  0.04  2.51*  (8) 2* 
- 9.58  0.02  0.99  1  F19 
+ 13.69  0.025  1.41  1.25 
- 8.51 0.015  0.88  0.75  F20 
+ 23.99 0.0355  2.48*  (9) 1.775 
- 9.31  0.02  0.96  1  F21 
+ 46.09  0.065  4.76*  (4) 3.25* 
- 8.84  0.02  0.91  1  F22 
+ 17.08  0.03  1.76  1.5 
- 3.94  0.01  0.41*  (10) 0.5*  F23 
+ 228.62  0.265  23.59*  (2) 13.25* 
- 3.18  0.01  0.33*  (7) 0.5*  F24 
+ 228.55  0.27  23.59*  (1) 13.5* 
- 4.08  0.01  0.42*  (12) 0.5*  F25 
+ 23.12  0.035  2.39*  (11) 1.75 
- 9.09  0.02  0.94  1  F26 
+  16.12 0.025  1.66  1.25 
- 8.84  0.02  0.91  1  F27 
+ 93.81  0.12  9.68*  (3) 6* 
- 8.57 0.015  0.88  0.75  F28 
+ 15.95  0.03  1.65  1.5 
† With reference to Table 7.1; * Factors that increased or reduced the outcome by a factor of two or greater; 
# Rank of factors marked with * 
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7.3.3 P-B fractional factorial sensitivity analysis 
 
The results of the P-B analysis implemented for all dogs, run for 27 variables and using 32 
design points, resulting in 64 runs when a foldover was applied are presented in Table 
7.10.  These results show that the five most influential variables for all dogs identified by 
this technique were, in decreasing order, the probability that a community dog is MRSA 
positive (F11), the number of contacts with a non family member (F10), the probability 
that the general human population is MRSA positive (F5), the probability of transmission 
from a community dog (F12) and the number of contacts that the dog has with family 
members (F8).  The results of the P-B analysis for dogs who attended a veterinary clinic 
only, run for 19 variables and using 20 design points, resulting in 40 runs when a foldover 
was applied are presented in Table 7.11.  These results identify the five most influential 
within veterinary clinic factors to be, in decreasing order, the probability of transmission 
from the veterinary environment (F24), the probability that the veterinary environment is 
contaminated (F23), the number of contacts with dogs at a veterinary clinic (F22), the 
probability that a home environmental site is contaminated given that there are no MRSA 
positive family members (F17) and the probability that a dog at a veterinary clinic is 
MRSA positive (F20).  The results are displayed for main effects calculated using the mean 
outcomes of the P-B analysis and also using the 90
th percentile of the outcomes. 
 
The amalgamated results of the LR, OAT and P-B analyses are presented in Table 7.12.    
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Table 7.10. Main effects of a P-B sensitivity analysis run for all dogs for the simulation 
model for acquisition of MRSA in dogs. 
Factor 
code 
Factor description  P-B main 
effect (using 
mean 
values) 
Rank
†  P-B main effect 
(using 90
th 
percentiles) 
(rank*) 
F1  P(dog attends vet in 24 hours)  0.022  12  0.025 (12) 
F2  P(health care worker is MRSA positive)  0.013  14  0.014 (14) 
F3  P(veterinary worker is MRSA positive)  -0.014  13  -0.019 (13) 
F4  P(other high risk group is MRSA positive)  0.009  15  0.007 (18) 
F5  P(general population is MRSA positive)  0.055  3  0.058 (3) 
F6  P(person MRSA positive if lives with MRSA 
positive person) 
0.009 16  0.010  (16) 
F7  P(transmission from MRSA positive family 
member per contact) 
0.040  6  0.045 (6) 
F8  Number of contacts with family member per 
24h 
0.044  5  0.052 (5) 
F9  P(transmission from MRSA positive non-family 
member per contact) 
0.032  9  0.036 (8) 
F10  Number of contacts with non-family member 
per 24h 
0.068  2  0.080 (1) 
F11  P(community dog is MRSA positive)  0.070  1  0.079 (2) 
F12  P(transmission from MRSA positive 
community dog per contact) 
0.048  4  0.053 (4) 
F13  Number of contacts with community dog per 
24h 
0.034  7  0.036 (9) 
F14  P(house contaminated with MRSA | at least one 
positive family member) 
-0.003 19  -0.006  (19) 
F15  P(house contaminated with MRSA | no positive 
family members) 
0.028  10  0.029 (11) 
F16  P(environmental site contaminated | at least one 
positive family member ) 
0.008 17  0.007  (17) 
F17  P(environmental site contaminated | no positive 
family members) 
-0.006 18  -0.010  (15) 
F18  P(transmission from MRSA positive home 
environment per contact) 
0.034  8  0.037 (7) 
F19  Number of contacts with home environment per 
24h 
0.027 11  0.031  (10) 
† Ranked on absolute mean main effect values 
* Ranked on 90
th percentile main effect values 
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Table 7.11. Main effects of a P-B sensitivity analysis run for dogs that attended a 
veterinary clinic in the 24 hours under consideration only for the simulation model for 
acquisition of MRSA in dogs. 
Factor 
code  Factor description 
P-B main 
effect (using 
mean 
values) 
Rank
† 
P-B main 
effect (using 
90
th 
percentiles) 
(rank*) 
F1  P(dog attends vet in 24 hours)    NA  NA 
F2  P(health care worker is MRSA positive)  0.022  16  0.027 (14) 
F3  P(veterinary worker is MRSA positive)  -0.011  22  -0.011 (23) 
F4  P(other high risk group is MRSA positive)  0.001  27  0.003 (25) 
F5  P(general population is MRSA positive) 0.023  14  0.023  (16) 
F6  P(person MRSA positive if lives with MRSA positive person)  -0.036  10  -0.038 (10) 
F7  P(transmission from MRSA positive family member per 
contact) 
-0.013 17  -0.013  (19) 
F8  Number of contacts with family member per 24h  0.013  18  0.017 (17) 
F9  P(transmission from MRSA positive non-family member per 
contact) 
-0.028 13  -0.029  (13) 
F10  Number of contacts with non-family member per 24h  0.012  20  0.015 (18) 
F11  P(community dog is MRSA positive)  0.057  7  0.060 (7) 
F12  P(transmission from MRSA positive community dog per 
contact) 
0.008 23  0.011  (22) 
F13  Number of contacts with community dog per 24h  -0.013  19  -0.013 (20) 
F14  P(house contaminated with MRSA | at least one positive family 
member) 
-0.002 26  -0.002  (26) 
F15  P(house contaminated with MRSA | no positive family 
members) 
-0.012 21  -0.012  (21) 
F16  P(environmental site contaminated | at least one positive family 
member ) 
-0.053  8  -0.060 (8) 
F17  P(environmental site contaminated | no positive family 
members) 
0.076  4  0.079 (4) 
F18  P(transmission from MRSA positive home environment per 
contact) 
-0.003 25  -0.001  (27) 
F19  Number of contacts with home environment per 24h  0.022  15  0.025 (15) 
F20  P(dog at vet is MRSA positive)  0.064  5  0.070 (5) 
F21  P(transmission from MRSA positive dog at veterinary clinic 
per contact) 
0.033 11  0.032  (12) 
F22  Number of contacts with a dog at a veterinary clinic per 24h  0.087  3  0.093 (3) 
F23  P(veterinary environment contaminated)  0.380  2  0.368 (2) 
F24  P(transmission from MRSA positive veterinary environment 
per contact) 
0.407  1  0.401 (1) 
F25  Number of veterinary environment contacts per 24h  -0.006  24  -0.005 (24) 
F26  P(small animal veterinary worker is MRSA positive)  0.060  6  0.061 (6) 
F27  P(transmission from MRSA positive veterinary staff member 
per contact) 
0.031 12  0.033  (11) 
F28  Number of veterinary staff contacts per 24h  0.047  9  0.049 (9) 
† Ranked on absolute mean main effect values 
* Ranked on 90
th percentile main effect values 
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Table 7.12. Combined table of ranks of results for the LR, OAT and P-B sensitivity analyses for the simulation model for acquisition of MRSA 
in dogs. 
  Variables    All dogs    Dogs that attend veterinary clinics 
   OAT  rank
^ P-B  rank
§ LR  rank
^^ OAT  rank
^ P-B  rank
§ LR  rank
^^ 
F1  P(dog attends vet in 24 hours)      #  NA  NA  NA 
F2  P(health care worker is MRSA positive)  10    *      * 
F3  P(veterinary worker is MRSA positive)      *      * 
F4  P(other high risk goup is MRSA positive)      *      * 
F5  P(general population is MRSA positive)  8  3  *      * 
F6  P(person MRSA positive if lives with MRSA positive person)             
F7  P(transmission from MRSA positive family member per contact)  1  6  5    =4 
F8  Number of contacts with family member per 24h  7  5 
2 
    
F9  P(transmission from MRSA positive non-family member per contact)  2  9  6   
F10  Number of contacts with non-family member per 24h  9  2 
4 
  
=5 
F11  P(community dog is MRSA positive)    1      7   
F12  P(transmission from MRSA positive community dog per contact)  4  4  3      =5 
F13  Number of contacts with community dog per 24h    7         
F14  P(house contaminated with MRSA | at least one positive family member)             
F15  P(house contaminated with MRSA | no positive family members)  6  10         
F16  P(environmental site contaminated | at least one positive family member )      1**      1** 
F17  P(environmental site contaminated | no positive family members)          4   
F18  P(transmission from MRSA positive home environment per contact)  3  8    7     
F19  Number of contacts with home environment per 24h  5           
F20  P(dog at vet is MRSA positive)  NA  NA  NA  8  5   
F21  P(transmission from MRSA positive dog at veterinary clinic per contact) NA  NA NA  4  9  3 
F22  Number of contacts with a dog at a veterinary clinic per 24h  NA  NA  NA    3   
F23  P(veterinary environment contaminated)  NA  NA  NA  2  2   
F24  P(transmission from MRSA positive veterinary environment per contact) NA  NA NA  1  1  2** 
F25  Number of veterinary environment contacts per 24h  NA  NA  NA  9     
F26  P(small animal veterinary worker is MRSA positive)  NA  NA  NA    6   
F27  P(transmission from MRSA positive veterinary staff member per contact)  NA  NA  NA  3  10  =4 
F28  Number of veterinary staff contacts per 24h  NA  NA  NA    8   
P(..) = Probability;  
^ Ranking of the first 10 factors that have a positive effect on the baseline ≥ a factor of two; 
§ Ranking of the first 10 factors that have a positive main 
effect; 
^^ Ranked based on odds ratios of main effects.  Boxes denote all input variables that are included in the estimate of composite input factor; 
# Not included in ranking as dichotomous variable; * Also included in non family member composite factor; ** When P(transmission) from all other routes = 0 
  200
7.4  Discussion 
 
This chapter has presented three methods of sensitivity analysis applied to the same 
stochastic model (described in full in Chapter 6).   
 
The inclusion of interaction terms to the LR model presented in Chapter 6, for the goal of 
sensitivity analysis, has enabled extension of the main effects LR models.  The main 
effects LR analyses presented in Chapter 6 examined the effect of varying each input 
variable away from a baseline value whilst maintaining all other variables at their baseline 
value, representing a defensible sensitivity analysis technique.  However, the LR analyses 
presented in the current chapter also address the effect on the outcome of varying more 
than one variable at the same time, enabling a more global application of the LR method 
(Campolongo et al., 2000b).  Whilst this technique as specified is globally appropriate, the 
interpretation of the LR model outputs are not intuitive, and the difficulty associated with 
interpretation of interaction terms for non-dichotomous categorical predictors is well 
documented (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; Dohoo et al., 2003; Norton et al., 2004).  If 
the LR models presented in this chapter were to be used for predictive purposes, thorough 
quantitative interpretation of the results of all of the significant interaction terms would be 
imperative.  However, for the purposes of this study, the interaction terms were included in 
an attempt to enhance the global capacity of the analysis and as such, interpretation of 
interactions qualitatively, along with quantitative interpretation of the main effects within 
the models that account for interaction terms, is adequate and appropriate (Frey and Patil, 
2002).   
 
The interactions that were specified in the LR models presented in this chapter reflect the 
potentially plausible interactions with respect to the underlying simulation model.  It was 
found that, while the fit of the LR models presented in Chapter 6 is improved by the 
inclusion of interaction terms (AIC values and deviance decrease), the ranking of the main 
effects reported for each of the transmission LR models in both chapters is identical.  This 
finding was expected, given that this ranking is with respect to the effect of all other 
variables in the model when they are set at their baseline value, in this case zero, and, in 
contrast, it has been shown that the magnitude of effect of the probability of environmental 
transmission when the other variables in the model are not zero reduces.  That is, the 
probability of transmission from the environment is not independent of probability of 
transmission from other sources and the magnitude of effect of probability of transmission  
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from the environment reduces in the presence of increased probability of transmission from 
other sources.  This is illustrated by the graphs (Figures 7.1 and 7.2) and results of the LR 
models (Tables 7.5 and 7.6) but could also be illustrated by the main effects that would be 
obtained by varying the referent categories for non-environmental variables and re-running 
the LR models.  The implication is that, while the environment may be the most influential 
source of MRSA when no other sources are present, its effect reduces in the presence of 
other sources of the pathogen and given that, within the stochastic model, environmental 
contamination is dependent on MRSA status of humans and (potentially, but not explicitly 
modelled) animals, it is unlikely that this source plays a large independent role in MRSA 
acquisition in dogs, but may be highly influential as a reservoir of the pathogen.  These 
results support a number of published studies that identify the environment as a potentially 
important reservoir of MRSA in the hospital and the home (Wagenvoort et al., 2000; 
Kniehl et al., 2005; Dancer, 2008) and also concurs with the small number of studies that 
have been undertaken at veterinary clinics where a putative collinearity appears to exist 
between human and environmental prevalence estimates (Loeffler et al., 2005; Heller et 
al., 2009).  Given the propensity for prolonged environmental survival of MRSA 
organisms, and particularly in outbreak strains (Wagenvoort et al., 2000), further 
elucidation of the role of the environment in transmission of MRSA should be explored.       
 
The use of LR modelling for sensitivity analysis presents advantages over local sensitivity 
analysis models which include; i) the ability to evaluate the sensitivity of individual model 
inputs while taking into account the simultaneous impact of other model inputs on the 
result (Helton and Davis, 2000; Frey and Patil, 2002) and ii) the ability to assess the input 
variables over a wide range, particularly when continuous variables are included.   
However, the reliance on a functional form of the relationship between the input and output 
variables, and the requirement for the key assumptions of regression to be met, represent 
potential limitations of the application of this method (Frey and Patil, 2002).  In the case of 
the study presented in this chapter, an additional limitation was the necessity to categorise 
the continuous input variables that represented probabilities in order to avoid collinearity 
and to satisfy the assumption of linearity in the logit.  While the results of the analyses as 
specified are interpretable and robust, it is somewhat more difficult to relate these results to 
the original input variables given that the specifications for the LR models are in terms of 
percentile estimates.  Finally, it should be noted that the large sample size that was used for 
the LR analyses resulted in an inability to assess or rank the models with respect to their p 
value estimates, given that these are a function of the sample size (McCarthy et al., 1995).   
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In the models presented in Chapters 6 and 7, the importance of a variable was assessed 
with respect to the magnitude of its coefficient(s) and resulting odds ratio(s). 
 
In addition to the LR models, two alternative sensitivity analysis techniques are presented 
in this chapter.  One-at-a-time analyses are referred to as ‘typical’ model sensitivity 
experiments (Henderson-Sellers and Henderson-Sellers, 1996).  This technique assesses 
the impact of changing the values of each of the chosen factors in turn and is a local form 
of sensitivity analysis (Henderson-Sellers and Henderson-Sellers, 1996; Campolongo et 
al., 2000a; Saltelli, 2000).  In the OAT analysis presented in this chapter, the results of the 
‘baseline’ run of the analysis, in which all factors are set at their most likely value, returned 
markedly different results when compared to the overall output of the model as described 
in Chapter 6.  This discrepancy is likely to have occurred due to the pronounced right skew 
that is present for many of the variables that are included in the simulation model.  This 
finding further supports the marked uncertainty that is present in the overall system and 
that was also reflected by the discrepancy between the median and mean output values of 
the simulation model in Chapter 6.  However, while this discrepancy is noted and 
discussed, the danger of making inference by replacing a probability distribution by its 
mean or other summary value is acknowledged and thus excess weight should not be 
placed on this absolute result (Law and Kelton, 2000).  The results of the OAT analyses are 
representative of a largely deterministic implementation of the simulation model and, while 
the weaknesses of an analysis such as this, including the inability to consider interactions, 
unsuitability to non-linear models and inability to resolve uncertainties of different orders 
of magnitude, have long been recognised (Henderson-Sellers and Henderson-Sellers, 1996; 
Campolongo et al., 2000a; Saltelli, 2000), these techniques continue to be commonly 
applied.   
 
The final technique, a P-B fractional factorial design reflects a method that allows for main 
effects and also for factor interactions by varying the levels of multiple factors 
simultaneously (Campolongo and Saltelli, 2000; Campolongo et al., 2000b).  The use of a 
full factorial experimental design to assess all potential interactions, using two levels for 
each of k factors, would require 2
k model runs.  However, a fractional factorial design can 
reduce the number of runs required by accounting for only some of the possible 
interactions, as described in Chapter 1 (Campolongo and Saltelli, 2000).  The P-B design, 
with a foldover to enable reduction of aliasing, requires “2 times that multiple of 4 which is 
next greater than the number of parameters [factors]” (Beres and Hawkins, 2001) and thus,  
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in the scenario where 28 input factors are considered, reduces the number of model runs 
from the computationally impractical 2.6 x 10
8 (2
28) to 64 (Beres and Hawkins, 2001). 
 
The overall results of the three analyses were found to be markedly different (Table 7.12).  
While many of the same factors were identified by the OAT and P-B analyses to be within 
the ten most influential, the ranking varied between techniques and, in particular, for the 
community factors when the models were run for all dogs.  A greater similarity was found 
for the OAT and P-B analyses run for dogs that attended veterinary clinics only, with the 
probability of transmission from the veterinary environment and probability that the 
veterinary environment is contaminated with MRSA defined as the two most influential 
factors in both analyses.  While only the main effects are assessed for both the OAT 
analyses and P-B analyses, it  possible to compute two-way interaction terms within the P-
B analyses (Beres and Hawkins, 2001).  However, the resolution of the P-B design does 
not support reliable estimation of two-way interactions as these effects are potentially 
confounded with each other (Law and Kelton, 2000) and consequently, the application of a 
P-B design matrix does not represent a global sensitivity analysis technique.  While the 
results of the OAT analysis may be described as more intuitive than the results of the P-B 
analysis, the knowledge that the stochastic model is non-linear and that the uncertainties 
associated with each factor are not always within the same order of magnitude, reduces 
confidence in the OAT results.  Conversely, the P-B results are less intuitive, but it is 
known that the P-B design is more robust to the non-linearity and variation in input factor 
magnitudes that exist within the specified stochastic model (Beres and Hawkins, 2001).  
 
All of the analyses indicate that the probability of transmission from the veterinary clinic 
environment is a highly influential factor for acquisition of MRSA by dogs that attend a 
veterinary clinic.  Consequently this area is strongly identified as deserving of future 
research efforts and more accurate quantification.  The probability of transmission of 
MRSA from the home environment was also identified as highly influential in the LR 
models as previously discussed (for all dogs and those that attend a veterinary clinic) and 
OAT analysis but was ranked lower in the P-B analysis.  This may reflect the effect of the 
interaction between this factor and other probabilities of transmission that have been 
discussed above and that may have been identified by the P-B design, resulting in a 
reduction of overall effect for this factor.  It is interesting that the same reduction in effect 
was not evident in the P-B analysis for the veterinary environment factors although a 
similar interaction was identified with respect to the probability of transmission from the 
veterinary environment as was identified for the home environment in the LR models.  The  
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difference in effect on the P-B results indicates that the effect of the veterinary 
environment interactions is likely to be smaller than that of the home environment 
interactions and this finding is confirmed by the higher odds ratios for the interaction terms 
for veterinary environmental transmission (Table 7.6).  While this previous statement is 
counterintuitive, one must remember that the interpretation of interaction term odds ratios 
for categorical predictors is as a ratio of a ratio.  As an example, if the first interaction term 
in the model specified for all dogs is considered (Table 7.5), one finds that when the 
probability of transmission from the environment is within the 25
th – 50
th percentile, and 
the probability of transmission from a non family member is in the 0-25
th percentile, a dog 
is 0.024 times more likely (41.6 times less likely) to become MRSA positive from 
environmental transmission than when the probability of transmission from the 
environment is within the 25
th -50
th percentile and the probability of transmission from a 
non family member is 0 (the referent category).  In the veterinary model, the reduction is 
less pronounced, with odds ratios maintaining generally greater values (Table 7.6). 
 
While the results of the P-B analyses can be interpreted with greater ease than the results of 
LR analyses, are more accurate than the OAT analyses and provide a useful adjunct to the 
LR outputs for models, some ambiguity is found with respect to the ranking of input 
variables within the P-B output.  Many of the variables that represent the same overall area 
received conflicting ranks.  The upper and lower (‘+’ and ‘-‘) values that were selected for 
use in these analyses represent the maximum and minimum values of the distributions 
respectively.  While these values were chosen to enable maximum assessment of the 
parameter space (Beres and Hawkins, 2001), it is possible that, given the marked 
uncertainty present in this model, the resulting variable combinations represented highly 
unlikely scenarios in many or all cases, resulting in the potential for inaccurate estimates of 
the main effects.  Re-running these models with more modest upper and lower estimates 
would potentially address this issue, but may also result in failure to detect and account for 
the effect of extreme values which, in an area with such marked uncertainty, may be of 
importance.  In addition, relationships and conditional dependencies exist between the 
some of the input variables that cannot be represented in the P-B or OAT designs, and 
indeed may be inaccurately represented, i.e., overridden by design-based variable 
combinations.  It is also possible that the input variables are so similar in some cases that a 
non-explicitly modelled dependence may be present in the data and simulation model that 
is ignored in the P-B design, whereby differing combinations of upper and lower values are 
forced.  Similarly, the finer resolution of input variables, that is, the representation of the 
data that were input into the simulation model rather than composite values obtained from  
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the simulation model, were included purposely in the OAT and P-B analyses in an attempt 
to facilitate a more targeted approach to future research and reduction of uncertainty.   
However, counterintuitively, the results of the P-B and OAT analyses would be likely to be 
less ambiguous and more comparable with the LR model outputs if coarser resolution of 
input variables (composite representations of the finer resolution variables) were used.   
Repetition of the P-B analysis in particular using the same input variables that were used 
for the LR models would further validate these points. 
 
In conclusion, this study found that the chosen technique and resolution of input variables 
is likely to have a marked effect on the output of any sensitivity analysis undertaken, 
particularly when applied to a complex non-linear system.  The stochastic model to which 
the sensitivity analyses were applied in this chapter was non-linear with input factors that 
are associated with numerous explicit and non-explicit dependencies, and uncertainties that 
vary in magnitude.  As a result of these model-dependent factors, the outcomes of the three 
sensitivity analysis methods varied.  The results of the OAT analyses, whilst plausible, 
were not robust, while the results of the P-B analyses were, to some degree, ambiguous, 
but were in agreement with the interaction terms within the LR models.  The results of the 
LR models were difficult to interpret and differentiate between but allowed consideration 
of putative interactions between input factors.   
 
Given the complexity of the simulation model to which the sensitivity analyses have been 
applied and the limitations encountered as discussed above, the results as presented in 
Chapter 6 remain valid, but are tempered by the inclusion of interaction terms.  That is, 
both community and veterinary routes are important for the acquisition of MRSA in dogs 
with the influence of transmission from family members of greatest importance and the 
role of the environment identified as an area that may be of importance as a non-
independent reservoir and deserving of greater quantification.  However, the explicit 
differentiation between ‘important’ variables and those that may be less important within 
community and veterinary settings was not possible using the techniques presented herein, 
given the marked uncertainty associated with the modelled system.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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The work presented represents a comprehensive exposure assessment of MRSA acquisition 
in pet dogs over a 24 hour period.  This assessment was an attempt to draw together the 
studies that are already published in this field of putative importance and to identify 
priority areas for future research effort on the issue of MRSA in dogs.  Formal risk 
assessment is a relatively recently adopted approach in the field of animal health 
(MacDiarmid and Pharo, 2003) and is commonly used to quantify the risk of emerging or 
poorly defined pathogens or disease, in particular in the areas of food safety (Hope et al., 
2002; Hald et al., 2004; Parsons et al., 2005; Clough et al., 2006) and live animal or animal 
product importation (Moutou et al., 2001; de Vos et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2005; Peeler et 
al., 2006; Martinez-Lopez et al., 2008).  However, application of the processes associated 
with risk assessment to alternative areas of animal health, or indeed human health, is less 
common (MacDiarmid and Pharo, 2003).  The risk assessment presented here was 
specified in a qualitative and quantitative format.  Supporting data-generating studies that 
facilitated parameterisation of the quantitative model were presented in the form of 
dedicated data collection exercises and an expert opinion elicitation.  The quantitative risk 
assessment was also extended by the implementation of sensitivity analyses, using three 
different methods.  The results of these studies allowed the aims of the overall thesis: a) to 
assess the risk of acquisition of MRSA in dogs over a defined time period, b) to identify 
priority data gaps for future research efforts in this data-sparse area and c) to comment on 
the usefulness of risk assessment, in a data sparse area and within a field in which it has not 
previously been used, to be addressed.  
 
The preliminary development of a conceptual model that described the likely pathways of 
acquisition of MRSA in dogs provided a framework for the qualitative and quantitative risk 
assessments to follow.  Importantly, this framework was structured to enable overall 
assessment of risk of acquisition of MRSA by consideration of both exposure and 
transmission (representing consequence) sub-sections within each putative pathway of 
organism acquisition.  The division of the model in this manner allowed for the 
consideration of dog-dependent variation in exposure and, along with the stratification of 
the model by community and veterinary clinic routes, also allowed the inclusion of data 
that predominated the literature, that of prevalence estimates in various populations 
(Abudu et al., 2001; Cesur and Cokca, 2004; Loeffler et al., 2005; Hanselman et al., 
2006b; Hanselman et al., 2008).  This framework also aligned the analyses with previously 
defined risk assessment structures (CAC, 1999; OIE, 2008b), allowing both exposure and  
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consequence assessments to be conducted.  However, structuring the model in this way 
also necessitated estimation of probabilities of transmission, which proved difficult in the 
quantitative assessment (discussed subsequently).  The qualitative risk assessment was 
parameterised using categorical estimators and these estimates were combined using a well 
documented and previously utilised matrix approach (EFSA, 2007).  However, this 
approach was found to be unsuitable for the model as specified.  Whilst an alternative 
specification of categorical estimators relative to the median value within each setting 
(community or veterinary clinic), rather than as absolute estimates, allowed for intra-
setting comparison and greater ability to differentiate between qualitative estimates for a 
low prevalence event, the combined risk of acquisition from all pathways could not be 
estimated using this modification.  Although some of the limitations that were encountered 
have previously been described (Cox et al., 2005; Cox, 2008), the application of matrix 
methods to less biologically complex systems has previously been found to be appropriate 
and has resulted in the generation of defensible results (Moutou et al., 2001; Clough et al., 
2006).  A more generalised model that relied on mutually exclusive pathways and that did 
not differentiate between exposure and transmission may have avoided many of the issues 
discussed, although specifying the model in this manner would undoubtedly have resulted 
in a less accurate, or indeed inaccurate, representation of the biological system and would 
have obviated the use of much of the data as published in the literature.  It is postulated that 
qualitative risk assessment implemented using matrix combination of categorical variables 
is likely to be inadequate when applied to a biologically complex scenario, and that the 
findings presented here are unlikely to be unique.   
 
Notwithstanding the limitations of a qualitative assessment as described, the process of 
assessing the risk using a qualitative format resulted in identification of key areas of 
uncertainty with respect to the subject.  The identification of these areas of uncertainty 
prompted targeted data-generation studies.  Similarly, potential associations and 
dependencies were also identified that had to be accounted for by representation of these 
relationships within the quantitative model when specified.  The results of the qualitative 
assessment were that, in absolute terms, the greatest risk was likely to be from humans 
(owners and staff) in the community and veterinary clinic.  In relative terms, within the 
community it was found that family members were the most important source of MRSA, 
followed by non-family members and the environment and lastly other dogs.  Within the 
veterinary clinic, the qualitative assessment identified staff to be the most important 
source, followed by the environment and then dogs at a veterinary clinic.    
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The greatest strength of risk assessment is often defined as its ability to rank, in order of 
importance, the effect of multiple inputs on a single output and thus identify high priority 
data gaps, or priority candidate mitigation targets (Saltelli, 2000; Vose, 2000; Frey and 
Patil, 2002; MacDiarmid and Pharo, 2003).  A quantitative risk assessment, to fulfil this 
aim and to corroborate (or repudiate) the results of the qualitative risk assessment, was 
specified.  While model structure and validation require high quality data (Law and Kelton, 
2000; Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2003), it is acknowledged that these data are often limited 
(Vose, 2000; Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2003).  Thus, the development of a model using 
alternative sources of data, such as expert opinion, in addition to more traditional published 
sources, is often required and performed (Law and Kelton, 2000; Vose, 2000; Vonk 
Noordegraaf et al., 2003).   
 
In order to parameterise the quantitative risk assessment, a number of data-generating 
studies were completed.  The first reported prevalence estimates of i) MRSA 
contamination in the environment of a tertiary referral small animal hospital (1.4%) and ii) 
MRSA colonisation in the staff within that hospital (3.1%).  In this study, genetic profiling 
provided the inference that the dissemination of environmental MRSA isolates was most 
likely to have occurred through veterinary staff.  This study reported a lower prevalence of 
MRSA contamination within the environment and of MRSA carriage in the external nares 
of staff (Heller et al., 2009), than had been reported in a previous study in a tertiary referral 
hospital within the UK (Loeffler et al., 2005).  This finding was of importance in 
parameterisation of the quantitative model as it mitigated over-estimation of the 
uncertainty associated with environmental contamination and staff carriage of MRSA 
within veterinary hospital settings.  As a result, the data obtained from the previously 
published study was down-weighted within the quantitative risk assessment.  Whilst this 
down-weighting was necessary to provide more accurate representation of an ‘average’ 
scenario within any veterinary hospital, it must be stressed that this does not reflect 
reduced confidence in the findings of the previously published study, but simply the lack of 
representativeness of these findings when applied to any veterinary clinic on any given 
day.  The findings of this study support this down-weighting of the dominant literature at 
the time of specification of the model, which otherwise would have been a speculative 
change to the weight of the input data.   
 
A separate data-generating study corroborated the findings of prior studies on dog-dog and 
dog-human interactions (Westgarth et al., 2007; Westgarth et al., 2008).   These findings 
increased confidence in the use of these data to populate the quantitative risk assessment  
  210
and also allowed extrapolation of some of the findings of Westgarth and colleagues (2008) 
for appropriate parameterisation of the quantitative risk assessment model in the format 
that it was specified, i.e., enabled estimation of overall exposure and individual contacts on 
a daily basis.  Similarly, the results obtained from the final data-generating study gave 
confidence in the classification of food (in particular raw meat and pig ear products) as a 
contributor to the environmental source of MRSA rather than requiring modelling as an 
independently specified pathway.   
 
The use of an expert opinion elicitation procedure aimed to fill the remaining data gaps, 
identified by the qualitative assessment, where estimates were required for 
parameterisation of the quantitative model.  The use of a novel application of previously 
utilised expert opinion techniques (Otway and von Winterfeldt, 1992; Clemen and 
Winkler, 1999; Bedford and Cooke, 2001; Goossens et al., 2008) enabled the specification 
of distributions to describe numerous variables associated predominantly with prevalence 
and transmission of MRSA.  The calibration variables that were utilised in this study 
provided an estimate of the accuracy of the experts, resulting in the exclusion of a single 
expert from all analyses, along with documentation of confidence in the remaining experts.  
However, notwithstanding this demonstrated confidence, markedly divergent opinions 
were obtained with respect to some questions, in particular for estimates of transmission, 
resulting in wide and minimally-informative combined expert distributions.  This finding 
was also reflected in the difficulty reported by the respondents in completing the 
questionnaire with respect to estimation of transmission variables.  While many of the 
issues surrounding this reported difficulty are difficult to improve, the application of a 
spreadsheet-based interactive distribution estimation procedure, as proposed by Vose 
(2000), in future studies may increase the understanding of the experts with respect to the 
implications of their overall and confidence estimates.  An interactive spreadsheet was 
devised (Appendix 11) but could not be implemented in the email format that was required 
in this study.  The integration of a method such as this may have given the expert a feeling 
of greater control with respect to their estimation and perhaps could be considered for 
inclusion in future email-based techniques, with access via a web-based link.     
 
The quantitative assessment followed the conceptual structure previously outlined and was 
parameterised using previously published and unpublished data, along with the data 
obtained through small studies discussed above.  The risk assessment was specified as a 
second order stochastic simulation model that allowed consideration of both uncertainty 
and variability.  While the variability was not entirely independent of uncertainty, the  
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specification of the model in this manner allowed separate consideration of these two 
aspects of overall uncertainty.  The results of the uncertainty analysis showed that the 
modelled process was dominated by uncertainty rather than variability and, as such is, in 
theory, reducible by further data collection (Saltelli, 2000; Vose, 2000; MacDiarmid and 
Pharo, 2003).  The overall outcome of the model showed that the median proportion of 
dogs that were likely to acquire MRSA on any given day was 1.5%.  This estimate was 
within the 95% binomial confidence intervals surrounding prior estimates of the prevalence 
of MRSA in dogs within the community (Murphy et al., 2006; Rich and Roberts, 2006; 
Vengust et al., 2006; Hanselman et al., 2008).  Consideration of the temporal component 
modelled within the risk assessment, inclusion of dogs at higher risk than those in the 
general community within the model and the knowledge that MRSA is likely to be a 
transient coloniser or contaminator in dogs (Weese and van Duijkeren, 2009), gives 
confidence in the overall outcome of the model when corroborated with these prior 
prevalence estimates.  The mean proportion of dogs that were likely to acquire MRSA on 
any given day, 4.2%, was considerably higher than the median, demonstrating a marked 
right skew to the uncertainty distribution.  Moreover, the uncertainty analysis revealed that 
some input variables were likely to be highly influential on the outcome of acquisition of 
MRSA in dogs, contributing to the skewness of this distribution.  Sensitivity analyses 
(discussed below) were subsequently utilised in an attempt to identify these highly 
influential variables.   
 
The specification of the variables included within the quantitative model required a great 
deal of careful consideration.  Within the quantitative application of the risk assessment, 
the subsections of exposure and transmission were further divided into numerous 
contributing inputs.  The exposure subsection required estimates of the number of 
exposures that the at-risk dog experienced to MRSA positive humans, dogs and 
environments within a given 24 hours.  These estimates used uncertain probabilities of, 
taking as an example exposure to MRSA positive family members: number of people 
within the family, the probability that each person belonged to a certain pre-defined risk 
group and the probability that the person was MRSA positive given that he/she belonged to 
a certain predefined risk group.  Within the transmission subsection, estimates of 
probability of transmission from exposure to a source of MRSA were modelled on a per-
contact basis.  The probability of transmission per 24 hours was estimated using the 
probability of transmission per contact, along with the number of (potentially infectious) 
contacts between an at-risk dog and the putative source of MRSA.  The decision to specify 
the transmission variables in this manner was difficult.  The reasoning behind this  
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categorisation was to allow full use of the literature and to enable the model to be fully 
transparent and updateable as future data became available.  However, no data relating to 
transmission were available within the literature and the experts found estimation of the 
transmission variables in this manner to be difficult.  Estimation of probability of 
transmission on a 24 hour, rather than per contact, basis may have been easier for the 
experts, and some of the comments from the experts suggested this format.  However, it 
was considered that estimation of transmission in this manner would require the implicit 
estimation or knowledge of average number and type of contacts with putative sources of 
MRSA per 24 hours, along with other demographic data that were unlikely to be within the 
expertise of the participants, given the selection criteria.  While estimation in this manner 
may have been appropriate for well-known putative sources such as owners, contact 
information for alternative sources such as non-family members or other dogs is likely to 
vary markedly from at-risk dog to dog and day to day.  Thus, to enable representation of 
this variability and uncertainty, it was decided to specify the model to allow the inclusion 
of this information through consideration of data such as demographic contact information 
(Westgarth et al., 2008).  However, in this area of data sparsity this may have resulted in 
overcomplication of the model.  Notwithstanding this, the specification of the model in this 
manner does allow for iterative updating as new data are obtained, and also has the 
potential to give more precise indications of where future research may be required. 
 
As noted above, the results of the simulation model indicated that the system was 
dominated by uncertainty which, in theory, could be reduced by further study and data 
collection.  Sensitivity analyses were applied to attempt to determine which inputs of the 
model were most influential on the output, and therefore deserving of greater study 
resulting in the potential to reduce the surrounding uncertainty.  The sensitivity analyses 
were specified in the form of LR models (with and without interaction terms), OAT 
analyses and fractional factorial design in the form of P-B analyses.  The results that were 
obtained from these models were, in many ways, ambiguous and difficult to interpret.  The 
effect of the home environment dominated the results of all of the sensitivity analyses.  A 
number of reasons can be postulated for this.  First, and in line with the discussion of the 
previous paragraph, the specification of environmental contact sites to be 10cm x 10cm in 
size is likely to have resulted in an overrepresentation of this source within the models.  
Again, the environment was specified in this manner to allow the inclusion of published 
prevalence estimates of environmental contamination, to enable updating of the model with 
future data as they emerged and to facilitate quantification of the number of contacts 
between at-risk dogs and the environment over a 24 hour period, in line with the prescribed  
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model structure.  However, consideration of the environment in this manner represented a 
marked difference to the consideration of contacts and transmission between at-risk dogs 
and humans.  Thus, while biologically this might be the most appropriate way to consider 
this variable, it may have resulted in overspecification with respect to its inclusion within 
the simulation and LR models.  Vastly more contacts between dogs and 10cm x 10cm 
environmental sites are likely in any given day than the number of contacts between dogs 
and owners.  Furthermore, the estimation of transmission from environmental sites of this 
size is likely to have presented an increased level of difficulty for experts which may have 
resulted in overestimation of probabilities.  Expert estimates of transmission from the 
environment were likely to have been made ‘relative’ to those from humans and animals.  
However, given the size of the environmental sites, estimates may have required 
modification with respect to transmission from other sources by a factor greater than was 
considered by the experts, particularly given that all probabilities are likely to be clustered 
at the lower end of the probability scale.  Furthermore, it is possible that the estimation of 
whole numbers, required by the expert opinion questionnaire, may have limited the 
adjustment of these overall estimates of transmission to an order of magnitude that is not 
sufficiently small to reflect reality.  As no data exist to corroborate or compare with these 
estimates, this discussion will remain speculative, although these points should be 
considered if any future risk analyses and expert opinion exercises are undertaken in an 
area comparable to this.   
 
In addition to the issues surrounding specification of environmental variables, it is difficult 
to consider the contribution of the environment as important in the absence of a human or 
animal source of MRSA as, indeed, environmental contamination is not believed to be an 
independent phenomenon.  This was modelled explicitly in the simulation model and was 
also reflected in the results of the LR models that were fitted to account for interactions 
between the environment and other sources of MRSA.  However, whilst these issues are 
taken into account and while it is noted that the environment does not provide an 
independent source of MRSA, its contribution as a potential reservoir in the immediate 
absence of an alternative source of the organism is deserving of greater quantification.  As 
this model is specified over a 24 hour period, the potential for the existence of 
environmental reservoirs is possible and plausible.  How to increase quantification of the 
environmental contribution to MRSA acquisition in dogs poses a separate and independent 
question.  A more thorough documentation of the existence of environmental areas most 
likely to be contaminated with MRSA, as has been done in human hospitals may be an 
initial step, within the home and veterinary hospitals.  Similarly, a thorough observational  
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study of the nature of contact between dogs and environmental sites within the home and at 
veterinary clinics would allow a more accurate definition of the number of 10cm x 10cm 
sites and the types of contact that occur over a given time frame, potentially resulting in 
refinement of the uncertainty that is currently included in the model.   
 
In the absence of the effect of the environment, the sensitivity analyses provided no 
consistent indication of the rankings of alternative sources of MRSA.  While family 
members were arguably identified as highly important within the sensitivity analysis 
models, their indisputable ranking as the most important or vastly more important than all 
other variables was not possible.  While direction towards further elucidation of the effect 
of the environment and further study into quantification of the potential for transmission 
from family members may be appropriate, it cannot be definitively proposed that all other 
variables are markedly less worthy of further study and research.  In short, the work 
presented has revealed the difficulty in determining priority areas for future research in the 
absence of suitable data inputs upon which to base a complex model.  The inclusion of 
marked uncertainty in the inputs of models such as this, combined with complexity within 
the model structure makes prioritisation of inputs through sensitivity analyses difficult.   
 
It is instructive to consider that, had a single sensitivity analysis been applied to the 
quantitative risk assessment, the overall results and conclusion may have been vastly 
different, with a single result and, in the case of the application of the OAT analysis, a 
logical and to some degree expected, conclusion.  However, given the results of the other 
sensitivity analyses that were applied, it is now known that this would have been incorrect.  
Ultimately, a combination of: i) the application of a quantitative risk assessment to a data 
sparse area that encompassed marked uncertainty, ii) a non-linear relationship along with  
numerous modelled dependencies and iii) a low prevalence event, resulted in the variation 
in the results of the different sensitivity analyses and the inability to reach consistent and 
uncomplicated conclusions.   
 
The application of LR models to the input/output data from a quantitative risk assessment 
model is a novel application of variance-based sensitivity analysis in the area of veterinary 
medicine.  While a previous study has applied this statistical method to the output of a 
fractional factorial design (Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2003), explicit de novo application of 
LR has not previously been reported.  The limitations of an approach such as this have 
been discussed but in general, this method appears to be easily applicable and interpretable 
in the absence of categorical interaction terms as were used within this research.  The  
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specification of the models required two separate LR models to be applied to each of the 
simulation model scenarios.  Fitting of the LR models in this manner was required to avoid 
collinearity and to enable differentiation between exposure and transmission.  Similarly, re-
running of the simulation model for all dogs enabled ranking of within-veterinary 
exposures and transmission, which otherwise would have been overshadowed by the 
higher prevalence within-community factors.   
 
Finally, the use of the computer programme R (R Development Core Team, 2008) 
provided marked advantages and limitations, in equal measure.  The ability to specify the 
simulation model in R allowed far more complex dependencies and conditional links to be 
included than would have been possible in a spreadsheet-based programme such as 
@RISK (Pallisade Corporation; Middlesex, UK).  It also allowed a large number of 
iterations to be implemented, which was imperative in a low prevalence event as specified.  
However, the R programming code is far less user-friendly than the menu-based interface 
that is present in alternative simulation and statistical programmes.  The code-based 
programming resulted in a marked amount of time spent in bug-fixing and code-checking, 
not to mention the time invested learning the language and writing the code in the first 
instance.  It is acknowledged that the time spent completing these activities is likely to 
decrease as experience increases, and that the capacity of this programme far outweighs the 
capacity of others used for the same purpose.  However, within the analyses undertaken a 
number of problems were encountered that could have befallen a programmer of any level 
of experience and were only identified through painstaking code checking.  Two such 
problems are outlined:  First, the omission of a single letter defining a variable in one set of 
code resulted in the LR models for the second specification of the simulation model (dogs 
that attended veterinary clinics only) being run against the outcome of the first 
specification of the simulation model (all dogs).  Whilst it is acknowledged that this fault 
was entirely programmer-based, the ability for small but important errors such as this to 
occur, and go undetected, using this programme is of great importance and care should be 
taken in selecting variable names to enable ease of subsequent error checking.  Second, the 
specification of all input matrices with ‘0’ prior to writing the data to these matrices 
resulted in difficulty in identification of incorrect code.  Within a low prevalence event, the 
specification of all initial input matrices with entries as ‘NA’ instead of ‘0’ should be 
routine, so that outputs do not appear plausible if the code for a variable does not work 
correctly within the code loop (which is ostensibly impossible to check without breaking 
the loop).  In short, while R is a very powerful and useful programme, painstaking bug 
checking and adherence to simple but important rules, which are not specified in any  
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literature but obtained through user experience, should be exhaustively practised by all 
programmers. 
 
Mathematical models have previously been defined and parameterised to explore the 
transmission of MRSA within closed human populations (Cooper and Lipsitch, 2004; 
Kajita et al., 2007).  However, the use of mathematical, or other forms of risk assessment 
models have not previously been applied to MRSA acquisition outwith a contained 
environment such as this, and have not explicitly included animal sources of the pathogen.  
Similarly, the use of risk assessment for pathogen transmission studies in general in the 
veterinary literature is limited, allthough numerous mathematical models relating to 
pathogen transmission exist.  While the nomenclature relating to risk assessment is 
ambiguous and a number of these mathematical models may address the same aim as a risk 
assessment without explicitly being defined as such, dedicated risk assessments are 
generally limited to exposure assessments within the field of animal health (de Vos et al., 
2004; Peeler and Thrush, 2004; Jones et al., 2005).  Thus, the study presented here is a new 
approach to prioritising research in an emerging area of animal health. 
 
In conclusion, qualitative and quantitative risk assessment processes have been used to 
identify a median risk of acquisition of MRSA in pet dogs over any given 24 hours as 1.5% 
(5
th – 95
th percentile range 0 – 19%).  While extensive sensitivity analyses were conducted, 
no clear prioritisation of influential inputs could be obtained.  However, community and 
veterinary hospital routes were both found to be important in acquisition of MRSA in dogs 
and, while it cannot be concluded that other sources of MRSA are unimportant, the role of 
the environment and of family members, were found to be deserving of further study.  The 
identification of further studies that may be useful in improving the specification of a 
model such as defined were themselves difficult, given the marked and in some cases 
intractable uncertainty surrounding estimates of transmission.  The usefulness of a risk 
assessment approach in this data sparse area was unconvincing as difficulties were 
encountered in accurate specification of the model and interpretation of the results of both 
the qualitative and quantitative assessments, despite thorough and extensively researched 
methods implementation.  While results were easily obtained for qualitative and 
quantitative assessments, along with sensitivity analyses, the consideration of the 
uncertainty surrounding these results reduced the confidence in these outputs.  It is 
postulated that the limitations encountered within this work are likely to be encountered 
when applying formal risk assessment methods to any other biologically complex 
phenomenon that is not represented by a closed or modular system, is non-sequential and  
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non-linear in nature, includes dependencies and is characterised by sparse data.   
Consequently, whilst the subject of this research relates to a single biological system, the 
use of risk assessment processes should not be considered an easy or appropriate approach 
to the initial assessment of any system with the above properties.   
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
Questionnaire used to investigate interactions between dogs, 
other animals and humans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2
2
0
Questionnaire administered to Dog Owners: 
  
 
2
2
1
  
 
2
2
2
 
  
 
2
2
3
  
 
2
2
4
Questionnaire administered to non-Dog Owners: 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for expert opinion elicitation in the area of 
MRSA in pet dogs 
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Expert Opinion Elicitation 
 
MRSA in dogs 
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Introduction 
 
The following questions are designed to elicit expert opinion. This exercise is undertaken 
to augment sparse data and will be used to inform a simulation model.  
 
There are no ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ responses. 
 
The questionnaire consists of 17 questions and will take approximately 10‐20 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Please note the format of the questions – in most cases responses will require estimation 
of numbers out of 1,000 
 
‐  Please use decimals if required – e.g. 1.5 people  
‐  For ease of reference; 
   0.1% of 1,000 = 1 
1% of 1,000 = 10  
10% of 1,000 = 100  
 
For most questions you will be asked to estimate the minimum, maximum and most 
likely amount.  You will also be asked to enter the level of ‘certainty’ that you have 
around the most likely estimate (i.e. how confident you are in your estimate).  
  
‐  Lack of confidence may relate to personal uncertainty or lack of current 
knowledge in the area (these do not require separation) 
‐  Confidence is graded between 1 (very unsure) and 10 (absolutely certain) 
‐  A level of certainty of 4 will be ascribed if left blank 
 
 
Please note:  
 
3.  The term positive will be used to account for any bodily carriage of the 
organism  (nasal,  skin,  perineal  …).  It  does  not  attempt  to  distinguish 
between colonisation (intermittent or consistent) and temporary carriage.  
This term will also encompass any infection with MRSA. 
 
4.  Please answer all questions for the average situation expected within the 
UK. 
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Prevalence of MRSA  
 
 
Question 1:     
 
Consider 1,000 people selected at random from the general population. 
 
How many of these people would you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA?  
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
 
Question 2: 
 
Consider  1,000  human  health  care  workers  selected  at  random  from  the  general 
population. 
 
How many of these health care workers would you expect, on average, to be positive for 
MRSA?  
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 3: 
 
Consider  1,000  veterinarians  (large  and  small  animal)  selected  at  random  from  the 
general population. 
 
How many of these veterinarians would you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA?  
 
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
Question 4: 
 
Place an ‘x’ on the line next to any groups that you consider to have an increased risk of 
carriage of MRSA in comparison to the general population: 
 
 
  a)  Health Care Workers 
   
 
‐ large animal  
 
b) Veterinarians :   
‐ small animal 
   
‐ large animal  
 
c) Veterinary nurses and other      
veterinary staff :  ‐ small animal 
   
  d) Farmers 
   
 
  e) Immunosuppressed 
   
 
  f) Hospitalised within the last year 
   
 
   g) Other, please state 
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Question 5: 
 
Consider 1,000 dogs selected at random from the general population. 
 
How many of these dogs would you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA?  
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
 
Question 6: 
 
Consider 1,000 hospitalised dogs selected at random at veterinary clinics. 
 
How many of these dogs would you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA?  
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Environmental contamination  
 
Question 7: 
 
Consider 1,000 houses selected at random. 
 
How many of these houses would you expect, on average, to be positive for the presence 
of any environmental contamination with MRSA anywhere in the house on a single day? 
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
Question 7a: 
 
Consider one average house that is positive for environmental contamination with MRSA. 
 
If 1,000 sites (approximately 10cm x 10cm) are sampled randomly within that house, how 
many of these sites would you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA? 
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 8: 
 
Consider 1,000 houses selected at random that each have at least one member of the 
household that is positive for MRSA. 
 
How many of these houses would you expect, on average, to be positive for the presence 
of any environmental contamination with MRSA on a single day? 
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
Question 8a: 
 
Consider one of the houses in Q8, with at least one member of the household positive 
for MRSA, that is also positive for environmental contamination with MRSA. 
 
If 1,000 sites are sampled randomly within that house, how many of these sites would 
you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA? 
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 9: 
 
Consider 1,000 small animal veterinary clinics selected at random. 
 
How many of these clinics would you expect, on average, to be positive for the presence 
of any environmental contamination with MRSA on a single day?  
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
Question 9a: 
 
Consider  one  of  these  small  animal  veterinary  clinics  (Q9)  that  is  positive  for 
environmental contamination with MRSA. 
 
If 1,000 sites are sampled randomly within that veterinary clinic, how many of these sites 
would you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA? 
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 10: 
 
Consider 1,000 small animal veterinary clinics selected at random that each have at least 
one member of staff that is positive for MRSA. 
 
How many of these clinics would you expect, on average, to be positive for the presence 
of any environmental contamination with MRSA on a single day?  
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
Question 10a: 
 
Consider  one  of  these  small  animal  veterinary  clinics  (Q10)  that  is  positive  for 
environmental contamination with MRSA. 
 
If 1,000 sites are sampled randomly within that veterinary clinic, how many of these sites 
would you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA? 
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 11: 
 
Consider 1,000 small animal veterinary clinics selected at random that each have at least 
one canine patient that is positive for MRSA. 
 
How many of these clinics would you expect, on average, to be positive for the presence 
of any environmental contamination with MRSA on a single day?  
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
Question 11a: 
 
Consider  one  of  these  small  animal  veterinary  clinics  (Q11)  that  is  positive  for 
environmental contamination with MRSA. 
 
If 1,000 sites are sampled randomly within that veterinary clinic, how many of these sites 
would you expect, on average, to be positive for MRSA? 
 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
 
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Transmission of MRSA 
 
Question 12: 
 
Consider 1,000 MRSA negative dogs.   
 
Estimate the number of dogs, on average, that will become positive for MRSA after a 
single average contact with the following: 
 
 
 
a)  An MRSA positive owner 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
b)  Another MRSA positive human (not their owner) 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
c)  An MRSA positive dog within their household 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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d)  An MRSA positive non‐household dog 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
e)  An MRSA positive veterinarian  
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
  
 
 
f)  MRSA positive veterinary staff‐member (non‐veterinarian) 
  
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
g)  An MRSA positive household environmental site (10cm x 10cm) 
  
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
h)  An MRSA positive veterinary hospital environmental site (10cm x 10cm) 
  
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 13: 
 
Consider 1,000 MRSA negative humans, selected from the general population.   
 
Estimate the number of people, on average, that will become positive for MRSA after a 
single average contact with the following: 
 
 
a)  An MRSA positive spouse or live‐in partner 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
b)  An MRSA positive non‐co‐habiting partner 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
c)  An MRSA positive (non‐spousal) household member <15 years old 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
d)  An MRSA positive (non‐spousal) household member >15 years old 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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e)  An MRSA positive non‐household member 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
f)  An MRSA positive household environment (10cm x 10cm) 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
g)  An MRSA positive dog 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
h)  MRSA in food 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 14: 
 
Consider 1,000 MRSA negative hospitalised humans.   
 
Estimate the number of people, on average, that will become positive for MRSA after a 
single average contact with the following (all of whom are positive for MRSA at the time 
of contact): 
 
 
a)  An MRSA positive patient 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
b)  An MRSA positive doctor 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
c)  An MRSA positive (non‐doctor) health‐care worker 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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d)  An MRSA positive visitor 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
e)  An MRSA hospital environment (10cm x 10cm) 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
 
f)  An MRSA positive dog (therapy animal) 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 15: 
 
What percentage (0 to 100%) of transmission of MRSA to humans would you estimate 
takes place by: 
 
a)  Direct contact (humans or animals) 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
b)  Aerosolisation 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
c)  Environmental contact 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
d)  Food 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 16: 
 
What percentage (0 to 100%) of transmission of MRSA to dogs would you estimate takes 
place by: 
 
a)  Direct contact  (humans or animals) 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
b)  Aerosolisation 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
c)  Environmental contact 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
 
 
e)  Food 
 
Minimum  Maximum  Most Likely 
   
 
Confidence in estimate (1‐10): 
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Question 17: 
 
Please rate your level of specialisation or expertise in the following areas: 
 
Please place a ‘x’ in the relevant box for each category.  A rating scale of 1‐10 is used 
where 1 represents the equivalent knowledge to a member of the general public and 10 
represents the knowledge of a specialist at the top of the particular field 
  
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
a) Veterinary microbiology                     
b) Human microbiology            
c) Small animal veterinary medicine                     
d) Large animal veterinary medicine            
e) Human medicine                     
f) MRSA            
g) Public health                     
h) Zoonotic disease            
i) Epidemiology                     
j) Food safety            
k) Communicable disease control                     
l) Other – please state and rate below           
                     
            
                     
            
                     
 
 
 
Your participation in this questionnaire is greatly appreciated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any additional 
comments: 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
Covering letter emails for the questionnaire for expert 
opinion elicitation in the area of MRSA in pet dogs 
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Accompanying the initial emailed mailing: 
 
 
Dear _______, 
 
I am writing to ask if you would be willing to participate in an exercise to obtain expert 
opinion regarding MRSA in dogs and the potential for transfer of this organism between 
dogs and humans (file attached).   
 
As you know, MRSA is classed as an emerging pathogen in small animals and its potential 
for zoonotic transfer is currently unquantified.  Recent calls have been made to assess the 
overall risk of MRSA in animals and humans using a formal risk assessment approach (FVE 
conference on MRSA, Bussels, 2008). 
 
I have been working on a quantitative risk assessment of MRSA acquisition in dogs and 
transfer to humans as part of an epidemiological PhD and DEFRA research fellowship.  
 
At the final stage of this risk assessment, it is imperative that the model that has been 
developed is parameterised appropriately.  As this area is data sparse, expert opinion is of 
great importance in obtaining parameter estimates. 
 
The use of expert opinion within the model will entail the combination of the opinions of 
a  number  of  experts  to  result  in  an  overall  distribution  of  estimates  for  important 
parameters.  
 
Please be assured that all responses will be confidential and anonymised.  The overall 
results from the questionnaire will be fed back to the group of experts. 
 
If  you  are  willing  to  participate,  I  would  be  very  grateful  if  you  would  reply  with  a 
completed  questionnaire  (attached).   I  am  happy  to  receive  printed  questionnaires 
(mailed to the address below) if preferred. 
 
With many thanks, 
 
 
 
Jane Heller BSc, BVSc, DipVetClinStud, MVetClinStud, MRCVS 
Research Fellow (DEFRA VTRI) 
  
Comparative Epidemiology and Informatics  
Institute of Comparative Medicine  
Faculty of Veterinary Medicine  
University of Glasgow  
Bearsden  
G61 1QH 
UK 
  
Ph: 0141 330 3437 
email: J.Heller@vet.gla.ac.uk 
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Accompanying the follow-up emailed mailing: 
 
 
Dear _______, 
 
A few weeks ago, I wrote to ask if you would be willing to participate in an exercise to 
obtain  expert  opinion  regarding  MRSA  in  dogs  and  the  potential  for  transfer  of  this 
organism between dogs and humans (file attached).   
 
To  date,  I  have  received  responses  from  approximately  half  of  the  experts  that  I 
contacted, which have been very interesting and informative. 
 
The  experts  that  have  been  contacted  were  targeted  based  on  publications  and 
involvement in the MRSA field and it was hoped that a broad representation of fields, 
facilities and countries would limit bias that might otherwise occur.  As such, I am still 
hoping to obtain some more responses. 
 
It has been brought to my attention on a number of occasions that this questionnaire is 
uncomfortable to fill in.  I totally agree and, whilst I apologise for the difficulty that may 
be encountered, I must reassure you that the purpose of the questionnaire is not to 
replace data that are likely to be available within the next years or decades, but to allow 
initial modeling of the problem at hand with the aim of identification of important data 
gaps and crucial areas for future research. 
 
The  elicitation  of  expert  opinion  is  a  recognised  technique  within  the  field  of  risk 
assessment and is often undertaken to enable an initial analysis where data are sparse. 
 
The  results  of  these  questionnaires  will  not  be  used  or  published  on  their  own,  but 
combined to parameterise inputs for a stochastic model and go some way to an initial 
estimation of the variability and uncertainty that we are likely to encounter in this area of 
research. 
 
Again, please be assured that all responses will be confidential and anonymised.   
 
I thank you for taking the time to read this and please do not hesitate to contact me if any 
further information is required. 
 
If  you  are  willing  to  participate,  I  would  be  very  grateful  if  you  would  reply  with  a 
completed  questionnaire  (attached).   I  am  happy  to  receive  printed  questionnaires 
(mailed to the address below) if preferred. 
 
With many thanks, 
 
 
 
Jane Heller BSc, BVSc, DipVetClinStud, MVetClinStud, MRCVS 
Research Fellow (DEFRA VTRI) 
  
Comparative Epidemiology and Informatics  
Institute of Comparative Medicine   
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Faculty of Veterinary Medicine  
University of Glasgow  
Bearsden  
G61 1QH 
UK 
  
Ph: 0141 330 3437 
email: J.Heller@vet.gla.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
 
User-defined R code for modified beta distributions  
(beta-PERT and modified beta-PERT) 
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1) Function to model a "beta-PERT" distribution.  Written by G.T. Innocent 
(g.innocent@vet.gla.ac.uk)   (Adapted from formulae published by Vose (2000), 
pp170,171) 
 
-  Parameter 1 = number of samples required  
-  Parameter 2 = minimum  
-  Parameter 3 = mode  
-  Parameter 4 = maximum  
 
-  Parameters 2-4 can be vectors and will be recycled if necessary  
-  Alternatively parameter 2 can be the vector c(min,mode,max)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rbetapert<‐function(n=1,min,Mode,max){
 
if(Mode==(min+max)/2){Mode<‐Mode+0.001} 
if((2*Mode‐min‐max)==0){Mode<‐Mode+0.001} 
 
mean<‐(min+4*Mode+max)/6 
 
if((Mode‐mean)==0){Mode <‐ Mode+0.001} 
if((mean‐min)==0){mean <‐ mean+0.001} 
if((max‐mean)==0){max <‐ max+0.001} 
 
alpha<‐(mean‐min)*(2*Mode‐min‐max)/((Mode‐mean)*(max‐min)) 
beta<‐alpha*(max‐mean)/(mean‐min) 
return(rbeta(n,alpha,beta)*(max‐min)+min) 
 
} 
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2) Function to model a "modified beta-PERT" distribution Written by J. Heller 
(j.heller@vet.gla.ac.uk) and G.T. Innocent (g.innocent@vet.gla.ac.uk). (Adapted from 
formulae published by Vose (2000), pp170,171) 
 
-  Parameter 1 = number of samples required  
-  Parameter 2 = minimum  
-  Parameter 3 = mode  
-  Parameter 4 = maximum  
 
-  Parameters 2-4 can be vectors and will be recycled if necessary  
-  Alternatively parameter 2 can be the vector c(min,mode,max)  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rmodbetapert<‐function(n=1,min,Mode,max,gamma){
 
    if(Mode==(min+max)/2){Mode<‐Mode+0.001} 
    if((2*Mode‐min‐max)==0){Mode<‐Mode+0.001} 
         
    mean<‐(min+gamma*Mode+max)/(gamma+2) 
     
    if((Mode‐mean)==0){Mode <‐ Mode+0.001} 
    if((mean‐min)==0){mean <‐ mean+0.001} 
         
    beta.part <‐ (max‐mean)/(mean‐min)  
     
    if(beta.part==0){beta.part<‐0.001} 
     
    alpha<‐((mean‐min)*(2*Mode‐min‐max))/((Mode‐mean)*(max‐min)) 
    beta<‐alpha*beta.part 
    value <‐ (rbeta(n,alpha,beta)*(max‐min)+min) 
        
}  
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
 
Concerns and comments noted by experts in association 
with the expert opinion elicitation exercise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  254
1.  I found it hard to estimate risk based on single contacts (as opposed to cumulative risk 
over a given time period). I may have overestimated risk from single contact, because 
I think any type of single contact results is a low risk of transmission. 
 
2.  I felt very uncomfortable filling it in as there is so little one can refer to and so much 
guess work so I left some blank. I still wanted to give it a try in order to help you with 
your data collection but with MRSA being such a media‐friendly area, this approach 
seems very vulnerable to abuse?   
 
3.  a) I found the questionnaire VERY uncomfortable to fill in. I tried to do my best but my 
feeling is that very few questions can be answered scientifically on the basis of the 
current knowledge 
 
b) The questionnaire is long and many questions are extremely difficult to answer on a 
scientific basis due to the lack of published data. It takes much more than 10‐20 
minutes to complete it… 
 
4.  Found it difficult to determine what an average contact between people and other 
people and people and dogs would be. 
 
5.  a) I think the answers would be significantly different if the definition of positive did 
not include all types of positive. 
 
b)  The  main  problem  for  dogs  is  that  they  are  like  large  dusters  in  hospital  and 
veterinary environments and they also tend to lie on the floor. So they are perfectly 
placed to transiently carry MRSA on their coats, picking it up from environmental 
dust. 
 
c) I would urge that the results are presented with care, bearing in mind that some 
members of the public might throw their dogs into the local canal if they perceive 
them to be a human health risk.  The questionnaire defines positive as any carriage, so 
if  we  are  commenting  on  transfer  between  humans/  dogs,  that  might  only  be 
transient skin/ coat colonisation of either species. 
 
 
6.  Guessing for a different setting(UK) = double guess Not sure how helpful that can be 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
 
 
Expert profiles of ‘expertness’ 
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Graphs of individual ‘expertness’.  The solid line represents the median and dashed lines represent 25
th and 75
th percentiles for all experts:  
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Graphs of ‘expertness’ grouped for specialisation.  The solid line represents the median and dashed lines represent 25
th and 75
th percentiles 
across specialisation:  
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APPENDIX 7 
 
 
 
Expert uncertainty distributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  264
Red dashed lines represent combined (composite) expert distributions: 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
 
 
R code for simulation model 
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library(epicalc) 
library(MCMCpack) 
library(odesolve) 
library(survival) 
library(coda) 
library(RWinEdt) 
library(sensitivity) 
library(sm) 
library(stats) 
library(MASS) 
library(colorspace) 
library(vcd) 
library(RGtk2) 
library(rggobi) 
library(lhs) 
 
########################################################## 
 
r.repeats <‐ 50           
n.dogs <‐ 200             
iterations <‐ 1000         
expert.iterations <‐ 5000 
 
############################################ 
#FOR DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ALL EXPERT OPINION QUESTIONS FOR INPUT TO THE MODEL... 
 
qnum <‐ read.csv("H://My Documents//Work//PhD//Expert opinion//question.numbers.csv") 
qnum <‐ qnum[,1] 
 
n.experts <‐ 15 
n.sample <‐ expert.iterations  
combination.data <‐ matrix(nrow=n.sample, ncol=length(qnum)) 
 
for(i in 1:length(qnum)){ 
filename <‐ paste("H://My Documents//Work//PhD//Expert opinion//question",qnum[i],".csv",sep="") 
data <‐ read.csv(filename) 
opinion <‐ numeric(n.experts*n.sample) 
dim(opinion) <‐ c(n.experts,n.sample) 
for(expert in (1:n.experts)){ 
  if(i>37){ 
opinion[expert,] <‐ 
rmodbetapert(n.sample,data[expert,2]/100,data[expert,3]/100,data[expert,4]/100,data[expert,5])}   
else{ 
opinion[expert,] <‐ 
rmodbetapert(n.sample,data[expert,2]/1000,data[expert,3]/1000,data[expert,4]/1000,data[expert,5]) 
} 
} 
combination.data[,i] <‐ sample(opinion,n.sample,replace=TRUE, prob=rep(c(0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1),n.sample))  
} 
 
################################MODEL BELOW HERE: 
 
simulation <‐ function(n.dogs,iterations){ 
 
##uncertainty 
#iterations = number of uncertainty samples 
 
 
    p.dog.goes.to.vet.1yr <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.dog.goes.to.vet.24h <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.owner.is.HCW <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.owner.is.vet <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.owner.is.other.risk <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.owner.no.risk <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.col.HCW <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.col.vet <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.col.oth.risk <‐ numeric(iterations)  
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    p.col.gen.pop <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    max.in.family <‐ 7 
    dirichlet.1.mat <‐ matrix(0,ncol=max.in.family,nrow=iterations) 
    p.exposure.to.other.dogs <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.house.contam.family.col <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.house.contam.family.not.col <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.environ.contam <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.community.dog.colonised.1 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.community.dog.colonised.2 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.community.dog.colonised.3 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.community.dog.colonised <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.dog.col.1 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.dog.col.2 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.dog.col.3 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.dog.col.4 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.dog.col.sample <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.dog.colonised <‐ numeric(iterations)  
    p.vet.environ.contam.1 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.environ.contam.2 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.environ.contam <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.col.1 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.col.2 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.col.3 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.vet.col.4 <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.transmission.owner.per.contact <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.transmission.non.owner.per.contact <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.transmission.community.dog.per.contact <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.transmission.community.environ.house.per.contact <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.transmission.vet.dog.per.contact <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.transmission.vet.environ.per.contact <‐ numeric(iterations) 
    p.transmission.vet.per.contact <‐ numeric(iterations) 
 
##data 
 
s.dog.to.vet <‐ 234             
n.dog.to.vet <‐ 279 
s.hcw <‐ 89                    
n.general.pop <‐ 2118 
s.vet <‐ 15671                  
n.general.pop.1 <‐ 37804500     
min.other.risk <‐ 0.01          
ml.other.risk <‐ 0.02 
max.other.risk <‐ 0.05 
min.O.oth.risk <‐ 0.015         
ml.O.oth.risk <‐ 0.05 
max.O.oth.risk <‐ 0.15 
s.gen.pop <‐ 4                   
n.gen.pop <‐ 274 
 
s.exposure.to.other.dogs <‐ 246   
n.exposure.to.other.dogs <‐ 272 
s.community.dog.colonised.1 <‐ 1    
n.community.dog.colonised.1 <‐ 255 
s.community.dog.colonised.2 <‐ 0     
n.community.dog.colonised.2 <‐ 188 
s.community.dog.colonised.3 <‐ 2     
n.community.dog.colonised.3 <‐ 203 
s.vet.dog.col.1 <‐ 4 
n.vet.dog.col.1 <‐ 200 
s.vet.dog.col.2 <‐ 3 
n.vet.dog.col.2 <‐ 287 
s.vet.dog.col.3 <‐ 7 
n.vet.dog.col.3 <‐ 230 
s.vet.dog.col.4 <‐ 4 
n.vet.dog.col.4 <‐ 45 
s.vet.environ.contam.1 <‐ 3 
n.vet.environ.contam.1 <‐ 27  
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s.vet.environ.contam.2 <‐ 2 
n.vet.environ.contam.2 <‐ 158 
s.vet.col.1 <‐ 12       
n.vet.col.1 <‐ 271 
s.vet.col.2 <‐ 5       
n.vet.col.2 <‐ 51 
s.vet.col.3 <‐ 14       
n.vet.col.3 <‐ 78 
s.vet.col.4 <‐ 2        
n.vet.col.4 <‐ 64 
 
##for variability 
 
    does.dog.go.to.vet <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    owner.category <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    owner.colonised <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    others.in.family <‐array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    family.members <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,max.in.family)) 
    family.members.colonised <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,max.in.family)) 
    temp.family.members.colonised <‐ numeric(length=max.in.family*n.dogs) 
    n.family.non.owner.colonised <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    others.not.in.family <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    max.others.not.in.family <‐ 20 
    non.family.members <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,max.others.not.in.family+1)) 
    temp.non.family.members.colonised <‐ numeric(length=(max.others.not.in.family+1)*n.dogs)  
    non.family.members.colonised <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,(max.others.not.in.family+1))) 
    n.non.family.members.colonised <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    total.humans.colonised <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    exposure.to.other.dogs <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    dog.contacts <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    n.colonised.community.dogs <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    house.contam <‐  array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    outside.contam <‐  array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations))  
    environ.contam <‐  array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    no.environ.sites <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    no.contam.environ.sites <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    no.dogs.contacted.at.vet <‐  array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    no.col.dogs.contacted.at.vet <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    p.vet.environ.contam <‐ numeric(iterations)  
    no.vet.environ.sites <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    no.contam.vet.environ.sites <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    no.vets <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    which.vet.p <‐ numeric(iterations)   
    no.col.vet <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations)) 
    transmission.col.O <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    transmission.col.non.O.fam <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    transmission.col.non.O <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    transmission.col.community.dog <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    transmission.col.house.environ <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    transmission.col.vet.dog <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    transmission.col.vet.environ <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    transmission.col.vet <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    n.sources <‐ 9  
    MRSA.positive <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    MRSA.positive.1 <‐ array(0,c(n.dogs,iterations,r.repeats)) 
    
##data 
 
human.risk.category <‐ c("hcw","vet","other.risk","non.risk") 
min.non.fam.exposure <‐ 0        
ml.non.fam.exposure <‐ 4 
max.non.fam.exposure <‐ 15 
min.dog.exposure <‐ 1           
ml.dog.exposure <‐ 2 
max.dog.exposure <‐ 15 
which.environ.estimate <‐ c(0.1,1) 
min.environ.site.exposure <‐ 1         
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ml.environ.site.exposure <‐ 20 
max.environ.site.exposure <‐ 200 
min.vet.dog.exposure <‐ 0       
ml.vet.dog.exposure <‐ 1 
max.vet.dog.exposure <‐ 10 
min.vet.environ.site.exposure <‐ 1   
ml.vet.environ.site.exposure <‐ 10 
max.vet.environ.site.exposure <‐ 100 
min.vet.exposure <‐ 1    
ml.vet.exposure <‐ 2 
max.vet.exposure <‐5 
 
#contact data per 24h ‐ contact between at‐risk‐dog and source: 
min.O.contacts <‐ 0 
ml.O.contacts <‐ 5 
max.O.contacts <‐ 20 
min.non.O.contacts <‐ 0 
ml.non.O.contacts <‐ 1  
max.non.O.contacts <‐ 10 
min.dog.contacts <‐ 0        
ml.dog.contacts <‐ 1 
max.dog.contacts <‐ 10 
min.environ.contacts <‐ 0 
ml.environ.contacts <‐ 1 
max.environ.contacts <‐ 100 
min.vet.dog.contacts <‐ 0 
ml.vet.dog.contacts <‐ 1 
max.vet.dog.contacts <‐ 10 
min.vet.environ.contacts <‐ 1 
ml.vet.environ.contacts <‐10 
max.vet.environ.contacts <‐ 25 
 
min.vet.contacts <‐ 0 
ml.vet.contacts <‐ 3 
max.vet.contacts <‐ 20  
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##uncertainty and variabiliy for contact information between at‐risk‐dog and source: 
 
O.contacts.per.24h <‐ matrix(round(rbetapert(iterations*n.dogs,min.O.contacts,ml.O.contacts,max.O.contacts)), nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations, byrow=TRUE)       
non.O.contacts.per.24h <‐ matrix(round(rbetapert(iterations*n.dogs,min.non.O.contacts,ml.non.O.contacts,max.non.O.contacts)),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations, byrow=TRUE)   
dog.contacts.per.24h <‐ matrix(round(rbetapert(iterations*n.dogs,min.dog.contacts,ml.dog.contacts,max.dog.contacts)),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations, byrow=TRUE)   
environ.contacts.per.24h <‐ matrix(round(rbetapert(iterations*n.dogs,min.environ.contacts,ml.environ.contacts,max.environ.contacts)),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations, byrow=TRUE)   
vet.dog.contacts.per.24h <‐ matrix(round(rbetapert(iterations*n.dogs,min.vet.dog.contacts,ml.vet.dog.contacts,max.vet.dog.contacts)),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations, byrow=TRUE)   
vet.environ.contacts.per.24h <‐ matrix(round(rbetapert(iterations*n.dogs,min.vet.environ.contacts,ml.vet.environ.contacts,max.vet.environ.contacts)),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations, byrow=TRUE)   
vet.contacts.per.24h <‐ matrix(round(rbetapert(iterations*n.dogs,min.vet.contacts,ml.vet.contacts,max.vet.contacts)),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations, byrow=TRUE)   
 
###########  MODEL: 
 
lhs.1 <‐ randomLHS(iterations,1)                      ##for latin hypercube sampling 
 
p.dog.goes.to.vet.1yr <‐ rbeta(iterations,s.dog.to.vet+1,n.dog.to.vet‐s.dog.to.vet+1)           
p.dog.goes.to.vet.24h <‐ 1‐(1‐p.dog.goes.to.vet.1yr)^(1/365) 
 
#p.dog.goes.to.vet.1yr <‐ rep(1,iterations)    #THESE FOR RUNNING L‐R MODEL FOR ALL DOGS ATTENDING VET ONLY 
#p.dog.goes.to.vet.24h <‐ rep(1,iterations) 
 
p.owner.is.HCW <‐ rbeta(iterations,s.hcw+1,n.general.pop‐s.hcw+1) 
p.owner.is.vet <‐ rbeta(iterations,s.vet+1, n.general.pop.1‐s.vet+1) 
p.owner.is.other.risk <‐ rbetapert(iterations,min.other.risk,ml.other.risk,max.other.risk) 
p.owner.no.risk <‐ 1‐(p.owner.is.HCW + p.owner.is.vet + p.owner.is.other.risk) 
 
p.col.HCW <‐ quantile(combination.data[,2],lhs.1) 
names(p.col.HCW) <‐ NULL  
p.col.vet <‐ quantile(combination.data[,3],lhs.1)   #n.b. this is for ALL vets (large and small animal) NOT for estimates whiile at small animal vet clinic 
names(p.col.vet) <‐ NULL 
p.col.oth.risk <‐ rbetapert(iterations,min.O.oth.risk,ml.O.oth.risk,max.O.oth.risk) 
p.col.gen.pop <‐ rbeta(iterations,s.gen.pop+1,n.gen.pop‐s.gen.pop+1) 
 
###to model dependency between owner status and status of other family members:    
min.p.col.contact.col.O <‐ 0.02  
ml.p.col.contact.col.O <‐ 0.1 
max.p.col.contact.col.O <‐ 0.5 
p.col.contact.col.O <‐ rbetapert(iterations, min.p.col.contact.col.O, ml.p.col.contact.col.O, max.p.col.contact.col.O)    ## this is P(household member is colonised given that they have contact with an 
owner that is colonised) 
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dirichlet.1.mat <‐  rdirichlet(iterations,c(39,86,51,57,27,4,3))  # data from excel sheet 1 
p.exposure.to.other.dogs <‐ rbeta(iterations,s.exposure.to.other.dogs+1,n.exposure.to.other.dogs‐s.exposure.to.other.dogs+1) 
 
p.community.dog.colonised.1 <‐ rbeta(iterations,s.community.dog.colonised.1+1,n.community.dog.colonised.1‐s.community.dog.colonised.1+1) 
p.community.dog.colonised.2 <‐ rbeta(iterations,s.community.dog.colonised.2+1,n.community.dog.colonised.2‐s.community.dog.colonised.2+1) 
p.community.dog.colonised.3 <‐ rbeta(iterations,s.community.dog.colonised.3+1,n.community.dog.colonised.3‐s.community.dog.colonised.3+1)     
p.community.dog.colonised <‐ sample(c(p.community.dog.colonised.1,p.community.dog.colonised.2,p.community.dog.colonised.3),iterations,replace=TRUE) 
 
p.house.contam.family.col <‐ quantile(combination.data[,8],lhs.1) 
names(p.house.contam.family.col) <‐ NULL 
p.house.contam.family.not.col <‐ quantile(combination.data[,6],lhs.1) 
names(p.house.contam.family.not.col) <‐ NULL 
 
p.vet.dog.col.1 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.dog.col.1+1, n.vet.dog.col.1‐s.vet.dog.col.1+1) 
p.vet.dog.col.2 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.dog.col.2+1, n.vet.dog.col.2‐s.vet.dog.col.2+1) 
p.vet.dog.col.3 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.dog.col.3+1, n.vet.dog.col.3‐s.vet.dog.col.3+1) 
p.vet.dog.col.4 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.dog.col.4+1, n.vet.dog.col.4‐s.vet.dog.col.4+1) 
p.vet.dog.colonised <‐ sample(c(p.vet.dog.col.1,p.vet.dog.col.2,p.vet.dog.col.3,p.vet.dog.col.4),iterations,replace=TRUE) 
  
p.vet.environ.contam.1 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.environ.contam.1+1,n.vet.environ.contam.1‐s.vet.environ.contam.1+1)   
p.vet.environ.contam.2 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.environ.contam.2+1,n.vet.environ.contam.2‐s.vet.environ.contam.2+1) 
 
p.vet.col.1 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.col.1+1,n.vet.col.1‐s.vet.col.1+1)    
p.vet.col.2 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.col.2+1,n.vet.col.2‐s.vet.col.2+1) 
p.vet.col.3 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.col.3+1,n.vet.col.3‐s.vet.col.3+1) 
p.vet.col.4 <‐ rbeta(iterations, s.vet.col.4+1,n.vet.col.4‐s.vet.col.4+1) 
p.vet.col <‐ sample(c(p.vet.col.1,p.vet.col.2,p.vet.col.3,p.vet.col.4),iterations,replace=TRUE, c(rep(1,iterations),rep(1,iterations),rep(0.1,iterations),rep(1,iterations)))  
 
p.transmission.owner.per.contact.1 <‐ quantile(combination.data[,16],lhs.1)                   #these transmission parameters estimated PER AVERAGE CONTACT 
names(p.transmission.owner.per.contact.1) <‐ NULL 
p.transmission.owner.per.contact <‐ matrix(rep(p.transmission.owner.per.contact.1,n.dogs),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations,byrow=TRUE) 
p.transmission.owner.24h <‐ 1‐((1‐p.transmission.owner.per.contact)^O.contacts.per.24h)    
 
p.transmission.non.owner.per.contact.1 <‐ quantile(combination.data[,17],lhs.1) 
names(p.transmission.non.owner.per.contact.1) <‐ NULL 
p.transmission.non.owner.per.contact <‐ matrix(rep(p.transmission.non.owner.per.contact.1,n.dogs),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations,byrow=TRUE)  
p.transmission.non.owner.24h <‐ 1‐((1‐p.transmission.non.owner.per.contact)^non.O.contacts.per.24h)    
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p.transmission.community.dog.per.contact.1 <‐ quantile(combination.data[,19],lhs.1) 
names(p.transmission.community.dog.per.contact.1) <‐ NULL 
p.transmission.community.dog.per.contact <‐ matrix(rep(p.transmission.community.dog.per.contact.1,n.dogs),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations,byrow=TRUE)  
p.transmission.community.dog.24h <‐ 1‐((1‐p.transmission.community.dog.per.contact)^dog.contacts.per.24h)    
p.transmission.community.environ.house.per.contact.1 <‐ quantile(combination.data[,22],lhs.1) 
names(p.transmission.community.environ.house.per.contact.1) <‐ NULL 
p.transmission.community.environ.house.per.contact <‐ matrix(rep(p.transmission.community.environ.house.per.contact.1,n.dogs),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations,byrow=TRUE) 
p.transmission.community.environ.house.24h <‐ 1‐((1‐p.transmission.community.environ.house.per.contact)^environ.contacts.per.24h)  
 
p.transmission.vet.dog.per.contact.1 <‐ quantile(combination.data[,18],lhs.1) 
names(p.transmission.vet.dog.per.contact.1) <‐ NULL 
p.transmission.vet.dog.per.contact <‐ matrix(rep(p.transmission.vet.dog.per.contact.1,n.dogs),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations,byrow=TRUE) 
p.transmission.vet.dog.24h <‐ 1‐((1‐p.transmission.vet.dog.per.contact)^vet.dog.contacts.per.24h) 
 
p.transmission.vet.environ.per.contact.1 <‐ quantile(combination.data[,23],lhs.1) 
names(p.transmission.vet.environ.per.contact.1) <‐ NULL 
p.transmission.vet.environ.per.contact <‐ matrix(rep(p.transmission.vet.environ.per.contact.1,n.dogs),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations,byrow=TRUE) 
p.transmission.vet.environ.24h <‐ 1‐((1‐p.transmission.vet.environ.per.contact)^vet.environ.contacts.per.24h) 
 
p.transmission.vet.per.contact.1 <‐ quantile(combination.data[,20],lhs.1) 
names(p.transmission.vet.per.contact.1) <‐ NULL 
p.transmission.vet.per.contact <‐ matrix(rep(p.transmission.vet.per.contact.1 ,n.dogs),nrow=n.dogs, ncol=iterations,byrow=TRUE) 
p.transmission.vet.24h <‐ 1‐((1‐p.transmission.vet.per.contact)^vet.contacts.per.24h) 
 
 
##### variability below here: 
 
if(.Platform$OS.type == "windows"){ 
dyn.load("resetarray.dll") 
}else{ 
if(Sys.info()$machine=="i386") dyn.load("resetarray_i386.so") else dyn.load("resetarray_ppc.so") 
} 
 
 
for(iter in 1:iterations){ 
 
temp.family.members.colonised[] <‐ NA   #to make sure that we know that the vector isn't resampled 
temp.non.family.members.colonised[] <‐ NA   #as above 
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#veterinary attendance (y/n) 
 
does.dog.go.to.vet[,iter] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs,1,p.dog.goes.to.vet.24h[iter]) #STEP 1 *************** 
 
##COMMUNITY FACTORS: 
 
#owner risk category 
owner.category[,iter] <‐ sample(human.risk.category,n.dogs,replace=TRUE,c(p.owner.is.HCW[iter],p.owner.is.vet[iter],p.owner.is.other.risk[iter],p.owner.no.risk[iter])) 
 
    #owner colonisation status (y/n) 
    owner.colonised[owner.category[,iter]=="hcw",iter] <‐ rbinom(sum(owner.category[,iter]=="hcw"), 1, p.col.HCW[iter]) 
    owner.colonised[owner.category[,iter]=="vet",iter] <‐ rbinom(sum(owner.category[,iter]=="vet"), 1, p.col.vet[iter]) 
    owner.colonised[owner.category[,iter]=="other.risk",iter] <‐ rbinom(sum(owner.category[,iter]=="other.risk"), 1, p.col.oth.risk[iter]) 
    owner.colonised[owner.category[,iter]=="non.risk",iter] <‐ rbinom(sum(owner.category[,iter]=="non.risk"), 1, p.col.gen.pop[iter]) 
 
#number of others in the family   
others.in.family[,iter] <‐ sample(c(0,1,2,3,4,5,6),n.dogs,replace=TRUE,c(dirichlet.1.mat[iter,]))  
 
#risk category of others in the family 
family.members[,iter,] <‐ sample(human.risk.category, length(family.members[,iter,]),replace=TRUE,c(p.owner.is.HCW[iter],p.owner.is.vet[iter],p.owner.is.other.risk[iter],p.owner.no.risk[iter])) 
 
##below models a dependency of colonisation on colonisation status of owner (owner acts as proxy for single MRSA positive person in family) 
#colonisation status of others in family ‐ needs correlation with owner status 
temp.family.members.colonised[family.members[,iter,]=="hcw" & owner.colonised[,iter]==TRUE] <‐ rbinom(sum(family.members[,iter,]=="hcw" & owner.colonised[,iter]==TRUE),1,(1‐((1‐
p.col.HCW[iter])*(1‐p.col.contact.col.O))))  
temp.family.members.colonised[family.members[,iter,]=="hcw" & owner.colonised[,iter]==FALSE] <‐ rbinom(sum(family.members[,iter,]=="hcw" & 
owner.colonised[,iter]==FALSE),1,p.col.HCW[iter])  
 
temp.family.members.colonised[family.members[,iter,]=="vet"& owner.colonised[,iter]==TRUE] <‐ rbinom(sum(family.members[,iter,]=="vet" & owner.colonised[,iter]==TRUE),1,(1‐((1‐
p.col.vet[iter])*(1‐p.col.contact.col.O)))) 
temp.family.members.colonised[family.members[,iter,]=="vet"& owner.colonised[,iter]==FALSE] <‐ rbinom(sum(family.members[,iter,]=="vet" & owner.colonised[,iter]==FALSE),1,p.col.vet[iter]) 
 
temp.family.members.colonised[family.members[,iter,]=="other.risk" & owner.colonised[,iter]==TRUE] <‐ rbinom(sum(family.members[,iter,]=="other.risk" & owner.colonised[,iter]==TRUE),1,(1‐
((1‐p.col.oth.risk[iter])*(1‐p.col.contact.col.O)))) 
temp.family.members.colonised[family.members[,iter,]=="other.risk" & owner.colonised[,iter]==FALSE] <‐ rbinom(sum(family.members[,iter,]=="other.risk" & 
owner.colonised[,iter]==FALSE),1,p.col.oth.risk[iter]) 
 
temp.family.members.colonised[family.members[,iter,]=="non.risk" & owner.colonised[,iter]==TRUE] <‐ rbinom(sum(family.members[,iter,]=="non.risk" & owner.colonised[,iter]==TRUE),1,(1‐((1‐
p.col.gen.pop[iter])*(1‐p.col.contact.col.O))))  
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temp.family.members.colonised[family.members[,iter,]=="non.risk" & owner.colonised[,iter]==FALSE] <‐ rbinom(sum(family.members[,iter,]=="non.risk" & 
owner.colonised[,iter]==FALSE),1,p.col.gen.pop[iter]) 
 
family.members.colonised[,iter,] <‐ temp.family.members.colonised  
 
family.members.colonised[,iter,1] <‐ 0   
 
resetarrayoutput <‐ .C('resetarray', data=matrix(as.integer(family.members.colonised[,iter,])), keep=as.integer(others.in.family[,iter]), ncol=as.integer(ncol(family.members.colonised[,iter,])), 
nrow=as.integer(nrow(family.members.colonised[,iter,])), replace=as.integer(0)) 
 
family.members.colonised[,iter,] <‐ matrix(resetarrayoutput$data, ncol=ncol(resetarrayoutput$data)) 
 
    #number of colonised family members (non‐owner) contacted per day 
    n.family.non.owner.colonised <‐ apply(family.members.colonised,c(1,2),sum) 
     
#number of others not in family contacted per day 
others.not.in.family[,iter] <‐ round(rbetapert(n.dogs,min.non.fam.exposure,ml.non.fam.exposure,max.non.fam.exposure)) 
 
#risk category of those not in family 
non.family.members[,iter,] <‐ 
sample(human.risk.category,length(non.family.members[,iter,]),replace=TRUE,c(p.owner.is.HCW[iter],p.owner.is.vet[iter],p.owner.is.other.risk[iter],p.owner.no.risk[iter])) 
     
temp.non.family.members.colonised[non.family.members[,iter,]=="hcw"] <‐ rbinom(sum(non.family.members[,iter,]=="hcw"),1,p.col.HCW[iter])  
temp.non.family.members.colonised[non.family.members[,iter,]=="vet"] <‐ rbinom(sum(non.family.members[,iter,]=="vet"),1,p.col.vet[iter])  
temp.non.family.members.colonised[non.family.members[,iter,]=="other.risk"] <‐ rbinom(sum(non.family.members[,iter,]=="other.risk"),1,p.col.oth.risk[iter])  
temp.non.family.members.colonised[non.family.members[,iter,]=="non.risk"] <‐ rbinom(sum(non.family.members[,iter,]=="non.risk"),1,p.col.gen.pop[iter])  
      
non.family.members.colonised[,iter,] <‐ temp.non.family.members.colonised  
 
non.family.members.colonised[,iter,1] <‐ 0 
 
resetarrayoutput <‐ .C('resetarray', data=matrix(as.integer(non.family.members.colonised[,iter,])), keep=as.integer(others.not.in.family[,iter]), 
ncol=as.integer(ncol(non.family.members.colonised[,iter,])), nrow=as.integer(nrow(non.family.members.colonised[,iter,])), replace=as.integer(0)) 
 
non.family.members.colonised[,iter,] <‐ matrix(resetarrayoutput$data, ncol=ncol(resetarrayoutput$data)) 
 
##STEP Ac************************** 
    #number of colonised non‐family members contacted 
    n.non.family.members.colonised <‐ apply(non.family.members.colonised,c(1,2),sum)     
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##STEP Bc************************** 
    #total number of non‐owner (family and non‐family combined) members that are colonised 
    total.humans.colonised[,iter] <‐ apply(matrix(c(n.family.non.owner.colonised[,iter], n.non.family.members.colonised[,iter]), ncol=2), 1, sum)  # Your comment:  # not sure if I want this as 
transmission dynamics are going to be different for family and non‐family 
 
#does the dog have any contact with other dogs (y/n) 
exposure.to.other.dogs[,iter] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs,1,p.exposure.to.other.dogs[iter]) 
 
#Number of contacts with other dogs   
dog.contacts[,iter] <‐ exposure.to.other.dogs[,iter] * round(rbetapert(n.dogs,min.dog.exposure,ml.dog.exposure,max.dog.exposure)) 
 
##STEP Cc******************* 
    #number of colonised community dogs contacted 
    n.colonised.community.dogs[,iter] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs,dog.contacts[,iter],p.community.dog.colonised[iter]) 
 
#is house contaminated (y/n) (depending on if a member of the family is colonised  
house.contam[((owner.colonised[,iter]+n.family.non.owner.colonised[,iter])=="0"),iter] <‐ 
rbinom(length(house.contam[((owner.colonised[,iter]+n.family.non.owner.colonised[,iter])=="0"),iter]),1,p.house.contam.family.not.col[iter]) 
house.contam[((owner.colonised[,iter]+n.family.non.owner.colonised[,iter])!="0"),iter] <‐ 
rbinom(length(house.contam[((owner.colonised[,iter]+n.family.non.owner.colonised[,iter])!="0"),iter]),1,p.house.contam.family.col[iter]) 
 
#how many contam sites per house?    
no.environ.sites[,iter] <‐ round(rbetapert(n.dogs, min.environ.site.exposure, ml.environ.site.exposure, max.environ.site.exposure))*house.contam[,iter] 
 
p.environ.contam[((owner.colonised[,iter]+n.family.non.owner.colonised[,iter])=="0")&(house.contam[,iter]==1)] <‐ combination.data[iter,7]  #probability of contamination of environmental sites 
p.environ.contam[((owner.colonised[,iter]+n.family.non.owner.colonised[,iter])!="0")&(house.contam[,iter]==1)] <‐ combination.data[iter,9] 
 
    no.contam.environ.sites[,iter] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs,no.environ.sites[,iter],p.environ.contam[iter]) 
 
##STEP Dc*********************** 
    environ.contam[,iter] <‐ no.contam.environ.sites[,iter] 
 
######VETERINARY FACTORS: 
no.dogs.contacted.at.vet[,iter] <‐ does.dog.go.to.vet[,iter] * round(rbetapert(n.dogs,min.vet.dog.exposure, ml.vet.dog.exposure, max.vet.dog.exposure)) 
 
##STEP Ec********************** 
    #number of colonised dogs contacted at vet in 24h 
    no.col.dogs.contacted.at.vet[,iter] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs,no.dogs.contacted.at.vet[,iter],p.vet.dog.colonised[iter])  
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p.vet.environ.contam[iter] <‐ sample(c(p.vet.environ.contam.1[iter], p.vet.environ.contam.2[iter]),1, replace=T, which.environ.estimate) 
no.vet.environ.sites[,iter] <‐ does.dog.go.to.vet[,iter] * round(rbetapert(n.dogs, min.vet.environ.site.exposure, ml.vet.environ.site.exposure, max.vet.environ.site.exposure)) 
##STEP Fc********************** 
    #number of contaminated environmental sites contacted at vet in 24h  
    no.contam.vet.environ.sites[,iter] <‐ does.dog.go.to.vet[,iter] * rbinom(n.dogs,no.vet.environ.sites[,iter],p.vet.environ.contam[iter]) 
 
no.vets[,iter] <‐ does.dog.go.to.vet[,iter] * round(rbetapert(n.dogs,min.vet.exposure,ml.vet.exposure,max.vet.exposure)) 
 
##STEP Gc********************** 
    #number of colonised vets contacted in 24h 
     no.col.vet[,iter] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs,no.vets[,iter],p.vet.col[iter]) 
} 
 
###TRANSMISSION DYNAMICS: 
 
#Changing transmission from per contact into per 24h: 
 
for(r in 1:r.repeats){ 
##STEP A*********** 
transmission.col.O[,,r] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs*iterations,owner.colonised,p.transmission.owner.24h) 
##STEP B*********** 
transmission.col.non.O.fam[,,r] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs*iterations,n.family.non.owner.colonised,p.transmission.owner.24h) 
transmission.col.non.O[,,r] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs*iterations,n.non.family.members.colonised,p.transmission.non.owner.24h) 
##STEP C*********** 
transmission.col.community.dog[,,r] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs*iterations,n.colonised.community.dogs,p.transmission.community.dog.24h) 
##STEP D*********** 
transmission.col.house.environ[,,r] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs*iterations,house.contam,p.transmission.community.environ.house.24h) 
##STEP E*********** 
transmission.col.vet.dog[,,r] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs*iterations,no.col.dogs.contacted.at.vet,p.transmission.vet.dog.24h) 
##STEP F*********** 
transmission.col.vet.environ[,,r] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs*iterations,no.contam.vet.environ.sites,p.transmission.vet.environ.24h) 
##STEP G*********** 
transmission.col.vet[,,r] <‐ rbinom(n.dogs*iterations,no.col.vet,p.transmission.vet.24h)         
} 
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##OUTPUT: 
 
#MRSA.positive[,iter,r] <‐ apply(matrix(c(transmission.col.O[,iter,r], transmission.col.non.O.fam[,iter,r], transmission.col.non.O[,iter,r], transmission.col.community.dog[,iter,r], 
transmission.col.house.environ[,iter,r],transmission.col.vet.dog[,iter,r], transmission.col.vet.environ[,iter,r], transmission.col.vet[,iter,r]), nrow=n.dogs), 1, sum)  
MRSA.positive <‐ 
transmission.col.O+transmission.col.non.O.fam+transmission.col.non.O+transmission.col.community.dog+transmission.col.house.environ+transmission.col.vet.dog+transmission.col.vet.environ+tra
nsmission.col.vet 
##OUTPUT AS Y/N ‐ ie dog can only become MRSA positive once in 24h: 
MRSA.positive.1[,,] <‐ MRSA.positive[,,]>0 
 
#assigning all the inputs to a global environment: 
assign("does.dog.go.to.vet",does.dog.go.to.vet,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.dog.goes.to.vet.24h",p.dog.goes.to.vet.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
#stepA: 
assign("owner.colonised",owner.colonised,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("transmission.col.O",transmission.col.O,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("owner.category",owner.category,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("O.contacts.per.24h",O.contacts.per.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.owner.per.contact",p.transmission.owner.per.contact,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.owner.24h",p.transmission.owner.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.owner.is.HCW",p.owner.is.HCW,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.owner.is.vet",p.owner.is.vet,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.owner.is.other.risk",p.owner.is.other.risk,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.owner.no.risk",p.owner.no.risk,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
#stepB: 
assign("n.family.non.owner.colonised",n.family.non.owner.colonised,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("n.non.family.members.colonised",n.non.family.members.colonised,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("transmission.col.non.O.fam",transmission.col.non.O.fam,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("transmission.col.non.O",transmission.col.non.O,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("others.in.family",others.in.family,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("n.family.non.owner.colonised",n.family.non.owner.colonised,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("others.not.in.family",others.not.in.family,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("total.humans.colonised",total.humans.colonised,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("non.O.contacts.per.24h",non.O.contacts.per.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.non.owner.per.contact",p.transmission.non.owner.per.contact,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.non.owner.24h",p.transmission.non.owner.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
#stepC: 
assign("n.colonised.community.dogs",n.colonised.community.dogs,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("transmission.col.community.dog",transmission.col.community.dog,pos=".GlobalEnv")  
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assign("exposure.to.other.dogs",exposure.to.other.dogs,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("dog.contacts.per.24h",dog.contacts.per.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.community.dog.colonised",p.community.dog.colonised,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.community.dog.per.contact",p.transmission.community.dog.per.contact,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.community.dog.24h",p.transmission.community.dog.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
#stepD: 
assign("environ.contam",environ.contam,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("transmission.col.house.environ",transmission.col.house.environ,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.environ.contam",p.environ.contam,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.community.environ.house.per.contact",p.transmission.community.environ.house.per.contact,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.house.contam.family.col",p.house.contam.family.col,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.house.contam.family.not.col",p.house.contam.family.not.col,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("environ.contacts.per.24h",environ.contacts.per.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.community.environ.house.24h",p.transmission.community.environ.house.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
#stepE: 
assign("no.col.dogs.contacted.at.vet",no.col.dogs.contacted.at.vet,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.vet.dog.per.contact",p.transmission.vet.dog.per.contact,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("no.dogs.contacted.at.vet",no.dogs.contacted.at.vet,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("vet.dog.contacts.per.24h",vet.dog.contacts.per.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.vet.dog.colonised",p.vet.dog.colonised,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("transmission.col.vet.dog",transmission.col.vet.dog,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.vet.dog.24h",p.transmission.vet.dog.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
#stepF: 
assign("no.contam.vet.environ.sites",no.contam.vet.environ.sites,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("transmission.col.vet.environ",transmission.col.vet.environ,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("vet.environ.contacts.per.24h",vet.environ.contacts.per.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.vet.environ.contam",p.vet.environ.contam,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.vet.environ.per.contact",p.transmission.vet.environ.per.contact,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.vet.environ.24h",p.transmission.vet.environ.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
#stepG: 
assign("no.col.vet",no.col.vet,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("transmission.col.vet",transmission.col.vet,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("no.vets",no.vets,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("vet.contacts.per.24h",vet.contacts.per.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.vet.per.contact",p.transmission.vet.per.contact,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.col.vet",p.col.vet,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("p.transmission.vet.24h",p.transmission.vet.24h,pos=".GlobalEnv") 
### 
assign("family.members",family.members, pos=".GlobalEnv")  
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assign("family.members.colonised",family.members.colonised, pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("temp.family.members.colonised",temp.family.members.colonised, pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("n.family.non.owner.colonised",n.family.non.owner.colonised, pos=".GlobalEnv") 
assign("MRSA.positive.1",MRSA.positive.1, pos=".GlobalEnv") 
      
    return(list(n.dogs=n.dogs,iterations=iterations, MRSA.positive.1=MRSA.positive.1)) 
} 
### calling the function: 
model <‐ simulation(n.dogs,iterations) 
  287
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 9 
 
 
 
Plackett-Burman fractional factorial designs 
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Design matrix for a two-level, 19 factor, 20 design point, Plackett-Burman design with foldover: 
  Factors 
Design 
point  F 1  F 2  F 3  F 4  F 5  F 6  F 7  F 8  F 9  F 10  F 11  F 12  F 13  F 14  F 15  F 16  F 17  F 18  F 19 
1  + + + - + - + - - - - + + - + + - - + 
2  + - + -  -  -  - + + - + + -  - + + + + - 
3  - + -  -  -  - + + - + + -  - + + + + - + 
4  - + + - + + - - + + + + - + - + - - - 
5  - + + - - + + + + - + - + - - - - + + 
6  + - - + + + + - + - + - - - - + + - + 
7  - + - + - - - - + + - + + - - + + + + 
8  + - + + - - + + + + - + - + - - - - + 
9  + + - + + - - + + + + - + - + - - - - 
10  - - - + + - + + - - + + + + - + - + - 
11  + - - - - + + - + + - - + + + + - + - 
12  + + + + - + - + - - - - + + - + + - - 
13  - - + + - + + - - + + + + - + - + - - 
14  - - - - + + - + + - - + + + + - + - + 
15  + - + - + - - - - + + - + + - - + + + 
16  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
17  + + - - + + + + - + - + - - - - + + - 
18  - + + + + - + - + - - - - + + - + + - 
19  + + - + - + - - - - + + - + + - - + + 
20  - - + + + + - + - + - - - - + + - + + 
21  - - - + - + - + + + + - - + - - + + - 
22  - + - + + + + -  - + -  - + + -  -  -  - + 
23  + - +  +  +  + - - + - - +  + - - - - + - 
24  + - - + - - + + - - - - + - + - + + + 
25  + - - + + - - - - + - + - + + + + - - 
26  - + + - - - - + - + - + + + + - - + - 
27  + - + - + + + + - - + - - + + - - - - 
28  - + - - + + - - - - + - + - + + + + - 
29  - - + - - + + - - - - + - + - + + + + 
30  + + + - - + - - + + - - - - + - + - + 
31  - + + + + - - + - - + + - - - - + - + 
32  - - - - + - + - + + + + - - + - - + + 
33  + + - - + - - + + - - - - + - + - + + 
34  + + + + - - + - - + + - - - - + - + - 
35  - + - + - + + + + - - + - - + + - - - 
36  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
37  - - + + - - - - + - + - + + + + - - + 
38  + - - - - + - + - + + + + - - + - - + 
39  - - + - + - + + + + - - + - - + + - - 
40  + + - - - - + - + - + + + + - - + - -  
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Design matrix for a two-level, 27 factor, 32 design point, Plackett-Burman design with foldover:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Factors 
Design 
point 
F 
1 
F 
2 
F 
3 
F 
4 
F 
5 
F 
6 
F 
7 
F 
8 
F 
9 
F 
10 
F 
11 
F 
12 
F 
13 
F 
14 
F 
15 
F 
16 
F 
17 
F 
18 
F 
19 
F 
20 
F 
21 
F 
22 
F 
23 
F 
24 
F 
25 
F 
26 
F 
27 
1  + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + 
2  + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - 
3  + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + 
4  + - - + - - - - + - + - +  +  + - +  + - - - +  +  +  +  + - 
5  - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + 
6  - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - 
7  + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - 
8  + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + 
9  + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - 
10  + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + 
11  - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - 
12  - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + 
13  - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - 
14  + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - 
15  +  +  + - +  + - - - +  +  +  +  + - - +  + - + - - + - - - - 
16  - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + 
17  - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + 
18  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
19  - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - 
20  - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + 
21  - - +  +  +  +  + - - +  + - + - - + - - - - + - + - +  +  + 
22  - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + 
23  - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - 
24  + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + 
25  - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - 
26  - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + + - - + + - + - 
27  + + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + 
28  + + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + 
29  + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - 
30  + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + + + 
31  - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - - - + + 
32  + + + - - + + - + - - + - - - - + - + - + + + - + + - 
33  - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - 
34  - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + 
35  - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - 
36  - + + - + + + + - + - + -  -  - + -  - + + + -  -  -  -  - + 
37  + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - 
38  + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + 
39  - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + 
40  - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - -  
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41  - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + 
42  - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - 
43  + - + - + - - - + - - +  +  + - - - - - +  + - - + - +  + 
44  + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - 
45  + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + 
46  - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + 
47  - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + 
48  + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - 
49  + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - 
50  + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
51  + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + 
52  + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - 
53  + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - 
54  + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - 
55  + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + 
56  - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - 
57  + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + 
58  + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - - + + - - + - + 
59  - - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - 
60  - - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - 
61  - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + 
62  - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - - - 
63  + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - + + + - - 
64  - - - + + - - + - + + - + + + + - + - + - - - + - - +  
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APPENDIX 10 
 
 
 
Graphs of the relationships between interaction terms 
considered in the logistic regression models 
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For models run for all dogs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A10.1. Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from family members and from the environment with regards to MRSA 
acquisition in a dog. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A10.2. Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from non-family members and from the environment with regards to MRSA 
acquisition in a dog. 
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Figure A10.3. Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from dogs and from the environment with regards to MRSA acquisition in a 
dog. 
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For models run for dogs that attended a veterinary clinic only: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A10.4 Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from family members and from the environment with regards to MRSA 
acquisition in a dog that has attended a veterinary clinic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A10.5 Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from non-family members and from the environment with regards to MRSA 
acquisition in a dog that has attended a veterinary clinic. 
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Figure A10.6. Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from dogs and from the environment with regards to MRSA acquisition in a 
dog that has attended a veterinary clinic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A10.7. Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from dogs at a veterinary clinic and from the veterinary environment with 
regards to MRSA acquisition in a dog that has attended a veterinary clinic. 
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Figure A10.8. Graphical representation of the relationship between the probabilities of 
transmission from staff at a veterinary clinic and from the veterinary environment with 
regards to MRSA acquisition in a dog that has attended a veterinary clinic. 
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APPENDIX 11 
 
 
 
Example question from interactive spreadsheet for 
expert opinion elicitation 
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